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Introduction
This thesis consists of four essays that belong to the literature on the theory of auctions and the
theory of contests. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are devoted to the research on auctions and study
the role of symmetry in auction design. In Chapter 1, I show how the designer can favor one of
the bidders by choosing auction rules even if the chosen auction has to be symmetric. In Chapter
2, the symmetric revenue-maximizing auction is completely characterized. Chapter 3 and Chapter
4 contribute to the contest theory. In Chapter 3, the role of head starts in search contests is
investigated. Chapter 4 finds optimal prize structures of elimination contests for a general form of
the designer's objective. Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Bo Chen, and Chapter 3 is based
on joint work with Bo Chen and Xiandeng Jiang.
Chapter 1 contributes to the mechanism design literature and considers the problem of fa-
voritism in auctions from the mechanism design perspective. The auction designer has one fa-
vorite among bidders and maximizes his utility by choosing an auction format conditional on the
favorite's value. Alternatively, one could think that one of the bidders can choose the auction
format he would like to participate in depending on his value. To prevent favoritism, several re-
strictions are imposed on the designer in my model. Many real-life auctions WTO and EU require
that procurement auctions conducted under their regulation have to be non-discriminatory that
is symmetric. I show that this restriction is not sufficient to prevent discrimination. Namely, even
if the designer is restricted to using anonymous and dominant strategy incentive compatible auc-
tions, she can transfer all potential revenue to her favorite and guarantee him the interim utility
at least equal to his value for any allocation rule. The equivalence of anonymity with respect
to bids and anonymity with respect to true values is also established in this case. This form of
favoritism is easily detectable. To prevent this obvious form of favoritism I add the restriction
of non-positive trasnfers. Altogether, anonymity, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and
non-positive transfers restrictions do not allow the designer to perform intra-auction favoritism,
that is there is no particular value favored in equilibrium compared to others. However, intra-
auction favoritism is still possible, where the deisgner chooses different auctions for different values
1
of her favorite. Thus, the auction choice still depends on the favorite's value. The designer chooses
a second-price auction with pooling, where she commits to not distinguishing values in pooling
regions and using lotteries to determine a winner. To fully prevent favoritism, the deterministic
auctions restriction is added. Altogether, these restrictions allow implementing only a specific
class of second-price auctions with a generalized reserve price. For each bidder, this reserve price
depends on opponents' bids. The designer chooses the standard second-price auction from this
class and no favoritism is possible.
In his seminal paper, Myerson (1981) finds the optimal auction that maximizes the revenue
of the designer. In general, for heterogeneous bidders, his construction is asymmetric. Deb and
Pai (2017) show that there exists and a symmetric auction and a Bayesian equilibrium of a new
constructed auction that implements the same expected outcome. However, their implementation
can lead to auctions with multiple equilibria where there is no reason to prefer one equilibrium
over another. In Chapter 2, multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated by considering strategy-proof
auctions. The optimal strategy-proof symmetric auction is obtained. It turns out to be a second-
price auction with a generalized reserve price defined in Chapter 1. Hence, for each bidder the
optimal reserve price depends on what other bidders bid in the auction.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of head starts in innovation contests. The model in this chapter is
similar to Taylor (1995). Chapter 3 studies continuous time version of Taylor (1995) and introduces
heterogeneity in the form of head start for one of contestants. A two firm winner-takes-all contest
in which each firm decides when to stop a privately observed search for innovations (with recall)
is analyzed. The firm with a superior innovation at the outset has a head start. The firm with
the most successful innovation at a common deadline wins. It is shown that a large head start
guarantees a firm victory without incurring cost. However, a medium-sized head start ensures
defeat for the firm if the deadline is sufficiently long. In the latter case, the competitor wins the
entire rent of the contest. The head start firm may still increase its expected payoff by discarding
its initial innovation in order to indicate a commitment to search. The effects of early stage
information disclosure and cost advantages are studied, respectively.
Chapter 4 considers multi-stage elimination contests where agents' efforts at different stages
generate some output for the organizer. Rosen (1986) studies the similar problem where the
organizer wants to induce the same level of effort at all stages and maximize it. In Chapter 4, I find
the optimal prize structure for a general class of the organizer's prferences over stages. Depending
on these preferences, various prize structures can be optimal. If the output function depends much
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more on efforts applied at later stages than on those applied at the earlier ones, the optimal prize
structure can be non-monotone, that is, at some stages prizes fall and the agents who are more
successful may earn less. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of such structures
are provided. I also show that for any increasing prize shape there exists an output function such
that this prize shape is optimal. Further, I consider the case of limited liability, where the principal
is not allowed to use negative prizes but can choose a contest success function (CSF). There is
always an efficient equilibrium under which the principal is able to extract the full surplus from
the agents and the corresponding optimal prize structure is always increasing. Moreover, under
some plausible assumptions, the optimal CSF is necessary convex, which corresponds to the most
frequently used prize schemes in practice.
3
4
Chapter 1
Favoritism in Auctions: A Mechanism Design Approach
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I approach the problem of favoritism in auctions from the mechanism design
perspective. Thus, I study how the designer chooses the auction format to maximize her fa-
vorite's utility under different sets of restrictions on the implemented auction rules. In my model,
favoritism does not arise due to some hidden actions, unfair manipulation with bids, fictitious
bidders, cheating or other unfair actions; rather, favoritism is solely due to the design of the
mechanism. There are two main reasons that make the problem interesting: first, there are some
restrictions on the auctions formats, which the designer needs to meet while choosing an auction;
and second, in addition to the knowledge of her favorite's identity, the designer has information
about how much her favorite values the good. This information can be used in the auction design,
whereby the designer can choose different auctions for different values of her favorite. The main
questions are what auction the designer chooses under different sets of restrictions to make her
favorite better depending on his value and what is a good set of restrictions to prevent different
forms of favoritism. The first question can be paraphrased in terms of the situation where the
bidder chooses an auction. Namely, what auction would be chosen, if one particular bidder could
choose an auction he would like to participate in.
There are many real-life auctions where the problem of favoritism is relevant. For example,
consider a situation where the principal intends to sell some good using an auction. If she is not
sufficiently informed about the market and potential buyers, she could hire an expert to design
the auction format to achieve goals such as revenue maximization, efficiency maximization, etc.
However, the designer's incentives can differ from those of the principal. As a result, the auction
format chosen by the designer can substantially differ from that preferred by the principal. In
this chapter, this conflict of interest arises in a situation where the designer has a favorite among
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potential buyers. One possible reason for this would be a bribe from this particular buyer or
any other form of collusion. Subsequently, the designer's objective could be maximization of this
particular buyer's utility and the principal could not achieve her goal in the auction outcome. If the
principal's objective is revenue maximization and the designer chooses an auction format where the
good directly goes to her favorite, this outcome is a disaster for the principal in terms of collected
revenue, which is equal zero. Thus, the principal would like to limit the freedom of an auction
format choice given to the designer to prevent favoritism. Another situation is a government
auction; for example, a government procurement auction, where one of the participating companies
may be partially or fully owned by a government. In this case, the government could prefer to
choose the auction format that favors this company.
However, one essential requirement for the rules of a procurement is that they guarantee fair
competition. Institutions like the European Commission and the WTO set procurement guide-
lines that should ensure the absence of positive and negative discrimination. In particular, equal
treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency (European
Comission, 2014) are required. Each Party shall seek to avoid introducing or continuing dis-
criminatory measures that distort open procurement (WTO, 2011). Nevertheless, statistics show
that discrimination in procurement is present. According to an estimate (PricewaterhouseCoopers
and Ecorys, 2013), the costs of corruption in public procurement in eight EU countries ranged
from e1.4 billion to e2.2 billion in 2010. More than half of foreign bribery cases occurring in-
volved obtaining a public procurement contract (OECD, 2014). 10-30% of the investment in a
publicly-funded construction project may be lost through mismanagement and corruption (CoST,
2012). The question is why the implemented legal restrictions cannot prevent discrimination and
favoritism and how legal restrictions should be changed.
It is obvious that if there are no restrictions imposed on the designer, then the designer can
simply allocate the good to her favorite and not charge him anything. This is an example of a
situation, which I call perfect favoritism. Namely, perfect favoritism is possible if the designer can
guarantee her favorite the ex-post utility higher than his value in any equilibrium of the auction.
Hence, some restrictions are needed to prevent this. Probably the most natural attempt to avoid
such obvious favoritism is to impose an anonymity restriction to eliminate direct discrimination
by identity of the bidder. Anonymity means that the allocation and transfer rules should only
depend on the submitted bids, rather than the identities of bidders. However, it emerges that
anonymity alone is not a particularly useful restriction for several reasons. First, as shown by
Deb and Pai (2017), given some asymmetric auction the designer is often able to construct an
6
anonymous auction, which has an equilibrium such that it provides the same expected outcome
as the original auction. Thus, if we assume that the designer can choose an equilibrium, then
anonymity restriction alone is not a binding constraint at all. One further reason is the first
main result of this chapter (Theorem 1.2), showing that if there is some anonymous and dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DIC) auction that generates revenue R, then there exists another
anonymous and DIC auction that has the same allocation rule and where the whole revenue R is
transferred to the favorite. For example, the designer can implement the allocation rule of a second-
price auction and transfer all collected revenue to his favorite. Hence, the favorite either obtains
the good for free or obtains the revenue weakly higher than his value. Therefore, the designer
can implement perfect favoritism in an anonymous and dominant strategy incentive compatible
auction. This result is stronger than the result of Deb and Pai (2017) in the sense that it does
not use the fact that the designer chooses a particular equilibrium. It should be also emphasized
that if the auction is DIC, then standard anonymity restriction with respect to bids implies "true"
anonymity with respect to values in the corresponding direct auction (Theorem 1.1).
I call intra-auction favoritism a situation where the designer can discriminate bidders within
the auction (a bidder with a higher value obtains lower utility than a bidder with a lower value).
To avoid intra-auction discrimination via transfers that results to perfect favoritism, I additionally
impose the non-positive transfers restriction, which does not allow the designer to transfer collected
revenue to her favorite. I analyze the case with two bidders and show that under these three
restrictions the intra-auction favoritism is not possible and the favorite's preferred auction is a
second-price auction with pooling (Proposition 1.1). This is the second important result of the
chapter. Pooling means that the designer commits to not distinguishing among the bids in certain
regions of the values domain and using a lottery to determine a winner. Pooling is always optimal
when the favorite's and his opponent's values are sufficiently close. In this case, the winner is
determined by a lottery and the payment is lower than in a second-price auction. Additionally,
pooling may be used to reduce payments when the favorite wins. I also provide comparative statics
results concerning how the choice of mechanism depends on the favorite's value (Proposition 1.3).
Only the pooling region at the top changes its size, with all other things being equal. If the
favorite's value is too low, then the top pooling region covers the whole set of possible values and
the optimal mechanism emerges as a simple lottery.
Although intra-auction favoritism is not possible under anonymity, DIC and non-positive trans-
fers1, the designer makes the choice of the auction dependent on her favorite's value. Even if the
1This is true in the model with two bidders. If there are more than two bidders, then the intra-auction favoritism
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chosen auction is fair (non-discriminatory), this is still a form of favoritism. I call this situation
inter-auction favoritism. To illustrate the last point, consider a situation in which the designer
can only choose among two auction formats: 1) a second-price auction and 2) a symmetric lottery.
Both of these formats can be called fair. Indeed, in a second-price auction the bidder with the
highest value wins the auction and has to pay the second highest bid. In a lottery, all bidders do
not need even to make bids and thus they have the same probabilities of winning the good. How-
ever, bidders with different values could still prefer one of these formats to another. For example,
if one of n bidders has a low value, he would certainly prefer a lottery rather than a second-price
auction, since it gives him a chance to obtain the good for free with probability 1/n. Meanwhile, a
bidder with a high value could prefer a second-price auction rather than a lottery, since his chances
of winning the good in the competition are high. Thus, although both described auction formats
are fair, they are not equally valued by different bidders.
I show that by imposing one more restriction on the designer, it is possible to prevent any
form of favoritism. Thus, I impose a deterministic auctions restriction, which does not allow the
designer to use randomization to determine a winner if there is a unique highest bid. The third
main result characterizes a class of auctions feasible under these four restrictions as second-price
auctions with a generalized reserve price (Theorem 1.3). A generalized reserve price is different
from the standard reserve price in the sense that it is unique for each bidder and depends on all bids
of his opponents. However, it is constructed in a symmetric way to preserve anonymity restriction.
Independent of the favorite's value, the auction maximizing the utility of the favorite in this class
of auctions is a standard second-price auction without any reserve price (Proposition 1.4). Thus,
this combination of four restrictions allows preventing any form of favoritism.
I also analyze what kind of favoritism is possible under different subsets of restrictions. I show
that the above restrictions form a hierarchy with non-positive transfers at the top, deterministic
auctions at the bottom and anonymity+DIC in the middle (Proposition 1.5). In other words,
non-positive transfers always reduce the scope of favoritism. Anonymity helps if and only if DIC is
imposed and vice versa. Deterministic auctions only matter in combination with anonymity+DIC.
This chapter is related to papers by Deb and Pai (2017) and Azrieli and Jain (2018). They show
that for many mechanisms that are not anonymous, one can find a symmetric auction such that
it has a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with the same expected revenue and bidder's utilities. Manelli
and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov et al. (2013) show that in the independent private values model,
there is equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in expected terms. This
can still be possible.
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equivalence does not hold here due to the additional restrictions and in particular anonymity.
Collusion among buyers is studied in Graham and Marshall (1987) and Mailath and Zemsky
(1991) for second-price auctions, as well as McAfee and McMillan (1992) for first-price auctions.
Robinson (1985), Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), Che and Kim (2006), Marshall and Marx (2007) and
Che and Kim (2009) compare possibilities of collusion among buyers or between a buyer and seller
in different auction formats. In a setting with non-transferable payments, Condorelli (2012) and
Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013) find the social welfare maximizing mechanism with a benevolent
designer. They show that the optimal mechanism comprises contest and lottery regions depending
on a distribution of values. In this chapter, the favorite's preferred auction under the restriction
of non-positive transfers exhibits similar properties.
Extensive literature exists on the informed principal problem (see Myerson, 1983, Maskin and
Tirole, 1990, 1992, Severinov, 2008, Mylovanov and Tröger, 2012, 2014 and Yilankaya, 1999). In
such models, the design of a mechanism can reflect the information that the designer possesses.
Thus, the choice of the mechanism can partially or fully reveal information to the agents. In
this chapter, all main results are formulated for dominant strategy incentive compatible auctions.
Since each bidder has a dominant strategy, he does not pay attention to the information revealed
by the designer.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I present the auction
model used in the chapter. Then, I introduce the concept of favoritism. Subsiquently, I introduce
the restrictions sequentially and discuss how they help (or ortherwise) to prevent different forms
of favoritism. I conclude with a discussion of open issues. All major proofs are delegated to
Appendix 1.A.
1.2 Auction Model
The designer has to conduct an auction to sell one indivisible good (object) to a set N = {1, ..., n}
of potential bidders. The bidders are characterized by independent private values vi coming from
continuously differentiable distributions Fi on Vi = [vi, vi] with a positive density
2. The designer
has a favorite among the bidders and without loss of generality, I assume that it is the first bidder3.
The designer knows the value of the favorite v1 = v∗ and maximizes his interim utility4.
2vi could be equal to +∞
3Otherwise, we can renumerate the bidders such that the favorite obtains a number 1.
4The assumption that the designer knows the favorite's value is quite natural. Since the designer wants to
maximize the utility of the favorite, their incentives are completely aligned and the favorite would like to disclose
the information about his value to the designer regardless.
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The auction proceeds in the following steps:
1. The designer announces the rules of the auction.
2. Agents simultaneously decide whether they want to participate in the auction and if yes they
make their bids.
3. The winner is determined according to the auction rules defined on step 1.
Each bidder i chooses a bid from a given set of admissible bids, bi ∈ {}∪Bi, where Bi ⊂ R+
and bi =  mean that the bidder i does not participate in the bidding. By B =×ni=1 ({} ∪ Bi)
we denote the product set of admissible bid sets. M ⊂ N is a set of bidders who participate
in the bidding, namely ∀i ∈ M : bi 6= . The number of participating bidders is m = |M |.
I denote a vector of values v = (v1, ..., vn) ∈ ×ni=1Vi and vector of bids b = (b1, ..., bn) ∈ B.
N−i = N\{i}, v−i, b−i are used for the set of bidders without a bidder i. When the bids are
submitted, an outcome of the auction has to be determined. Denote by aj an allocation of the
object where an agent j obtains the object. By a0, I denote the allocation when the object remains
unassigned. The set of possible allocations is A = {aj}nj=0. An allocation is chosen according to
an allocation rule y : B → [0, 1]n, y(b) = (y1(b), ..., yn(b)), where yi(b) := Pr(ai|b)5. The
allocation rule determines how often each allocation is chosen. Transfer rule p : A × B → Rn,
p(a,b) = (p1(a,b), ..., pn(a,b)), where pi(a,b) specifies how much agent i receives in the allocation
a, given that a vector of bids b is submitted. Transfers t : B→ Rn, t(b) = (t1(b), ..., tn(b)), where
ti(b) :=
∑
a∈A pi(a,b) Pr(a|b) =
n∑
j=0
pi(aj ,b) Pr(aj |b) =
n∑
j=0
pi(aj ,b)yj(b) can be computed after
the bids have been submitted, but before an allocation has been chosen.
Example 1.1. The auction format is a simple lottery, where the winner and only the winner
pays a fixed price γ independent of bids. Subsequently, the allocation rule is y(b) = (1/n, ..., 1/n),
bidder i pays −γ if he obtains the object and 0 otherwise, namely pi(aj ,b) = −γ if i = j and
pi(aj ,b) = 0 if i 6= j, and the transfers are t(b) = (−γ/n, ...,−γ/n).
The utility of an agent i who participates in the auction is
Ui(vi|a) = viI{a = ai}+ pi,
where I : A → {0, 1} is an indicator function equal to 1 if a = ai and 0 otherwise. The ex-post
5By Pr(ai|b), I mean the probability that an allocation ai∈A is chosen conditional on a vector b ∈ B is submitted.
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utility of a bidder i given vector of bids b is as follows:
Ui(vi|b) =
∑
a∈A Ui(vi, a) Pr(a|b) = viyi(b)+ti(b).
For any vector of bidding strategies β(v) = (β1(v1), ..., βn(vn)) where βi : Vi → {} ∪Bi, we can
define the interim utility of a bidder i as an expectation of his ex-post utility taken with respect
to a vector of other bidders' values v−i, given that β(v) is played. Thus,
Ui(vi|β) = viEv−iyi(β(v)) + Ev−iti(β(v)).
When it is clear which bidding strategy we consider, I simply use Ui(vi) rather than Ui(vi|β). Each
bidder i participates in the auction, making a bid bi 6=  if and only if the individual rationality
constraint holds:
Ui(vi|β) ≥ 0. (1.1)
Definition 1.1 (feasible auction).
A feasible auction FA = (B,y,p) is a collection of bid sets B, an allocation rule y and a
transfer rule p, such that
∀i,b 0 ≤ yi(b) ≤ 1,
∀b
∑
i
yi(b) ≤ 1,
∀i, a,b−i yi(b) = pi(a,b) = 0 if bi = .
Any feasible auction should completely ignore bidders who do not participate in the bidding.
These bidders never receive the good or transfers. The solution concept is Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE). The profile of bidding strategies ψ = {β∗i (vi)}ni=1 constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
an auction if the interim utility from playing the equilibrium strategy is greater than any other
strategy, i.e. for any vi and for any βi(vi) :
viEv−iyi(β
∗(v)) + Ev−iti(β
∗(v)) ≥ (1.2)
≥ viEv−iyi(β∗1(v1), ..., βi(vi), ..., β∗n(vn))+Ev−iti(β∗1(v1), ..., βi(vi), ..., β∗n(vn)).
Definition 1.2 (no deficit).
An equilibrium ψ of a feasible auction FA is feasible if it does not run ex-post deficit:
ψ :
∑n
i=1
ti(β
∗(v)) ≤ 0. (1.3)
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In any feasible equilibrium, the sum of transfers to bidders is non-positive. However, without
any further restrictions, a transfer to some particular bidder could be positive. It is important
to emphasize here that non-positive transfers are only a restriction only on equilibrium outcome.
Thus, it may not hold for any vector v, but should hold for those vectors that appear in equilibrium
ψ. Since the designer knows the value of the favorite, the auction can be such that it runs the deficit
if the favorite makes a bid b1 different from β∗1(v∗). However, this never happens in equilibrium ψ
and hence it is sufficient that
∑
i ti(β
∗(v)) ≤ 0 only for v1 = v∗ and for any v−1. This concludes
the description of a model and now we continue with a concept of favoritism.
1.3 Favoritism
Denote by Ψ(A) the set of all undominated feasible BNE of some auction A. I will now use
notation Ui(vi, ψ) to denote the interim utility of a bidder i in a particular equilibrium ψ ∈ Ψ(A).
Definition 1.3 (favorite's preferred equilibrium).
A favorite's preferred equilibrium (FPE) ψ∗(A) : A → Ψ(A) is the equilibrium that gener-
ates the highest interim utility for the favorite given his value v∗ among all feasible undominated
equilibria, namely for any ψ ∈ Ψ(A) :
U1(v
∗, ψ∗(A)) ≥ U1(v∗, ψ)
Definition 1.4 (favorite's preferred auction).
A favorite's preferred auction (FPA) is a feasible auction that maximizes the favorite's interim
utility in FPE, namely,
FPA = arg max
FA
U1(v
∗, ψ∗(FA)) (1.4)
Since the choice of an auction may generally depend on the actual value of the favorite, it
means that the favorite and all other bidders can be in different information sets when the auc-
tion starts. Hence, when an auction format is announced, other bidders can make an inference
about a favorite's value. By manipulation with the auction format, the designer can exclude the
participation of some potential bidders.
Taking into account the possibility of favoritism, some restrictions can be imposed on auctions
proposed by the designer. I denote by C = {ci}Ki=1 the set of restrictions on (y,p, t). Thus, the
designer is not completely free in the choice of an auction. I introduce the following two definitions
to take this into account.
Definition 1.5 (auction feasible under restrictions).
12
A feasible auction under set of restrictions C (later FA(C)) is a feasible auction FA =
(B,y,p) such that (B,y,p) satisfy C.
Definition 1.6 (favorite's preferred auction under restrictions).
A favorite's preferred auction under set of restrictions C (later FPA(C)) is a feasible under
C auction, which maximizes favorite's interim utility in FPE, namely,
FPA(C) = arg max
FA(C)
U1(v
∗, ψ∗(FA(C)))
The concept of favoritism is formulated in the next definitions.
Definition 1.7 (intra-auction favoritism).
The auction allows intra-auction favoritism if there exist an equilibrium ψ ∈ Ψ(A), two bidders
i, j and a vector of values v, such that vi ≥ vj and Ui(vi|β∗(v)) < Uj(vj |β∗(v)).
This definition means that intra-auction favoritism exists if there exist an equilibrium and two
bidders such that one of them has a greater value and at the same time a lower level of ex-post
utility in this equilibrium compared to the other. It also implies that all bidders with the same
values should obtain the same utilities. If intra-auction favoritism is possible, it means that the
designer can discriminate bidders by their identities within the same auction.
Definition 1.8 (inter-auction favoritism).
The auction allows inter-auction favoritism if the favorite's preferred auction depends on the
favorite's value v∗.
In other words, for two different values of the favorite the choice of the auction format will
differ. Thus, even if intra-auction favoritism is not possible, the designer could favor one bidder
by a particular choice of a mechanism.
Definition 1.9 (perfect favoritism).
Perfect favoritism is possible under set of restrictions C if there exists a feasible auction FA(C)
such that in any equilibrium in undominated strategies ψ ∈ Ψ(FA(C)) and for any v∗ ∈ V1 the
following holds
U1(v
∗, ψ) ≥ v∗
Thus, perfect favoritism is possible when the designer is always able to guarantee her favorite
the interim utility greater than or equal to his value of the good. One trivial example is an
allocation of the good to the favorite independent of bids. Another example is when rather than
allocating a good she sends him a transfer pi > vi. Of course, these examples may not be feasible
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under an appropriate set of constraints. Next, we discuss what the designer can do under different
sets of restrictions C.
1.4 Unrestricted Favoritism
First, suppose that C = . Thus, no restrictions are imposed on the designer's choice of an auction.
In this case, the designer can simply give the object to her favorite for free. However, it is not the
favorite's preferred auction and it is possible to construct an even better mechanism. The next
proposition provides a characterization of FPA.
Claim 1.1 (favorite's preferred auction).
If no restrictions are imposed on the designer, the favorite's preferred auction has a favorite's
preferred equilibrium in dominant strategies ψ∗ and treats the favorite and other bidders differently.
The favorite obtains the object if nobody else obtains it and receives all collected revenue. All other
bids are treated as in the optimal auction proposed by Myerson (1981), where a seller's reservation
value is equal to v∗.
Proof. Since the designer is always able to transfer all collected revenue to his favorite, it is always
possible to have an equality in (1.3) and hence t1(b) = −
∑
i 6=1 ti(b). Subsequently, problem (1.4)
can be rewritten as
v∗Ev−1y1(β∗(v))− Ev−1
∑
i 6=1 ti(β
∗(v))→ max
FA
This problem is essentially similar to a problem of profit maximization when the seller has a
reservation value equal to v∗ and all bidders aside from the favorite participate in the bidding.
The result follows directly.
The Myerson's optimal auction allocates the good to a bidder with the highest "ironed virtual
value" φi(vi)6, provided that this value is greater than the reservation value r of a seller. The
winner should pay the amount that is equal to the lowest v̂, such that it lets him win, i.e. v̂ is the
solution to φi(v̂) = max({φj(vj)}j 6=i, r} In the model of favoritism, we can think about a favorite's
value as a reserve value of a designer and thus r = v∗. Hence, in FPA the favorite obtains the
object if all other bidders have virtual values smaller than v∗, i.e. ∀j 6= 1, φj(vj) < v∗. Suppose
that the bidder k wins in FPA. The smallest value v̂k that lets the him win the auction is always
greater than or equal to v∗. Indeed, otherwise, since φk(vk) < vk, we would have φk(v̂k) < v̂k < v∗,
which contradicts the fact that v̂ lets win the auction. Thus, when the favorite does not win the
6ϕi(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) if it is increasing, otherwise ϕi(vi) is equal to a special "ironed" transformation of
vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , such that it makes it monotone.
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FPA, he always receives a monetary transfer v̂ > v∗ and hence even his ex-post utility is greater
than his value.
Observation 1.1. If the designer is unrestricted, then the perfect favoritism is possible.
Since all of the collected money goes to the favorite, the actual revenue is always zero. In order
to prevent the perfect favoritism and the zero revenue, restrictions on feasible auction should
be imposed. To understand what would be the reasonable set of restrictions, I discuss what
the designer uses to implement perfect favoritism if she is unrestricted. First, we observe from
Claim 1.1 that the designer always wants to differentiate her favorite and all other bidders. This
possibility should be excluded and the natural way to achieve this is to impose a restriction that
requires the designer to treat all bidders equally, namely anonymity.
1.5 Anonymity
Let pi : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n} be a permutation. Denote Θ as the set of all permutations of
n elements. Later, for simplicity, I will also use expressions like pi(i) = j, where I mean that
the element in i-th position moves to j-th position when permutation pi is applied. Denote by
bpi = (bpi(1), ..., bpi(i), ..., bpi(n))
Definition 1.10 (anonymity).
A feasible auction FA is anonymous (feasible under cA) if the names of the bidders do not
matter, namely if any permutation of bids among bidders alters (y, t) symmetrically. Precisely,
for any bidders i, j ∈ N, for any allocation ak ∈ A for any permutation pi ∈ Θ and for any vector
of bids b ∈ B:
Bi = Bj ,
yi(bpi(1), ..., bpi(i), ..., bpi(n)) = ypi(i)(b1, ..., bi, ..., bn),
pi(ak, bpi(1), ..., bpi(i), ..., bpi(n)) = ppi(i)(api(k), b1, ..., bi, ..., bn).
This definition means that if after a permutation pi a bidder i makes a bid that an agent pi(i)
has made before the permutation, he should have the same probability of winning the auction and
the same transfer at any allocation ak as the agent pi(i) before the permutation at the allocation
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api(k). Note that this also implies that
ti(bpi(1), ..., bpi(i), ..., b(n)) =
n∑
j=0
pi(aj ,bpi)yj(bpi) =
=
n∑
j=0
ppi(i)(api(j),b)ypi(j)(b) =
n∑
j=0
ppi(i)(aj ,b)yj(b) =
= tpi(i)(b1, ..., bi, ..., bn).
Hence, expected transfers are also symmetric with respect to a permutation. To understand how
it works, consider an example with three bidders, and a vector of bids (b1, b2, b3). Consider now
the permuted vector of bids (b2, b3, b1). By the anonymity restriction, the probability that bidder
1 wins bidding b2, when bidder 2 bids b3 and bidder 3 bids b1, should be equal to the probability
that bidder 2 wins bidding b2 and his opponents bidding b1 and b3. Consider also the allocation
a3, i.e. the third bidder wins the good bidding b1. Accordingly, the transfer to bidder 1 in this
allocation given that he bids b2, and bidder 2 bids b3 must be equal to the transfer to bidder 2
when he bids b2 in the allocation, where bidder 1 wins and bids b1, with bidder 3 making a bid b3.
This restriction holds strong importance. Without anonymity, the designer can simply give the
object to her favorite for free. By contrast, when anonymity is imposed, the designer is no longer
able to discriminate bidders directly by making different rules for different bidders. However, as
shown in Deb and Pai (2017), the anonymity restriction often does not truly restrict the designer in
the ability to implement the auction that she wants. Suppose that the designer wants to implement
the nonanonymous allocation rule, such that it allocates the object to a bidder with the highest
index Ii, where Ii(vi) is some increasing function of a bidder's value.
They show that there exists an anonymous auction and an equilibrium of this auction such that
it implements the same allocation and the same expected payments as the original auction. One
of their main results is also that the designer is able to implement in a symmetric way, particularly
the optimal auction, which is not anonymous if the distributions of agents' values differ. Indeed,
since the optimal auction allocates the object to a bidder with the highest ironed virtual value, we
can define Ii(vi) = φi(vi). In terms of allocation rule, FPA only differs from the optimal auction
in the index function for the first agent, namely I1(v1) = v1. Hence, this implementability result
also holds in our model and the designer can implement FPA as an anonymous mechanism.
In Appendix 1.B, we show ex-post implementability for the case of symmetric bidders. This
theorem states that for symmetric bidders it is possible to construct an auction that has an
equilibrium such that the outcome of this equilibrium is ex-post identical in terms of allocation
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and payments to the equilibrium of FPA. This equilibrium has the property that among all
bidders with values smaller or equal than v̂ only the favorite participates and bids his true value
v∗.If there is no other bidder with a value greater than v̂, the favorite wins the object and pays
zero; otherwise, the highest bid wins the auction and this bidder pays a maximum of the second
highest bid and v̂. This payment goes to the favorite. The intuition behind this result is that when
such an auction is announced, all standard bidders with values lower than v̂ know that if they
participate they cannot end up with a profit in the case when there is somebody else with a value
below v̂, who participates. In this case, the revenue for the designer is also equal to zero.
This construction above  as well as one by Deb and Pai (2017)  has the weakness that there
could be many equilibria of the symmetric auction and we emphasize one particular equilibrium
where the favorite is preferred. In fact, it is assumed that the designer can choose among different
equilibria. There are also n−1 similar equilibria where one of bidders participates and the others,
including the favorite, do not participate. Since our notion of perfect favoritism requires that the
favorite obtains sufficiently high utility in any equilibrium, the construction above does not allow
preventing the perfect favoritism. Hence, at this point one could think that perfect favoritism is
not possible if anonymity restriction is imposed. However, it is not true and, as we show below,
the perfect favoritism is still possible; namely, there exists an auction such that it has only one
equilibrium in undominated (in our case, it would even be dominant!) strategies that provides the
favorite with the level of utility higher than his value.
Thus, anonymity restriction itself is not sufficient for the absence of favoritism. It is clear
that the opportunity to exclude the participation of other bidders has to be disabled. Thus, we
consider dominant strategy incentive compatibility restriction.
1.6 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
Definition 1.11 (dominant strategy incentive compatibility).
A feasible auction FA is dominant strategies incentive compatible (DIC, feasible under cDIC)
if for any bidder there exists a strategy β∗i (vi) that provides higher utility than any other strategy
independent of how the other bidders play, namely for all {βj(vj)}, j = 1, ...n:
viEv−iyi(β1(v1), ..., β
∗
i (vi), ..., βn(vn)) + Ev−iti(β1(v1), ..., β
∗
i (vi), ..., βn(vn)) ≥
≥ viEv−iyi(β1(v1), ..., βi(vi), ..., βn(vn))+Ev−iti(β1(v1), ..., βi(vi), ..., βn(vn))
Since the inequality should hold for all βj(vj), it should also hold for any constant strategies,
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∀j 6= i,∀vj : βj(vj) = bj . In turn, if the equality holds for any bids bj plugged instead of βj(vj),
this means that it would hold in expectation. Thus, the β∗i (vi) is a dominant strategy for a bidder
i if and only if for any bj ∈ {} ∪Bi and for any βi(vi)
viyi(b1, ..., β
∗
i (vi), ..., bn) + ti(b1, ..., β
∗
i (vi), ..., bn) ≥
≥ viyi(b1, ..., βi(vi), ..., bn)+ti(b1, ..., βi(vi), ..., bn)
Although dominant strategy implementation is robust in the sense that the behavior of each
player does not depend on what others do, it can have more than one dominant strategy7. However,
in the auction setting with bidders who have private values and linear utilities, the dominant
strategy is unique if it exists. The next result shows this:
Lemma 1.1 (uniqueness of dominant strategy).
For any FA, there could be at most one dominant strategy in the sense that if there are other
dominant strategies they also provide the same allocation and transfers, namely for any two dom-
inant strategies of each player β∗i (v), β
∗∗
i (v) and for any bids of other bidders b−i the following
holds:
yi(b1, ..., β
∗
i , ..., bn) = yi(b1, ..., β
∗∗
i , ..., bn),
ti(b1, ..., β
∗
i , ...bn) = ti(b1, ..., β
∗∗
i , ...bn),
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
The next simple lemma is also crucial for our further results and it only holds for anonymous
auctions.
Lemma 1.2 (universality of dominant strategy).
If b∗(v), v ∈ Vi, is a dominant strategy for a bidder i in some anonymous auction FA(C), it
is also a dominant strategy for any other bidder j with any value vj ∈ Vi ∩ Vj .
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
Later on, when we talk about "equilibrium" we mean the unique equilibrium in dominant
strategies where all bidders use the same strategy. It is also convenient to consider direct auctions.
An auction is called direct if for any bidder i ∈ N the allowed bidding set is equal to a union
of sets of possible values, namely Bi = ∪
j∈N
Vj for any i. Subsequently, describing direct auctions,
7Here, I mean a weakly dominant strategy. If there exists a strictly dominant strategy, it is unique.
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instead of (B,y,p), I use simplified notation (y, t), keeping in mind that B = ×
i∈N
( ∪
j∈N
Vj} and
ti(v) =
n∑
j=0
pi(aj ,b)yj(b). The classical revelation principle claims that without loss of generality
it is possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms in which truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. However, under anonymity restriction, it is not possible to directly apply the revela-
tion principle and preserve this restriction for a direct auction. Note that anonymity restriction
imposes constraints on allocation and transfers based on bids b, not the values. If anonymity is
the only restriction, namely C = {cA}, then the anonymity with respect to bids does not imply
the anonymity with respect to values of the direct mechanism. To illustrate this idea, consider
the auction from Proposition 1. This auction is anonymous with respect to bids, although the
bidding behavior is different for different bidders. Thus, bidders with the same values can make
different bids in the auction. Hence, the class of anonymous direct auctions is smaller than the
class of all anonymous auctions. Hence, while considering anonymous auctions, we cannot simply
restrict our attention to direct anonymous auctions. However, under additional DIC restriction,
I can show the equivalence between anonymity with respect to bids of the original auction and
anonymity with respect to values of the corresponding direct auction.
Theorem 1.1 (anonymity with respect to valuations).
Anonymity with respect to bids of any DIC auction implies anonymity with respect to values of
the corresponding direct auction.
Proof. Suppose that each agent has a dominant strategy β∗i (v) in the original anonymous auction.
In the corresponding direct auction, then:
yi(vpi(1), ..., vpi(n)) = yi(β
∗
1(vpi(1)), ..., β
∗
n(vpi(n))) =
= yi(β
∗
pi(1)(vpi(1)), ..., β
∗
pi(n)(vpi(n))) =
= ypi(i)(β
∗
1(v1), ..., b
∗
n(vn)) = ypi(i)(v1, ..., vn),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 1.1, the second equality follows from Lemma 1.2, the
third equality is due to anonymity and the final one is again due to Lemma 1.1. The similar logic
holds for transfers.
In other words, for any feasible auction that is DIC and anonymous, the corresponding direct
auction is also anonymous. Thus, we do not exclude any feasible auctions when instead of using
original anonymous DIC auctions we consider corresponding anonymous direct auctions. Maskin
and Laffont (1979) characterizate all DIC direct mechanisms and show that the necessary and
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sufficient conditions for bidders reporting their true values are as follows:
1) yi(v) is nondecreasing in vi for all v−i, (1.5)
2) viyi(v) + ti(v) = hi(vi,v−i) +
∫ vi
vi
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq (1.6)
where hi(vi,v−i) are some arbitrary functions that do not depend on the bidder i's value. Using
this characterization, we can consider auctions where all bidders report their true values.
We should note that if DIC is the only restriction, i.e. C = {cDIC}, then it is never binding
for the construction of the favorite's optimal auction, namely FPA({cDIC}) = FPA. Indeed, the
favorite's optimal auction is dominant strategy incentive compatible, since the favorite does not
participate in the bidding and his opponents have a dominant strategy to bid their true values in
the optimal auction. As Theorem 1.1 shows, imposing DIC and anonymity is indeed a binding
restriction that allows implementing only "true" anonymous auctions. However, I show below
that despite Theorem 1.1, anonymity+DIC do not prevent even perfect favoritism. It is almost
always possible to send revenue to the favorite.
Theorem 1.2 (transferring revenue to the favorite).
For any direct feasible anonymous and dominant strategy incentive compatible auction (y′,p′)
that generates the equilibrium revenue R(v∗,v−1) = −
∑n
i=1 t
′
i(v
∗,v−1) there exists another direct
feasible anonymous and dominant strategy incentive compatible auction (y′′,p′′) that has the same
allocation rule y′′(.) = y′(.) and such a transfer rule p′′(.) that implements the same equilibrium
transfers for all bidders except the favorite, namely t′′j (v
∗,v−1) = t′j(v
∗,v−1) for any j 6= 1, and the
favorite's equilibrium transfer is such that t′′1(v∗,v−1) = t′1(v∗,v−1) +R(v∗,v−1) almost always.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
In other words, it is almost always possible to transfer all collected revenue to the favorite
even in an anonymous and DIC auction. Almost always means that the statement is true for all
realizations of values, except those where one or more bidders' values coincide with the favorite's
value v∗. However, since the distributions of values are atomless and the number of bidders is
finite, the probability of such event is equal to zero. The intuition behind this surprising result
is that the designer manipulates the transfer rule taking into account that the favorite bids v∗.
Then, the auction is constructed in such a way that for any value it is a dominant strategy to bid
the true value and the auction transfers all collected revenue to the bidder who submitted a bid
v∗, namely to the favorite. Since the probability that there is more than one bidder having a value
v∗ (in this case, it is not possible to transfer money to the favorite) is zero, such events do not
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affect the favorite's utility. In order to maintain dominant strategy incentive compatibility, the
designer should promise substantially high payments to bidders in the case when nobody bids v∗.
In general, if there is no such bidder that reports v∗, the auction would not be budget balanced.
However, since the bidder reports v∗, this is not an equilibrium path and hence the auction would
be budget balanced in equilibrium for every realization of opponents' values.
Now, consider a standard second-price auction. It is anonymous andDIC. Hence, Theorem 1.2
implies the following:
Corollary 1.1 (transferring revenue in the second-price auction).
If the designer is restricted to using only anonymous and DIC auctions, then there exists a
feasible auction that implements the same allocation rule for all bidders and the same transfers in
equilibrium for all bidders except the favorite as in the second-price auction. Instead, the favorite
receives all collected revenue and has the ex-post utility greater than his value v∗ in equilibrium
almost always.
It is possible to send the revenue collected in a second-price auction to the favorite for almost
all opponents' bids. In the constructed auction, the favorite wins if and only if he has the highest
value and almost always pays nothing in this case. If the value of the favorite is not the highest,
then the bidder with the highest value obtains the good and the favorite receives monetary transfer
equal to the second highest value. Thus, in all cases when the favorite's value is not the highest
or the second highest one, the utility obtained by the favorite is equal to the second highest value
and strictly exceeds v∗. Since the equilibrium strategy is unique due to Lemma 1.1, the following
is true:
Corollary 1.2. Anonymity and DIC together do not prevent perfect favoritism.
Thus, even a strong combination of anonymity and dominant strategy incentive compatibility
that allows to implement only those rules that are symmetric with respect to real values does
not prevent even perfect favoritism. It is important to notice here that unlike the mechanisms
discussed in the previous section this construction has the unique equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies. Although my notion of favoritism assumes that the designer can choose among equilibria
in undominated strategies, corollary 1.1 implies that the designer can construct an auction that
has the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies and in this equilibrium the favorite obtains
utility weakly greater than his value for (almost) any realization of opponent values.
Furthermore, notice that I do not claim that the proposed auction is the constrained favorite's
preferred auction. In fact, the designer can do even more for his favorite by imposing reserve
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prices, similar to the unconstrained case. However, the problem of finding the favorite's preferred
auction is complicated in this case, because there are many anonymity constraints that have to be
satisfied.
The auction proposed in corollary 1.1 is efficient, namely the good is always allocated to the
bidder with the highest value. Thus, if the designer is restricted to using only efficient auctions,
she can achieve perfect favoritism while implementing efficient auctions. Thus, we can formulate
the following corollary.
Corollary 1.3. It is possible to achieve efficiency and perfect favoritism simultaneously.
In order to reduce favoritism, it is important to prevent the designer from sending all revenue
to her favorite. Since anonymity and dominant strategy incentive compatibility do not restrict the
designer's ability to transfer money to her favorite, an additional restriction should be imposed.
1.7 Non-Positive Transfers
Definition 1.12 (non-positive transfers).
A feasible auction FA satisfies non-positive transfers (NT, feasible under cNT ) if for any vector
of bids b ∈ B and any allocation a ∈ A
p(a,b) ≤ 0
This restriction is crucial for preventing favoritism. We see from Theorem 1.2 that the designer
always wants to transfer all collected revenue to her favorite. Even anonymity and DIC are
insufficient to prevent the designer from doing this. It is clear that to prevent favoritism this
possibility should be excluded. The natural way to do this is to impose a restriction that allows
the designer to only collect money from the agents but not to give it. In other words, the principal
may want to prohibit positive transfers.
If NT is the only restriction, namely C = {cNT }, then the best that the designer can do is to
allocate the good to her favorite for sure, independent of all bids. Imposing anonymity restriction
jointly with NT, that is C = {cA, cNT }, does not particularly help. Again, with the result of Deb
and Pai (2017) the designer is still able to allocate the good to her favorite (in some equilibrium)
without extracting money from him. C = {cDIC , cNT } works in the same way as C = {cNT },
since allocating the good to the favorite independent of the bids is trivially incentive compatible.
However, the combination of all three constraints, C = {cA, cDIC , cNT } substantially limits the
scope of favoritism. In this case, as I show below, the designer has to use stochastic mechanisms
22
and pool bidders having values in some regions to one specific value. I provide a complete solution
to the problem in the case with two bidders. In the case with many bidders, it seems impossible
to obtain an analytical solution due to the increased number of anonymity constraints that have
to be satisfied. In general, there are n! constraints only due to anonymity. Since the problem of
maximizing the favorite's utility is asymmetric, it is incredibly difficult to take all of them into
account. However, even the case with two bidders is sufficiently rich to shed some light on what
is happening here.
There are two bidders, with bidder 1 being a favorite and bidder 2 being his opponent. For
this case, we are able to characterize the FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) for any continuously differentiable
distribution of the opponent's value F (v), v ∈ [0, v]. Note that I allow the case when the favorite's
value is greater than any possible value of his opponent and thus v∗ > v is possible. In order to
formulate the main result, I need some additional notations. Denote G : R+ → R+,
Gx(z) =

concx 〈F (z)〉 , if z ≤ x ≤ v
concv 〈F (z)〉 , if z ≤ v < x
1 +
(
lim
q→x−
dGx(q)
dz
)
∗ (z − x), if z, v > x
1, if z, x > v

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where concx 〈F (z)〉 is the lowest function that is concave, weakly greater than F (v) and takes a
value equal to 1 at the point z = x. It is illustrated in figure 1.1 for the case x < v. Denote
gx(z) := dGx(z)/dz
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Proposition 1.1 (FPA under anonymity, DIC and NT).
Assume that there are only two bidders. The favorite's preferred auction under anonymity,
DIC and NT allocates the object to a bidder with the lowest gv∗(vi). In the case of equality, a
simple lottery is used to determine a winner. Transfers are computed by (1.6) with hi(vi,v−i) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
The auction described in Proposition 1 has a very clear economic description and is easy to
implement. I call it a second-price auction with pooling. It is possible to think about a standard
second-price auction with a slight modification; namely, there are intervals on the value domain
such that if a bidder reports a value in one of these regions, he is treated as a bidder having
8 lim
q→x−
is the limit from the left at the point x. We use it to define Gx(z) for values beyond the domain of F.
9If z = q ∈ {v, x} then Gx(z) is not differentiable. In this case, let the derivative gx(q) equal the limit from the
left of gx(z) at the point z = q, i.e. gx(q) = lim
z→q−
dGx(z)
dz
.
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Figure 1.1: Concave envelope
value in the middle of this interval. For example, assume that there is only one such "pooling" or
"lottery" interval (a, b). Suppose the second bidder has a value v2 ∈ (a, b). If a value of the favorite
v∗ is greater than b, he obtains the object and pays (a + b)/2. If v∗ ∈ (a, b) both bidders have
an equal chance 1/2 of winning the object. In the case of a win, the winner pays a, i.e. the left
bound of the interval. If v∗ < a, the second bidder obtains the object and pays v∗. The structure
of pooling and contest regions is illustrated in figure 1.2.
There are two reasons why pooling arises in the solution. The first one is that it is a way for
the designer to give the object to her favorite when the opponent's value is higher. In order to
better understand this, I can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2 (pooling at the top).
For any v∗ < v, there exists a cutoff v̂ < v∗, such that the FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) pools all
bidders with values above v̂. This cutoff v̂(v∗) is a monotone increasing function of the favorite's
value.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
Thus, the designer prefers to use lottery if a value of a second bidder is higher than a value
of her favorite or lower, but sufficiently close. In the first case, it gives a chance to allocate the
object to her favorite and in the second case it reduces payments in the case of win.
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Figure 1.2: Second-price auction with pooling
Example 1.2. F (v) =
√
v, v ∈ [0, 1], v∗ = 0.75
By propositions 1.1 and 1.2, we know that since the distribution function is concave, the re-
stricted favorite's preferred auction is a second-price auction with one pooling region at the top.
The pooling cutoff v̂ can be computed from
√
v̂+ 1
2
√
v̂
(v∗− v̂) = 1, which gives v̂ = 0.25. Thus, the
result of the favorite's optimal auction is as follows: if the opponent has a value lower than 0.25,
the favorite obtains the object and pays an amount equal to his opponent's value. If the opponent
has a value higher than 0.25, there will be a lottery among two bidders and the winner pays 0.25.
The expected utility of the favorite in the favorite's preferred auction is 0.458, which is larger than
the utility 0.433 of a standard second-price auction and 0.375 of a standard lottery.
The second reason why pooling may be optimal is that it reduces expected payments made
by the favorite when his value is substantially higher than a value of his competitor. Indeed, in
the regions where pooling is used the graph of the cumulative distribution function lies below the
straight line and hence the average value in each such region is smaller than the middle value.
Suppose that a value of the second bidder belongs to that region. In the case of no pooling, the
first bidder would have to pay in expectation the amount that is equal to the average value. When
pooling is used he pays only the amount equal to the middle value and this reduces payments. We
can also observe how the FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) depends on the favorite's value.
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Proposition 1.3 (comparative statics).
If v∗ < v, then the only difference between FOA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) for different values is the
size of a pooling region above the cutoff function v̂(v∗). For any v∗ > v, FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) is
the same as the one for v∗ = v.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
Thus, if the favorite's value becomes smaller, the designer wants to increase pooling in the
region of high values and keep the same allocation rule for low realizations of values. Thus, the
change of the favorite's value has only a local effect on the auction design. If the favorite has a
value higher than any possible value of his opponent, then the optimal auction does not depend
on the specific value.
One can easily see that intra-auction favoritism and perfect favoritism are not possible under
restrictions of anonymity, DIC and NT . However, inter-auction favoritism can be successively
used by the designer to make the auction better for her favorite. In the next section, I show how
any form of favoritism can be prevented by adding one additional constraint.
1.8 Deterministic Auctions
Definition 1.13 (deterministic auctions).
A feasible auction FA is deterministic (DA, feasible under cDA) if for any two bidders i 6= j
and for any two bids bi, bj submitted by these bidders, such that bi 6= bj , the allocation is such that
yi ∈ {0, 1} and yj ∈ {0, 1}.
This restriction does not allow the designer to use any randomization in the case when submit-
ted bids are different. For example, the second price with probability 1. However, a second-price
auction with pooling is not DA, because it uses randomization to determine the winner.
Definition 1.14 (second-price auction with a generalized reserve price).
An auction is called a second-price auction with a generalized reserve price if the following is
satisfied: {
yi(b) = 1
ti(b) = −maxj 6=i(bj , r(b−i))
}
, if bi > max
j 6=i
(bj , r(b−i))
yi(b) = ti(b) = 0, if bi < max
j 6=i
(bj , r(b−i))
where r : Rn−1 → R is a componentwise symmetric function 10.
10In the zero probability case, when there are two or more bids that are equal and the highest among all bids,
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The difference between a second-price auction with a generalized reserve price and a standard
second-price auction is only that the reserve price is not the same for different bidders but rather
for each player it may depend on bids made by his opponents. If a generalized reserve price is a
constant function, i.e. r(x) =const ∀x ∈Rn−1, we obtain a second-price auction with a standard
reserve price. In a special case of a zero reserve price, we get a standard second-price auction. The
next important result characterizes the set of all feasible auctions.
Theorem 1.3 (auctions feasible under full set of constraints).
Any feasible anonymous, DIC, deterministic auction with nonpositive transfers is a second-
price auction with a generalized reserve price.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
This result shows that the set of all auctions feasible under C = {cA, cDIC , cNT , cDA} is only
a very specific class of auctions, described above. Hence, the ability to favor some participant is
substantially limited. The next result shows that there is actually no scope for favoritism in this
case.
Proposition 1.4 (no favoritism).
For any favorite's value v∗, the favorite's preferred auction feasible under restrictions of anonymity,
strategyproofness, nonpositive transfers and determinism is a standard second-price auction.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
From Theorem 1.3, we know that all the designer can do is to choose some auction from a class
of second-price auctions with a generalized reserve price. Proposition 1.4 shows that the reserve
price that makes the favorite better off is zero. Hence, FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT , cDA}) is a standard
second-price auction.
Thus, I have shown that if the designer is allowed to use only anonymous, dominant strategy
incentive compatible, deterministic auctions such that bidders never obtain money from it, then
any kind of favoritism is impossible. The best the designer can do is always choose a second-
price auction independent of her favorite's value and value distributions. Note also that although
this set of restrictions substantially limits the freedom to choose the auction format, the revenue
maximizing auction is still available for the designer if the agents are symmetric. Indeed, in this
case the revenue maximizing auction will be the second-price auction with a reserve price that
only a symmetric lottery can be used to determine the winner who obtains the object and pays his bid if it is greater
than a generalized reserve price. Note also that due to symmetry the reserve price is the same for all agents with
the highest bids.
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can be implemented under {cA, cDIC , cNT , cDA}. Such a set of restrictions guarantees collected
revenue as the revenue in a second-price auction even if the designer only cares about the favorite.
1.9 Hierarchy of Restrictions
Based on the previous results, we can understand how the restrictions interact with each other,
namely how each restriction helps to prevent favoritism depending on the other restrictions in
place.
First, DA is a binding restriction if and only in the situation without this restriction the
favorite's optimal auction uses lotteries. As we have seen above, it can be only the case when
anonymity and DIC are imposed jointly. Next, without anonymity, the requirement of dominant
strategies does not restrict the designer, because in this case the situation is equivalent to a
situation where the designer has her own value of v∗ and there is no favorite. In this case,
the optimal mechanism is DIC even without imposing DIC. The opposite direction is also
true, namely without the DIC restriction, the requirement of anonymity does not restrict the
designer. This follows from Deb and Pai (2017) argument. Hence, we conclude that the anonymity
restriction is binding if and only if theDIC restriction is imposed and vice versa. From the previous
discussion, we have seen that NT restriction binds if DA is not imposed. Since DA is binding if
and only if a combination of anononymity+DIC is present, we are left to consider only the case
with anonymity+DIC+DA as restrictions to fully understand the role of NT. Note that in this
case the allocation rule is uniquely determined, since due to anonymity and DA the allocation
rule has to be such that the highest bid wins the auction for sure, which jointly with DIC implies
that the bidder with the highest value wins the auction. Hence, the favorite's preferred auction is
the one described in corollary 1.1, where the designer transfers all collected revenue to her favorite
in equilibrium. Thus, NT always reduces the scope of favoritism independent of other restrictions
imposed. Thus, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1.5 (hierarchy of restrictions).
The set of restrictions comprising anonymity, DIC, NT, DA forms a hierarchy with NT at
the top, DIC + NT in the middle and DA at the bottom. NT restricts the scope of favoritism
independent of whether other constraints are imposed. DIC reduces the scope of favoritism if and
only if anonymity is imposed and vice versa. DA reduces the scope of favoritism if and only if a
combination anonymity +DIC is imposed.
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1.10 Discussion
The fact that the designer knows not only the identity of the favorite but also his value is the
main driving force of favoritism in choosing the particular auction format. If the designer did
not know the value of the favorite, a combination of anonymity and dominant strategy incentive
compatibility would turn the problem of favoritism to a problem of buyers' welfare maximization
irrespective of their identities. Hence, anonymity and dominant strategy incentive compatibility
would be a sufficient condition to prevent any kind of favoritism.
My results are robust to the imperfect knowledge of the designer. In particular, if the designer's
belief v∗d about the favorite's value is sufficiently precise, namely there exist such ε and δ such
that Pr(|v∗d − v∗| > ε) < δ, she can provide him the interim utility Ud(v∗) such that Ud(v∗) >
U(v∗)−O(max{ε, δ}), where U(v∗) is the utility of the favorite in the perfect knowledge case. When
ε and δ are sufficiently small, the favorite's expected utility approaches the perfect information
case. Thus, our results are not simply an artifact of precise information about the favorite's value.
For a set of restrictions which that comprises anonymity, DIC and non-positive transfers, I
have analyzed the case with only two bidders. The favorite's preferred auction for many agents
and one favorite would have the similar properties and would be a second-price auction with
pooling. For many agents, pooling in general is partial, namely not all bidders above some cutoffs
are pooled, although due to increased number of anonymity restrictions it is much more difficult
to compute. In order to observe what happens when we increase the number of bidders, we
can compare a standard lottery and a second-price auction. The expected utility of the favorite
from participation in a lottery is U1(v∗) = v∗/n and from participation in a second-price auction
is U1(v∗) = Fn(v∗) ∗ (v∗ − E[v(1)|v(1) ≤ v∗]), where v(1) is the first-order statistic out of (n −
1) variables. Obviously, both expressions go to zero when n increases, although the speed of
convergence is 1/n in the case of a lottery and Fn(v∗) in the second-price auction. Since for any
v∗ < v we have Fn(v∗) < v∗/n we can conclude that when the number of bidders increases, all of
them would prefer a lottery to an auction11.
1.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed the problem of favoritism in auctions from a mechanism design
perspective. In my model, the designer has one favorite among the bidders, whose value is known
11This does not imply that a lottery is socially preferable to an auction. See Condorelli (2012) for a description
of a socially optimal mechanism.
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to the designer. I have characterized feasible auctions that the designer can implement to maximize
the utility of her favorite under different sets of restrictions on these auctions. Deb and Pai (2017)
have shown that assuming that the designer can choose between different undominated equilibria,
anonymity is not a binding restriction for the designer. I have shown that even if the designer
is restricted not only by anonymity but also by dominant strategy incentive compatibility, it is
insufficient to prevent perfect favoritism. Namely, the designer is almost always able to transfer
all collected revenue to her favorite in any auction. Hence, it is possible to guarantee him the
interim utility greater than or equal to his value in the unique equilibrium of the constructed
auction. To prevent this possibility, I additionally impose the non-positive transfers restriction.
Subsequently, the designer cannot discriminate bidders within any auction. However, although
intra-auction favoritism is not possible, the inter-auction favoritism could still be possible, whereby
the designer chooses different auction formats for different favorite's values. I have shown that the
favorite's preferred auction is a second-price auction with pooling where the designer commits to
not distinguishing some value reports. The size of the pooling region for the highest values depends
on the favorite's value. Thus, the designer uses inter-auction favoritism. Finally, I have shown
that it is possible to completely prevent any form of favoritism if the designer is restricted to using
only deterministic auctions in addition to anonymity, dominant strategy incentive compatibility
and non-positive transfers restrictions. In this case, any feasible mechanism is a second-price
auction with a generalized reserve price, whereby the reserve price for each bidder depends on bids
submitted by other bidders. The favorite's preferred auction in this class is a standard second-price
auction without any reserve price.
My results imply that while delegating the decision about the auction format choice to the
designer, the principal should care about how much freedom should be given to the designer and
in what way this freedom can be limited. If the final goal of the principal is revenue maximization,
then along with anonymity and dominant strategy incentive compatibility, restrictions of non-
positive transfers and deterministic auctions should be imposed. Non-positive transfers would help
to prevent discrimination of bidders via transfers. Determinism is used to sustain competition,
since without it the designer would like to make it less intensive by using lotteries.
Traditional problems of mechanism design (revenue maximization, efficiency maximization,
social welfare maximization) are symmetric and hence they have symmetric solutions. I have
considered essentially asymmetric problems and have found symmetric (anonymous) solutions
for them. Thus, my results can also serve as a mathematical approach to solving such kind of
problems.
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1.A Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Similar to Maskin and Laffont (1979), if β∗i (vi) is a dominant stratefy for
bidder i, then for bi = β∗i (vi) and for any bj ∈ {} ∪Bj , j 6= i:
Ui(vi|b) =
∫ vi
vi
yi(b1, ..., β
∗
i (q), ..., bn))dq + hi(vi,b−i).
Since β∗i (vi) and β
∗∗
i (vi) are both dominant strategies:
Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗i (vi), ..., bn) ≥ Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗∗i (vi), ..., bn),
Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗∗i (vi), ..., bn) ≥ Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗i (vi), ..., bn).
Hence,
Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗∗i (vi), ..., bn) = Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗i (vi), ..., bn).
Taking a derivative of both sides with respect to vi we obtain for any vi:
yi(b1, ..., β
∗
i (vi), ..., bN ) = yi(b1, ..., β
∗∗
i (vi), ..., bN ).
Then,
ti(b1, ...β
∗
i (vi), ...bN ) = Ui(vi|b1, ..., β∗i (vi), ..., bN )− viyi(b1, ..., β∗i (vi), ..., bN ) =
= Ui(vi, |b1, ..., β∗∗i (vi), ..., bN )− viyi(b1, ..., β∗∗i (vi), ..., bN ) = ti(b1, ..., β∗∗i (vi), ...bN ).
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Suppose that β∗(v) is a dominant strategy for an agent i and consider
some value v from the intersection of possible values sets for bidders i and j :
Ui(v|b1, ..., β∗(v)
i
, ..., bN ) ≥ Ui(v|b1, ..., β(v)
i
, ..., bN ) for any β(v) and bk ∈ {} ∪Bk, k 6= i.
This means that for any b˜:
vyi(b1, ..., β
∗(v)
i
, ..., b˜
j
, ..., bN ) + ti(b1, ..., β
∗(v)
i
, ..., b˜
j
, ..., bN ) ≥
≥ vyi(b1, ..., β(v)
i
, ..., b˜
j
, ..., bN (vN )) + ti(b1, ..., β(v)
i
, ..., b˜
j
, ..., bN ).
If we switch bids of agents i and j, by anonymity agent j should have the same allocation as an
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agent i had before. Hence, the previous inequality can be rewritten as:
vyj(b1, ..., b˜
i
, ..., β∗(v)
j
, ..., bN ) + ti(b1, ..., b˜
i
, ..., β∗(v)
j
, ..., bN ) ≥
≥ vyj(b1, ..., b˜
i
, ..., β(v)
j
, ..., bN ) + ti(b1, ..., b˜
i
, ..., β(v)
j
, ..., bN ).
Hence,
Uj(v|b1, ..., β∗(v)
j
, ..., bN ) ≥ Uj(v|b1, ..., β(v)
j
, ..., bN ).
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Step 1 (Construction of h′′i (vi,v−i)).
Consider some anonymous and DIC auction that has the allocation rule y′(v) and the transfer
rule t′(v). The new constructed auction also has to be DIC. By (1.6) functions {h′i(vi,v−i)}ni=1,
{h′′i (vi,v−i)}ni=1 have to satisfy:
t′i(v) = −viy′i(v) + h′i(vi,v−i) +
∫ vi
vi
y′i(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq (1.7)
t′′i (v) = −viy′′i (v) + h′′i (vi,v−i) +
∫ vi
vi
y′′i (v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq (1.8)
It is required that the new allocation rule is the same as before. Accordingly, for any vector of
reported values v, we must have y′i(v) = y
′′
i (v). However, transfers should be (almost always)
the same only in equilibrium. In equilibrium, the favorite always reports v∗. Hence, only vectors
v =(v∗,v−1) can be on equilibrium path. For any i and for any v−i, define
h′′i (vi,v−i) := h
′
i(vi,v−i) (1.9)
if at least one component of v−i is equal to v∗ and
h′′i (vi,v−i) := v
∗y′′i (v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn)−
∫ v∗
vi
y′′i (v1, ..., q
i
, ..., vn)dq + (1.10)
+
∑
j 6=i
vjy
′′
j (v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn)−
∑
j 6=i
∫ vj
vj
y′′j (v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., q
j
, ..., vn)dq −
∑
j 6=i
h′′j (vj ,v−j |vi = v∗)
if none of v−i components is equal to v∗, where h′j(vj ,v−j |vi = v∗) means that the value of
component vi in v−j is replaced by v∗.
Step 2. (Computing transfers).
Equation (1.8) then uniquely defines t′′i (v) given y
′′
i (v) and h
′′
i (vi,v−i). Thus, if v−i has a
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component equal to v∗, then h′′i (vi,v−i) = h
′
i(vi, ,v−i) and, hence,
t′′i (v) =t
′
i(v). (1.11)
If all components of v−i are different from v∗, plugging the expression (1.10) to (1.8), using y′′ = y′
and h′′j (vj ,v−j |vi = v∗) = h′j(vj ,v−j |vi = v∗), j 6= i we obtain
t′′i (v)=− viy′i(v) +
∫ vi
v∗
y′i(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq + v
∗y′i(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn) +
+
∑
j 6=i
vjy
′
j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn)−
∑
j 6=i
∫ vj
vj
y′j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., q
j
, ..., vn)dq −
∑
j 6=i
h′j(vj ,v−j |vi = v∗) =
= −viy′i(v) +
∫ vi
v∗
y′i(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq + v
∗y′i(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn) +
+
∑
j 6=i
vjy
′
j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn)−
∑
j 6=i
t′j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., vn)−
∑
j 6=i
vjy
′
j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., vn) =
= −viy′i(v) +
∫ vi
v∗
y′i(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq + v
∗y′i(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ...vn)−
∑
j 6=i
t′j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., vn), (1.12)
where we also used that (1.7) implies
∑
j 6=i
∫ vj
vj
y′j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., q
j
, ..., vn)dq+
∑
j 6=i
h′j(vj ,v−j |vi = v∗) =∑
j 6=i
t′j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., vn) +
∑
j 6=i
vjy
′
j(v1, ..., v
∗
i
, ..., vn). Now, we need to verify that the constructed auc-
tion satisfies anonymity and in equilibrium it almost always implements the described transfers.
Step 3. (Check anonymity of (y′′, t′′)).
Since (y′, t′) is an anonymous auction and y′′ = y′, the allocation rule is trivially symmet-
ric. Now, consider t′′(v). If v−i has a component equal to v∗, then t′′i (v) =t
′
i(v). Since t
′
i(v) is
symmetric, then t′′i (v) is also symmetric. If all components of v−i are different from v
∗, then
t′′i (v) is described by expression (1.12), which does not depend on {vi}ni=1 and has only symmetric
functions inside. Thus, anonymity is satisfied.
Step 4. (Equilibrium transfers).
In equilibrium the favorite reports v∗. Hence, (1.11) implies that t′′i (v
∗,v−1) =t′i(v
∗,v−1) for
all bidders, except the favorite. Since the number of bidders is finite and the distributions are
strictly increasing the probability that some other bidder is going to report v∗ is zero. Thus,
the favorite's transfer in equilibrium is almost always described by (1.12) and plugging v1 = v∗,
we obtain t′′1(v∗,v−1) = −
∑
j 6=1
t′j(v
∗,v−1) = t′1(v∗,v−1) + R(v∗,v−1). The no-deficit requirement
is trivially satisfied in equilibrium, because the constructed auction transfers all revenue to the
favorite making the budget balanced. This completes the proof.
Lemma 1.3. If {cA, cDIC , cNT } ⊂ C, then in any direct FA(C): hi(0,v−i) = 0 for any i, v−i
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Proof of Lemma 1.3. Suppose that bidder i has a value vi = 0. Then, by (1.6)
ti(v) = Ui(v) = hi(0,v−i)
Since cNT ∈ C, we should have hi(0,v−i) = ti(v) ≤ 0 for any v−i. Simultaneously, Ui(v) has to
be positive otherwise it would not be the dominant strategy to report the true value and bidder
i could exclude himself from participation. Hence, hi(0,v−i) ≥ 0 should also hold for any v−i.
Combining last two inequalities we have hi(0,v−i) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Using characterization (1.6) and Lemma 1.3, transfers ti(v1, v2) are
fully determined by the allocation rule yi(v1, v2). Since the function Gx has a different form de-
pending on a relationship between v∗ and v, we consider possible cases separately.
Case 1. v∗ ≤ v.
By the anonymity restriction we need to specify an allocation rule only on the cone Γ =
{v =(v1, v2) ∈ [0, v]2 : v1 ≥ v2}. Indeed, suppose we have specified some allocation rule on Γ.
Then, for all reported values (v1, v2) 6∈ Γ we have v2 > v1. Since for v2 > v1 the bid vector
(v2, v1) ∈ Γ, we know the allocation probabilities y1(v2, v1) and y2(v2, v1). Then, by anonymity we
have the allocation for (v1, v2) 6∈ Γ as y1(v1, v2) = y2(v2, v1) and y2(v1, v2) = y1(v2, v1).
To illustrate our proof we plot for convenience simultaneously two things on the same figure.
The first one is a graph of a distribution function F (v) of the opponent's value. The second one
is the value space (v1, v2). The auction described in the statement implies that the whole value
space is cut into a certain number of triangles and rectangles (see figure 1.3 as an example). I use
Ri to talk about region i on the figure 1.3. The rectangles can be only of two types: 1) interior
rectangles, like R2, in general there could be many of them; and 2) at most one boundary rectangle
with values v1 ≥ v∗ inside, like R4. For all pairs (v1, v2) inside each such rectangle y1(v1, v2) = 1
and y2(v1, v2) = 0. Triangles can be of three types: 1) interior triangles like R3, 2) the unique
boundary triangle containing v1 = v2 = 0, like R1, 3) the unique boundary triangle with values
v1 ≥ v∗ inside, like R5. If a triangle is the region, where gv∗(v1) is constant (R1, R5 on figure 1.3),
then y1(v1, v2) = y2(v1, v2) = 1/2, for all pairs (v1, v2) inside this triangle. If a triangle lies in the
region, where gv∗(v1) is strictly decreasing (R3 on Figure 3), then y1(v1, v2) = 1 and y2(v1, v2) = 0.
Our task is to prove that the described allocation is indeed optimal for the favorite having a value
v∗.
Using a notation k(v1, v2) := y1(v1, v2) + y2(v1, v2), where 0 ≤ k(v1, v2) ≤ 1, we can rewrite
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Figure 1.3: Illustration of a proof
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the interim utility of the first agent:
U1(v
∗) =
∫ v
0
(v∗y1(v∗, v2) + t1(v∗, v2))f(v2)dv2 =
∫ v
0
(
∫ v∗
0
y1(v1, v2)dv1)f(v2)dv2 =
=
∫ v∗
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v∗
0
∫ v
v1
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv2dv1 =
=
∫ v∗
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v∗
0
∫ v
v1
y2(v2, v1)f(v2)dv2dv1 =
=
∫ v∗
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v∗
0
∫ v
v2
y2(v1, v2)f(v1)dv1dv2 =
=
∫ v∗
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v∗
0
∫ v
v2
[k(v1, v2)− y1(v1, v2)]f(v1)dv1dv2, (1.13)
where the equality in the first line follows from (1.6) and Lemma 1.3, the next one is changing the
order of integration, then we apply anonymity, and finally we switch notations of v1 and v2 in the
second summand. Here, we can notice that it is always optimal to put k(v1, v2) = 1 for any v1, v2.
This means that it is never optimal to throw the object away. From now onwards, I will skip the
term
∫ v∗
0
∫ v
v2
k(v1, v2)f(v1)dv1dv2, which is constant in the FPA(C). Now, we need to maximize
(1.13) subject to monotonicity constraints (1.5).
I prove that even separately in each of the described regions, i.e. neglecting global monotonicity
constraints, it is not possible to change an allocation rule to increase utility of the favorite. Denote
by z1, z2, ... such points where gv∗(v1) changes its type from linear to strictly concave and vice
versa. Suppose that there exists any interior or boundary triangle with (0, 0) inside, called R1,
such that gv∗(v1) is linear for any v1 ∈ R1 and y1(v1, v2) 6= 1/2 for some (v1, v2) ∈ R1. Due to
anonymity on the diagonal y1(v, v) = 1/2 for any v and due to monotonicity y1(v1, v2) ≥ 1/2 in
each of the regions. Thus, y1(v1, v2) > 1/2 is only possible in the low-right corner of the triangle
R1, which I denote by A1 ⊂ R1. But if it is the case, we can reduce y1(v1, v2) by a small ε > 012.
In R1 the following holds:
∫ ∫
A1
εf(v2)dv1dv2 <
∫ ∫
A1
εf(z1)dv1dv2 and
∫ ∫
A1
εf(v1)dv1dv2 >∫ ∫
A1
εf(z1)dv1dv2. The change in utility is:
∆U1 = −
∫ ∫
A1
εf(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ ∫
A1
εf(v1)dv1dv2 >
> −
∫ ∫
A1
εf(z1)dv1dv2 +
∫ ∫
A1
εf(z1)dv1dv2 > 0
Hence, it is not possible to improve upon y1(v1, v2) = 1/2 in the region R1.
12Strictly speaking, we cannot always reduce allocation probability by ε everywhere, since it could prove to
be lower than 1/2 and violate monotonicity constraint. Thus, in the points where it occurs, we only reduce by
y1(v1, v2)− 1/2. Hence, the decrease is min{ε, y1(v1, v2)− 1/2}. But it matters only in the region with at least one
dimension of order ε and hence it would be a second-order effect, which we can neglect.
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Now consider any interior rectangle R2. I claim that it is always optimal to give the object to
the first agent. I use the similar logic as above. Assume that it is not true and there exists a subset
A2 ⊂ R2 : for any (v1, v2) ∈ A2 we have y1(v1, v2) < 1. Due to monotonicity, it could only be the
upper-left corner. Now we increase probability of allocation to the first agent by ε in A213. In R2
the following inequalities hold
∫ ∫
A2
εf(v2)dv1dv2 >
∫ ∫
A2
εf(z1)dv1dv2 and
∫ ∫
A1
εf(v1)dv1dv2 <∫ ∫
A1
εf(z1)dv1dv2. Hence, the utility change is:
∆U1 =
∫ ∫
A2
εf(v2)dv1dv2 −
∫ ∫
A2
εf(v1)dv1dv2 >
>
∫ ∫
A2
εf(z1)dv1dv2 −
∫ ∫
A2
εf(z1)dv1dv2 > 0
So it is never optimal to put y1(v1, v2) < 1 anywhere in R2 , i.e. in the FPA(C) the first agent
always get the object in R2.
While considering any interior or boundary triangle R3 such that gv∗(v1) is strictly increasing
for any v1 ∈ R3, we notice that for any point (v1, v2) ∈ R3 the following relation holds: f(v1) <
f(v2). Hence, from (1.13) it is optimal even pointwise in R3 to make y(v1, v2) as high as possible,
i.e. y(v1, v2) = 1.
Boundary rectangle R4 and boundary triangle R5 such that (v∗, v2) ∈ R4 ∩R5 for any v2 ≤ v∗
are specific regions. The logic of a proof is a modified logic of the proof for regions R1 and R2. We
start from R4 and assume that for some A4 ⊂ R4 it is optimal to allocate the good to the favorite
with a probability y1(v1, v2) < 1. Again, it could only be the upper-low corner of the rectangle.
We again increase probability of allocation in A4 by ε14. The change in utility is:
∆U1 =
∫ ∫
A4∩{v1≤v∗}
εf(v2)dv1dv2 −
∫ ∫
A4
εf(v1)dv1dv2
In this region
∫ ∫
A4∩{v1≤v∗} εf(v2)dv1dv2 >
∫ ∫
A4∩{v1≤v∗} εf(z2)dv1dv2 and
∫ ∫
A4
εf(v1)dv1dv2 <∫ ∫
A4∩{v1≤v∗} εf(z2)dv1dv2. Hence, ∆U > 0 and y1(v1, v2) = 1 must be optimal.
In R5 we need to show that y1(v1, v2) = 1/2 is optimal. By contrast, assume that there is
A5 ⊂ R5 in the low-right corner where y1(v1, v2) > 1/2. As before, reduce allocation probability
by ε15. Since
∫ ∫
A5∩{v1≤v∗} εf(v2)dv1dv2 <
∫ ∫
A5∩{v1≤v∗} εf(z2)dv1dv2 and
∫ ∫
A5
εf(v1)dv1dv2 >∫ ∫
A5∩{v1≤v∗} εf(z2)dv1dv2, the utility change is:
∆U1 = −
∫ ∫
A5∩{v1≤v∗}
εf(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ ∫
A5
εf(v1)dv1dv2 > 0
13min{ε, 1− y1(v1,v2)}
14min{ε, 1− y1(v1,v2)}
15min{ε, y1(v1, v2)− 1/2}.
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Thus, y1(v1, v2) = 1/2 is optimal in R5.
Since we worked with each region independently, this proof holds for any number and any
combination of these regions. Since for any distribution function we can divide the subset of
values below the diagonal v1 = v2 into regions of described values, we can apply the above logic
to any distribution function and corresponding partition.
To complete the proof, we must show that the global monotonicity conditions are satisfied.
Indeed, y1(v1, v2) ∈ {1, 1/2} for any v1 > v2. The regions where y1(v1, v2) = 1/2 are only the
triangles close to the diagonal. Thus, the proposed auction is indeed monotone. Transfers are
chosen according to (1.6) taking into account that by Lemma 1.3 we have hi(0,v−i) = 0.
Case 2. v∗ > v.
The idea here is to consider the characterization for the case v∗ = v which follows from the
previous case, and then to show for v∗ > v that for all (v1, v2) such that v1 ∈ (v, v∗] and v2 < v1
the optimal allocation is y(v1, v2) = 1, and for all (v1, v2) such that (v1, v2) ∈ [0, v] × [0, v] the
allocation remains unchanged.
Indeed, suppose we consider v∗ > v. Then, similarly to the previous case we obtain the
following.
U1(v
∗) =
∫ v
0
(v∗y1(v∗, v2) + t1(v∗, v2))f(v2)dv2 =
∫ v
0
(
∫ v∗
0
y1(v1, v2)dv1)f(v2)dv2 =
=
∫ v
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v
0
∫ v
v1
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv2dv1 =
=
∫ v
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v
0
∫ v
v1
y2(v2, v1)f(v2)dv2dv1 =
=
∫ v
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v
0
∫ v
v2
y2(v1, v2)f(v1)dv1dv2 =
=
∫ v
0
∫ v∗
v2
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2 +
∫ v
0
∫ v
v2
[k(v1, v2)− y(v1, v2)]f(v1)dv1dv =
= U1(v) +
∫ v
0
∫ v∗
v
y1(v1, v2)f(v2)dv1dv2
Hence, it is optimal to have y1(v1, v2) = 1 if v1 > v. At the same time, it does not violate
monotonicity constraint. Thus, the optimal allocation for v1 ≤ v when v∗ > v should coincide
with the allocation for v1 ≤ v, when v∗ = v. The auction described in the statement implements
exactly this allocation16. Once again, transfers can be computed according to (1.6) taking into
account that by Lemma 1.3 we have hi(0,v−i) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Since distribution F (v) is atomless, we have F (v) < 1 for any v < v.
16The allocation for (v1, v2) : v < v1 ≤ v2 does not affect the utility of the favorite. For definiteness sake, in the
statement we have specified y(v1, v2) = 1 for v < v1 ≤ v2 .
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Thus, 1 = Gv∗(v∗) > F (v∗) for any v∗ < v. Since Gv∗(v) and F (v) are different at v = v∗, it
means that v = v∗ belongs to a subset where Gv∗(v) is linear, i.e. there is a pooling interval (v̂, ̂̂v)
such that v∗ ∈ (v̂, ̂̂v). v̂ is a point, tangent line from which goes directly to (v∗, 1). By construction
gv∗(v) = const for v > v∗ and hence v > v∗ is a pooling region. This implies that all values v > v̂
must be pooled.
To show monotonicity of v̂ as a function of v∗, suppose that it is not true, i.e. there exist v∗1 and
v∗2 such that v∗1 < v∗2 and v̂(v∗1) > v̂(v∗2). By definition of Gv∗ the following holds: Gv∗2 (v̂(v
∗
1)) ≥
F (v̂(v∗1)). Since Gv∗1 (v
∗
1) − Gv∗1 (v̂(v∗1)) = 1 − F (v̂(v∗1)) > Gv∗2 (v∗1) − Gv∗2 (v̂(v∗1)) we must have
gv∗1 (v̂(v
∗
1)) > gv∗2 (v̂(v
∗
1)). Then
Gv∗1 (v̂(v
∗
2)) = Gv∗1 (v̂(v
∗
1))− (v̂(v∗1)− v̂(v∗2))gv∗1 (v̂(v∗1))
= F (v̂(v∗1))− (v̂(v∗1)− v̂(v∗2))gv∗1 (v̂(v∗1))
< F (v̂(v∗1))− (v̂(v∗1)− v̂(v∗2))gv∗2 (v̂(v∗1)) = F (v̂(v∗2))
However, Gv∗1 (v̂(v
∗
2)) < F (v̂(v
∗
2)) is impossible by construction of Gv∗1 . Thus, v̂(v
∗) has to be
monotone.
Proof of Proposition 1.3. The result follows from the proof of Proposition 1.1. Suppose v∗ < v.
If the favorite's value changes, the corresponding change of the FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) is related
to the change of the function Gv∗(v). The only change of this function happens on the sub-
set [v̂(v∗), v], which is a pooling region. For all favorite's values above the maximal possible
value of his opponent, the function Gv∗(v) is the same function for all v∗, which brings the same
FPA({cA, cDIC , cNT }) for all v∗ > v.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Step 1:
First, consider a value vi of a bidder i such that vi < maxj 6=i{vj}. Then, due to DA, anonymity
and monotonicity condition (1.5), the bidder i should receive the object with zero probability and
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn) = 0 for all q ≤ vi. Indeed, to show this, suppose that yi(v1, ..., vi, ..., vn) =
1 for some vi < maxj 6=i{vj}. Then, monotonicity implies that yi(v1, ...,maxj 6=i{vj}, ...vn) = 1.
However, due to anonymity the bidder k who has the value vk = maxj 6=i{vj} should also have
probability of assigning the good equal to one. Thus, we obtain that yi(v1, ...,maxj 6=i{vj}, ...vn) =
yk(v1, ...,maxj 6=i{vj}, ...vn) = 1, which contradicts feasibility. Thus, all bidders whose value is not
the highest one should receive the good with zero probability, namely if vi < maxj 6=i{vj}, then
yi(v) = 0.
Step 2:
From Step 1, it follows that for any realization of values there could be only two possible
cases: 1) the bidder with the highest value obtains the object for sure, 2) nobody gets the object.
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Monotonicity constraint (1.5) implies that if for some vector of values bidder i receives the good,
he should also receive the good when he has a higher value keeping values of his opponents fixed.
Thus, for any FA(C) there is a cutoff ri for each bidder, which can depend on other bidders'
values, such that the bidder obtains the object with a probability of 1 if and only if his value is
1) the greatest among values of other bidders and 2) greater or equal than the cutoff ri. Thus,
yi(v) = 1 if and only if vi > maxj 6=i(vj , ri), otherwise yi(v) = 0.
Step 3:
Now we need to understand how these values {ri}ni=1, or essentially reserve values, are con-
structed. First, notice that for each bidder i his reserve value ri can depend on his opponents'
bids. Hence, ri can depend on v1, ..., vi−1, vi+1, ..., vn. By anonymity, the allocation probability
for a bidder i should not be affected by any permutation of other players' bids. Hence, ri has to
be a symmetric function of n − 1 variables ri : Rn−1 → R. Then, again due to anonymity, since
the allocation rule must be symmetric among bidders, then for any bidders i and j and for any
x ∈Rn−1 the function ri(x) and rj(x) have to be equal, ri(x) =rj(x). Hence, the reserve value
function should be common for all bidders: r1(x) = ... =rn(x) =r(x).
Step 4:
Take any bidder i : vi < maxj 6=i{vj}. Then, from Step 1 we have yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn) = 0 for all
q ≤ vi. Hence, from (1.6) we have
ti(v) = Ui(v) = hi(vi,v−i)
Since transfers have to be non-positive, it follows that ∀v−i: hi(vi,v−i) ≤ 0. However, simul-
taneously to satisfy DIC, utility of bidder i has to be at least non-negative, otherwise he could
refrain himself from participation. Thus, it must be the case that hi(vi,v−i) ≥ 0. Combining the
two inequalities we obtain hi(vi,v−i) = 0. It means that transfers are uniquely defined when the
allocation is chosen. Thus, plugging the obtained allocation rule and hi(vi,v−i) = 0 to (1.6) we
get ti(v) = −maxj 6=i(vj , r(v−i)) if and only if vi > maxj 6=i(vj , r(v−i)), and ti(v) = 0 otherwise.
Since we have yi(v) = 1 if and only if vi > maxj 6=i(vj , r(v−i)), the statement follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. From the proof of Theorem 3, the utility of any bidder under the
full set of restrictions C = {cA, cDIC , cNT , cDA} must be Ui(v) =
∫ vi
vi
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq, where
yi(v) = 1 if and only if vi > maxj 6=i(vj , ri(v−i)), otherwise yi(v) = 0. The choice of a reserve value
function completely determines the auction format. Hence, the utility of each bidder including
the favorite can be written as follows:
Ui(v) =
∫ vi
maxj 6=i(vj ,ri(v−i))
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq =
= max{0, vi −max
j 6=i
(vj , ri(v−i))}
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Hence, making positive reserve prices can only reduce the utility of each bidder including the
favorite. Thus, it is optimal to put zero reserve price, so ri(x) = 0 ∀x ∈Rn−1.
1.B Appendix B
Assumption 1.1 (symmetric bidders). ∀i, j ∈ N : Vi = Vj = V and Fi(v) = Fj(v) = F (v)
Proposition 1.6 (ex-post equivalence of unrestricted and anonymity-restricted favoritism).
If bidders are symmetric and C = {cA} then there exists FA(C) = (B̂, ŷ,p̂) such that it has an
equilibrium ψ̂, in which B̂ = [v, v], M̂ = MFPA, p̂(a, b̂(v)) = pFPA(a,bFPA(v)), ŷ(b̂(v)) = yFPA(bFPA(v)),
where b̂(v) and bFPA(v) stand for the biddings in the equilibrium ψ̂ of FA(C) and ψ∗ of FPA
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. I prove the theorem by directly constructing the equivalent anony-
mous auction FA(C). Consider the set of admissible bids equal to the set of possible values,
B = [v, v]. Denote v̂ as the smallest value such that v∗ = v̂− 1−F (v̂)f(v̂) . If no solution to this equation
exists, assume v̂ = v. The allocation rule is such that the bidder with the highest bid wins, i.e.
ŷ(b1, ..., bi, ..., bm) = (0, ...., 1
i
, ..., 0) if bi > bj for any j 6= i. If k ≥ 2 bidders make exactly the
same bids, there is a symmetric lottery between them with 1/k being a probability of securing
the good for each of them. Transfers p̂(b) are such that if there is only one bid on the interval
[v, v̂], then this bidder pays nothing, although if there are two or more bidders who make bids
from this interval, all of them should pay v̂. If the winning bid is greater than v̂, the payment is
the maximum between the second highest bid and v̂. Subsequently, there is an equilibrium ψ̂, in
which the favorite bids v∗, all bidders with values smaller than v̂ do not participate in the bidding
and all bidders with values greater than v̂ participate and bid their true values. This equilibrium
outcome is always the same as in the FPA.
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Chapter 2
Non-discriminatory Strategyproof Optimal Auction
2.1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Myerson (1981) characterizes the revenue maximizing mechanisms for auction-
ing a single indivisible object to buyers who have independent and private valuations (IPV) of the
object. Such a mechanism allocates the object to an agent with the highest virtual valuation,
which depends on this agent's actual valuation and her valuation distribution. If bidders are ex-
ante symmetric, i.e., their valuations are drawn from the same distribution, revenue maximization
can be achieved by implementing a second-price auction with a common reserve price. Second-
price auction is an anonymous (symmetric) and dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC),
or strategyproof, mechanism. Anonymity means that the allocations and transfers depend only
on bidders' bids but not on bidders' identities (names, races, nationalities, and etc.). Dominant
strategy incentive compatibility However, when bidders are ex-ante asymmetric, then Myerson's
optimal auction is not symmetric anymore. In reality, agents are often ex-ante asymmetric, for ex-
ample, foreign firms and domestic firms can be characterized by different distributions. Meanwhile,
mechanism designers can be restricted to use only symmetric mechanisms to avoid descrimination.
Hence, the following natural question arises. Namely, what would be the optimal mechanism under
the restriction of anonymity. The surprising answer to this question is given by Deb and Pai (2017).
They demonstrate that the optimal mechanism is ex-ante implementable in a symmetric way. Pre-
cisely, there is a symmetric auction that has an equilibrium with the same ex-post allocation rule
and interim utilities as that of the asymmetric optimal auction. However, this equivalence holds
only in the sense of bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). It means that even though the initial
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC), its implementation is only bayesian
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incentive compatible. Hence, many important properties of the mechanism are lost.1 Even more
crucial issue is that BIC implementation does not exclude multiplicity of equilibria. For example,
the mechanisms from Deb and Pai (2017) generically have many equilibria and some of them could
be symmetric equilibria. However, only one particular equilibrium is chosen. Hence, the results
obtained by Deb and Pai (2017) crucually rely on the asumption that the designer can pick the
preferred equilibrium. In this chapter, we are interested in finding the optimal mechanism that
preserves anonymity and DIC together. This mechanism is robust and has a unique equilibrium
in undominated strategies.
There is a literature on BIC-DIC equivalence. Manelli and Vincent (2010), Gershkov et al.
(2013) show that in IPV models any Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcome can also be achived in
expectation in some mechanism that implements dominant strategies. However, in this chapter,
the anonymity restriction breaks this equivalence.
Azrieli and Jain (2018) generalize Deb and Pai (2017) from auction setting to a symmetric
implementation of a general social choice function. However, Azrieli and Jain (2018) obtain this
generalization by using abstract message spaces. In particular, they allow agents to report their
names in messages. Then the designer can make the mechanism depend on the reported names.
On need only to care that there exists and equilibrium where every bidder reports his name
truthfully. At the same time, there could be many equilibria where agents strategically misreport
their names.
The methedology used in this chapter is closely related to the methodology used in Chap-
ter 1that considers a question of favoritism in auctions. In Chapter 1, the designer is interested
in maximizing the utility of her favored bidder and is restricted by the anonymity and DIC con-
straints. In this chapter we find the auction which maximizes the revenue of the seller under the
same two constraints. We have shown in Chapter 1 that anonymity and DIC constraints imply
that anonymity of original auction transfers to anonymity of the corresponding direct auction. We
also employ this characterization to construct the optimal anonymous DIC auction.
In the next section we present our model and show our main result that the optimal anony-
mous DIC mechanism is a second-price auction with specially constructed reserve prices. Each
bidder's reserve price depends on the bids and the value distributions of her competitors. However,
the constructions of the reserve prices are symmetric for the bidders and satisfy the anonymity
restriction.
1Some of them are the following. Bidders should know each others' value distributions. It is possible that a
bidder has to pay eventually without obtaining the object. Multiple equilibria may also arise.
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2.2 Main Model
There is one indivisible object that can be sold to one of n buyers (bidders). Buyer i has a privately
known valuation of the object, vi, which is drawn indepently from a continuously differentiable
destibution Fi on [0, v], v ∈ (0,+∞]. Each bidder i submits a bid bi ∈ R+, and all bids are
submitted simultaneously and independently of each other. The objective of the designer is to
maximize her expected revenue. A mechanism M := (y, t) is a collection of an allocation rule
y :Rn+ → [0, 1]n, y(b) = (y1(b), ..., yn(b)) and a transfer rule t :Rn+ → Rn, t(b) = (t1(b), ..., tn(b)).
For each bidder, yi(b) is the probability of bidder i getting the object and ti(b) is the transfer to
agent i, where b := (b1, ...bn) is a vector of submitted bids. Bidder i's utility is
Ui =

viy(b) + ti if i obtains the object,
ti otherwise.
(2.1)
The difference from the standard literature on revenue maximization is that we require the mech-
anism to be anonymous and implements dominant strategies.
Let pi : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n} be a permutation. Denote Θ to be the set of all permutations of
N elements. The expression pi(i) = j means that the element in i-th position is permuted to j-th
position. We denote pi−1 as the inverse of the permutation of pi. To simplify notations, for any
vector x = (x1, ..., xn) we use pi(x) to denote the vector obtained after permutation pi is applied.
Thus, pi(x) := (xpi(1), ..., xpi(n)).
Definition 2.1. A mechanism M is anonymous if under a permutation of bids, its allocations
and payments are permuted. Formally, for any permutation pi,
y(pi(b)) = pi(y(b)) and t(pi(b)) = pi(t(b)).
We now consider dominant strategy implementation. Although dominant strategy implemen-
tation is quite robust in the sense that the behavior of an agent does not depend on the strategies
of her opponents, there could still be a problem of multiple equilibria in a mechanism, because
each agent can have more than one dominant strategy. Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2 and Theorem 1.1 from
Chapter 1are crucial for our results.
Together they imply that if we apply the revelation principle and consider only mechanisms in
which bidders report their valuations directly, instead of considering mechanisms that implement
dominant strategies, we can directly consider anonymous dominant strategy incentive compatible
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(DIC) direct mechanisms.
The following standard lemma due to Maskin and Laffont (1979) characterizes all DIC direct
mechanisms.
Lemma 2.1 (Maskin and Laffont (1979)). A direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive
compatible if and only if for each agent:
1. yi(v) is nondecreasing in vi for all v−i.
2. There exist functions {Ci(v−i)} such that
viyi(v) + ti(v) = Ci(v−i) +
∫ vi
0
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vN )dq. (2.2)
Thus, the designer's problem is:
max
{yi(.)},{ti(.)}
E[R] = E[−
∑
i
ti(v)] (2.3)
subject to: (2.4)
yi(v1, ..., vN ) = ypi(i)(vpi(1), ..., vpi(N)) (2.5)
ti(v1, ..., vN ) = tpi(i)(vpi(1), ..., vpi(N)) (2.6)
0 ≤ yi(v) ≤ 1,
∑
i
yi(v) ≤ 1 (2.7)
yi(v) is nondecreasing in vi for all v−i (2.8)
viyi(v) + ti(v) = Ci(v−i) +
∫ vi
0
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vN )dq (2.9)
We solve this problem under the following assumption on the monotonicity of cross hazard
rates.2
Assumption 2.1. For any i, j the function hi,j(·) := 1−Fi(·)fj(·) is decreasing.
2This asumption is not new in the mechanism design literature. See, for example, Krähmer and Strausz (2015)
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This assumption is a generalization of the standard decreasing inverse harzard rate assumption
made in the mechanism design literature to the case in which the anonymity restriction is present.
Then we can obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal anonymous DIC auction is a second-price auction with different
reserve prices for different bidders. Each bidder's reserve price depends on her opponents' bids
and valuation distributions, and it is determined in the following equation:
rk =
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(k)(rk))Πj 6=pi−1(k)fj(vpi(j))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(k)(rk)Πj 6=pi−1(k)fj(vpi(j))
(2.10)
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As we know from Theorem 1.1, the auction must
treat agents' reported valuations in a symmetric way. Hence, any feasible auction must allocate
the object to a bidder with the highest bid or pool some bids. In the optimal auction, pooling
may arise only if some ironing procedure is necessary, as in Myerson (1981). By Asumption 1 we
exclude those cases where ironing is necessary. Hence, the object should be allocated to a bidder
with the highest bid. Then, by the DIC restriction, the winner should pay the second highest bid.
The most interesting aspect of the mechanism is the optimal reserve prices. The reserve price
for each bidder depends both on the actual valuations and the valuation distributions of all her
opponents. However, the constructions of all reserve prices are symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
E[R] = E[−
∑
i
ti(v)]
= E[−
∑
i
(Ui(v)− viyi(v))]
= E[−
∑
i
(Ci(vviyi(v))]
=
∫
· · ·
∫
v
(−
∑
i
(Ci(v−i) +
∫ vi
0
yi(v1, ..., q
i
, ...vn)dq−viyi(v))f1(v1)...fn(vn)dv1...dvn.
It is standard that {Ci(v−i)}i=1,...,n are set to be as low as possible to satisfy the individual
rationality constraints. Due to Lemma 2.1, Ci(v−i) ≡ 0.
Using standard technique of integration by parts we obtain the following representation of
revenue:
∫
· · ·
∫
v
∑
i
yi(v)(vi − 1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)f1(v1)...fn(vn)dv1...dvn (2.11)
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Now we must take into account the anonymity constraint. Denote Θ as the set of all per-
mutation functions. There are n! elements in this set. Then, for any allocation rule, if we know
the allocation at some vector v =(v1, v2..., vn), by anonymity we also know the allocation at each
vector pi(v) = (vpi(1), vpi(2), ..., vpi(n)), which is a permutation of v.
In order to find the optimal allocation, we do pointwise maximization and then check that
all monotonicity constraints hold. Suppose, we take some allocation y(v) := (y1(v), ..., yn(v)).
Consider some bidders l, k and assume without loss of generality that vk > vl. We will first fix the
allocation for other bidders and distribute the rest allocation probability between bidders l and k.
Denote q(v) := 1− ∑
j 6=k.l
yj(v) and q(v) := yl(v)+yk(v). By definition q(v) ≤q(v).
Now in (2.11) we can consider only the terms associated with yl and yk, since the other
probabilities are fixed. We substitute yl by q − yk in the maximization function (2.11) and then
have ∫
· · ·
∫
v
[yk(v)(vk − 1− Fk(vk)
fk(vk)
) +
+(q(v)− yk(v))(vl − 1− Fl(vl)
fl(vl)
)]f1(v1)...fn(vn)dv1...dvn
=
∫
· · ·
∫
v
[yk(v)((vk − 1− Fk(vk)
fk(vk)
)− (vl − 1− Fl(vl)
fl(vl)
)) +
+q(v)(vl − 1− Fl(vl)
fl(vl)
)]f1(v1)...fn(vn)dv1...dvn.
To maximize properly the above term under anonymity constraint, we need to maximize the
integral of the following term, which considers together all points which are permutations of each
other:
q(v)
∑
pi∈Θ
[vl −
1− Fpi−1(l)(vl)
fpi−1(l)(vl)
]Πjfj(vpi(j)) (2.12)
+ yk(v)(
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk −
1− Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
]Πjfj(vpi(j))−
∑
pi∈Θ
[vl −
1− Fpi−1(l)(vl)
fpi−1(l)(vl)
])Πjfj(vpi(j).
We omit for a while the term associated with q(v) and focus only on the term associated
with yk(v). Now, consider a permutation S ∈ Θ such that it switches the positions of k and l,
without affecting the other positions. Thus, S(j) = j for all j 6= k, l, S(k) = S−1(k) = l, and
S(l) = S−1(l) = k. Since in the last expression we have summands with respect to all possible
permutations, the value of the expression will not change if we replace pi(·) by Spi(.) := S(pi(.)) in
the second summand. We also notice that Spi−1(.), the inverse permutation of Spi(.), is equal to
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pi−1(S(.)). Thus, we have
yk(
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk −
1− Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
]Πjfj(vpi(j))−
∑
pi∈Θ
[vl −
1− Fpi−1(S(l))(vl)
fpi−1(S(l))(vl)
]Πjfj(vS(pi(j))))
= yk(
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk − vl]Πjfj(vpi(j)) +
∑
pi∈Θ
[
1− Fpi−1(S(l))(vl)
fpi−1(S(l))(vl)
Πjfj(vS(pi(j))))−
−1− Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
Πjfj(vpi(j))]
= yk(
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk − vl]Πjfj(vpi(j)) +
∑
pi∈Θ
[
1− Fpi−1(k)(vl)
fpi−1(k)(vl)
Πjfj(vS(pi(j))))−
−1− Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
Πjfj(vpi(j))]
= yk(
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk − vl]Πjfj(vpi(j)) +
(
(1− Fpi−1(k)(vl))fpi−1(l))(vk)
−(1− Fpi−1(k)(vk))fpi−1(l)(vl)
)
Πj 6=pi−1(k),pi−1(l)fj(vpi(j))
= yk(
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk − vl]Πjfj(vpi(j)) +
+(
1− Fpi−1(k)(vl)
fpi−1(l)(vl)
− 1− Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(l)(vk)
)fpi−1(l)(vl)fpi−1(l)(vk)Πj 6=pi−1(k),pi−1(l)fj(vpi(j))
Since by assumption vk > vl and
1−Fi(v)
fj(v)
is decreasing, it is optimal to set yk = q and yl = 0.
Now we need to find the optimal value for q. Notice that (2.12) has the following form:
q(v)
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk −
1− Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
]Πjfj(vpi(j)) (2.13)
Hence, q(v) should be equal to q(v) if
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk−
1−Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
]Πjfj(vpi(j)) ≥ 0 and zero otherwise.
Keeping {vj}j 6=k constant, consider Φ(vk) ≡
∑
pi∈Θ
[vk−
1−Fpi−1(k)(vk)
fpi−1(k)(vk)
]Πjfj(vpi(j)). We will show that
this function is monotonely increasing and there exists a unique point rk such that Φk(rk) = 0. If
Φk(rk) = 0 then
∑
pi∈Θ
[rk −
1− Fpi−1(k)(rk)
fpi−1(k)(rk)
]Πjfj(vpi(j)) = 0 (2.14)
Hence, rk satisfies the following equation:
rk =
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(k)(rk))Πj 6=pi−1(k)fj(vpi(j))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(k)(rk)Πj 6=pi−1(k)fj(vpi(j))
(2.15)
If the derivative Φ
′
k of the function Φk has the same sign the uniqueness of rk is guaranteed.
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Since all inverse hazard rates are decreasing by assumption, the derivative of Φk is always positive:
Φ
′
k(rk) =
∑
pi∈Θ
[1−
(
1− Fpi−1(k)(rk)
fpi−1(k)(rk)
)′
]Πjfj(vpi(j)) > 0 (2.16)
Thus, q(v) =q(v) if vk > rk and q(v) = 0 if vk ≤ rk. Essentially, when choosing the allocation
between bidders k, l, we compare their valuations and allocate the good to the bidder with a
higher valuation, provided that this valuation is also higher than the reserve price determined
from (2.15). Following this procedure we choose the buyer with the highest valuation and he
receives the good if his valuation is higher than his reserve price. The price that she needs to pay
is then the maximum between the second highest valuation and the reserve price for this buyer.
All monotonicity constraints are trivially satisfied in such an allocation. The only constraint left
to be varified is that the reserve prices are symmetric for all bidders. To show this, consider two
bidders m,n and show that rm and rn depend on the bids of their respective opponents in the
same way. To show this, we use the same trick as above. In the summation, we replace pi with
Spi, where S is such permutation that switches the positions of m and n. Consider bidder m when
bidder n has a valuation vn = v̂. Then the following equalities hold:
rm =
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(m)(rm))Πj 6=pi−1(m)fj(vpi(j))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(m)(rm)Πj 6=pi−1(m)fj(vpi(j))
=
=
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(S(m))(rm))Πj 6=pi−1(S(m))fj(vS(pi(j)))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(S(m))(rm)Πj 6=pi−1(S(m))fj(vS(pi(j)))
=
=
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(n)(rm))Πj 6=pi−1(n)fj(vS(pi(j)))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(n)(rm)Πj 6=pi−1(n)fj(vS(pi(j)))
=
=
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(n)(rm))fpi−1(m)(vS(pi(pi−1(m))))Πj 6=pi−1(n),pi−1(m)fj(vS(pi(j)))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(n)(rm)fpi−1(m)(vS(pi(pi−1(m))))Πj 6=pi−1(n),pi−1(m)fj(vS(pi(j)))
=
=
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(n)(rm))fpi−1(m)(vn)Πj 6=pi−1(n),pi−1(m)fj(vpi(j))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(n)(rm)fpi−1(m)(vn)Πj 6=pi−1(n),pi−1(m)fj(vpi(j))
=
=
∑
pi∈Θ
(1− Fpi−1(n)(rm))fpi−1(m)(v̂)Πj 6=pi−1(n),pi−1(m)fj(vpi(j))∑
pi∈Θ
fpi−1(n)(rm)fpi−1(m)(v̂)Πj 6=pi−1(n),pi−1(m)fj(vpi(j))
The last expression represents exactly the reserve price for a bidder n, if bidder m has a
valuation v̂. Hence, the constructed mechanism is indeed anonymous.
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Chapter 3
Head Starts and Doomed Losers:
Contest via Search
3.1 Introduction
[U]nfortunately, for every Apple out there, there are a thousand other companies . .
. like Woolworth, Montgomery Ward, Borders Books, Blockbuster Video, American
Motors and Pan Am Airlines, that once `ruled the roost' of their respective industries,
to only get knocked off by more innovative competitors and come crashing down.
(Forbes, January 8, 2014)
This chapter studies innovation contests, which are widely observed in a variety of industries.
In many innovation contests, some firms have head starts: One firm has a more advanced ex-
isting technology than its rivals at the outset of a competition. The opening excerpt addresses
a prominent phenomenon that is often observed in innovation contests: Companies with a head
start ultimately lose a competition in the long run. It seems that having a head start sometimes
results in being trapped. The failure of Nokia, the former global mobile communications giant,
to compete with the rise of Apple's iPhone is one example. James Surowiecki (2013) pointed out
that Nokia's focus on (improving) hardware, its existing technology, and neglect of (innovating)
software contributed to the company's downfall. In his point of view, this was a classic case of
a company being enthralled (and, in a way, imprisoned) by its past success (New Yorker Times,
September 3, 2013).
Motivated by these observations, we investigate the effects of head starts on firms' competi-
tion strategies and payoffs in innovation contests. Previous work on innovation contests focuses
on reduced form games and symmetric players, and previous work on contests with head starts
considers all-pay auctions with either sequential bidding or simultaneous bidding. By contrast,
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we consider a stochastic contest model in which one firm has a superior existing innovation at the
outset of the contest and firms' decisions are dynamic. The main contribution of our study is the
identification of the long-run effects of a head start. In particular, in a certain range of the head
start value, the head start firm becomes the ultimate loser in the long run and its competitor (or
competitors) benefits greatly from its initial apparent disadvantage. The key insight to the above
phenomenon is that a large head start (e.g., a patent) indicates a firm's demise as an innovator.
Specifically, the model we develop in Section 3.3 entails two firms and one fixed prize. At the
beginning of the game, each firm may or may not have an initial innovation. Whether a firm has
an initial innovation, as well as the value of the initial innovation if this firm has one, is common
knowledge. If a firm conducts a search for innovations, it incurs a search cost. As long as a
firm continues searching, innovations arrive according to a Poisson process. The value of each
innovation is drawn independently from a fixed distribution. The search activity and innovation
process of each firm are privately observed. At any time point before a common deadline, each firm
decides whether to stop its search process. At the deadline, each firm releases its most effective
innovation to the public, and the one whose released innovation is deemed superior wins the prize.
First, we consider equilibrium behavior in the benchmark case, in which no firm has any
innovation initially, in Section 3.4. We divide the deadline-cost space into three regions (as in
figure 3.1). For a given deadline, (1) if the search cost is relatively high, there are two equilibria, in
each of which one firm searches until it discovers an innovation and the other firm does not search;
(2) if the search cost is in the middle range, each firm searches until it discovers an innovation;
(3) if the search cost is relatively low, each firm searches until it discovers an innovation with a
value above a certain positive cut-off value. In the third case, the equilibrium cut-off value strictly
increases as the deadline extends and the arrival rate of innovations increases, and it strictly
decreases as the search cost increases.
We then extend the benchmark case to include a head start: The head start firm is assigned
a better initial innovation than its competitor, called the latecomer. Section 3.5 considers equi-
librium behavior in the case with a head start and compares equilibrium payoffs across firms, and
Section 3.6 analyzes the effects of a head start on each firm's equilibrium payoff.
Firms' equilibrium strategies depend on the value of the head starter's initial innovation (head
start). Our main findings concern the case in which the head start lies in the middle range. In
this range, the head starter loses its incentive to search because of its high initial position. The
latecomer takes advantage of that and searches more actively, compared to when there is no head
start.
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An immediate question is: who does the head start favor? When the deadline is short, the
latecomer does not have enough time to catch up, and thus the head starter obtains a higher
expected payoff than the latecomer does. When the deadline is long, the latecomer is highly likely
to obtain a superior innovation than the head starter, and thus the latecomer obtains a higher
expected payoff. In the latter case, the latecomer's initial apparent disadvantage, in fact, puts
it in a more favorable position than the head starter. When the deadline is sufficiently long, the
head starter is doomed to lose the competition with a payoff of zero because of its unwillingness
to search, and all benefits of the head start goes to the latecomer.
Then, does the result that the latecomer is in a more favorable position than the head starter
when the deadline is long imply that the head start hurts the head starter and benefits the
latecomer in the long run? Focus on the case in which the latecomer does not have an initial
innovation. When the search cost is relatively low, the head start, in fact, always benefits the
head starter, but the benefit ceases as the deadline extends. It also benefits the latecomer when
the deadline is long. When the search cost is relatively high, the head start could potentially hurt
the head starter.
If the head start is large, neither firm will conduct a search, because the latecomer is deterred
from competition. In this scenario, no innovation or technological progress is created, and the head
starter wins the contest directly. If the head start is small, both firms play the same equilibrium
strategy as they do when neither firm has an initial innovation. In both cases, the head start
benefits the head starter and hurts the latecomer.
Section 3.7.1 extends our model to include stages at which the firms sequentially have an
option to discard their initial innovation before the contest starts. Suppose that both firms'
initial innovations are of values in the middle range and that the deadline is long. If the head
starter can take the first move in the game, it can increase its expected payoff by discarding its
initial innovation and committing to search. When search cost is low, by sacrificing the initial
innovation, the original head starter actually makes the competitor the new head starter; this new
head starter has no incentive to discard its initial innovation or to search any more. It is possible
that by discarding the head start, the original head starter may benefit both firms. When search
cost is high, discarding the initial innovation is a credible threat to the latecomer, who will find the
apparent leveling of the playing field discouraging to conducting a high-cost search. As a result,
the head starter suppresses the innovation progress.
In markets, some firms indeed give up head starts (Ulhøi, 2004), and our result provides a
partial explanation of this phenomenon. For example, Tesla gave up its patents for its advanced
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technologies on electric vehicles at an early stage of its business.1 While there may be many
reasons for doing so, one significant reason is to maintain Tesla's position as a leading innovator
in the electronic vehicle market.2 As Elon Musk (2014), the CEO of Tesla, wrote,
technology leadership is not defined by patents, which history has repeatedly shown to
be small protection indeed against a determined competitor, but rather by the ability
of a company to attract and motivate the world's most talented engineers.3
Whilst Tesla keeps innovating to win a large share of the future market, its smaller competitors
have less incentive to innovate since they can directly adopt Tesla's technologies. One conjecture
which coincides with our result is that Tesla might be planning to distinguish itself from the
competitors it helps . . . by inventing and patenting better electric cars than are available today
(Discovery Newsletter, June 13, 2014).
Section 3.7.2 considers intermediate information disclosure. Suppose the firms are required to
reveal their discoveries at an early time point after the starting of the contest, how would firms
compete against each other? If the head start is in the middle range, before the revelation point, the
head starter will conduct a search, whereas the latecomer will not. If the head starter obtains a very
good innovation before that point, the latecomer will be deterred from competition. Otherwise, the
head starter is still almost certain to lose the competition. Hence, such an information revelation
at an early time point increases both the expected payoff to the head starter and the expected
value of the winning innovation.
Section 3.8 compares the effects of a head start to those of a cost advantage and points out
a significant difference. A cost advantage reliably encourages a firm to search more actively for
innovations, whereas it discourages the firm's competitor.
Section 3.9 concludes this chapter. The overarching message this chapter conveys is that a
market regulator who cares about long-run competitions in markets may not need to worry too
much about the power of the current market dominating firms if these firms are not in excessively
high positions. In the long run, these firms are to be defeated by latecomers. On the other hand, if
the dominating firms are in excessively high positions, which deters entry, a regulator can intervene
the market.
1Toyota also gave up patents for its hydrogen fuel cell vehicles at an early stage.
2Another reason is to help the market grow faster by the diffusion of its technologies. A larger market increases
demand and lowers cost.
3See All Our Patent Are Belong To You, June 12, 2014, on http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-
are-belong-you.
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3.2 Literature
There is a large literature on innovation contests. Most work considers reduced form models
(Fullerton and McAfee, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Baye and Hoppe, 2003; Che and Gale,
2003).4 Head starts are studied in various forms of all-pay auctions. Leininger (1991), Konrad
(2002), and Konrad and Leininger (2007) model a head start as a first-mover advantage in a
sequential all-pay auction and study the first-mover's performance. Casas-Arce and Martinez-
Jerez (2011), Siegel (2014), and Seel (2014) model a head start as a handicap in a simultaneous
all-pay auction and study the effect on the head starter. Kirkegaard (2012) and Seel and Wasser
(2014) also model a head start as a handicap in a simultaneous all-pay auction but study the effect
on the auctioneer's expected revenue. Segev and Sela (2014) analyzes the effect a handicap on the
first mover in a sequential all-pay auction. Unlike these papers, we consider a framework in which
players' decisions are dynamic.
The literature considering settings with dynamic decisions is scarce, and most studies focus
on symmetric players. The study by Taylor (1995) is the most prominent.5 In his symmetric
T -period private search model, there is a unique equilibrium in which players continue searching
for innovations until they discover one with a value above a certain cut-off. We extend Taylor's
model to analyze the effects of a head start and find the long-run effects of the head start, which
is our main contribution.
Seel and Strack (2013, 2016) and Lang et al. (2014) also consider models with dynamic deci-
sions. Same as in our model, in these models each player also solves an optimal stopping problem.
However, the objectives and the results of these papers are different from ours. In the models
of Seel and Strack (2013, 2016), each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brown-
ian motion with a drift. In their earlier model, there is no deadline and no search cost and a
process is forced to stop when it hits zero. They find that players do not stop their processes
immediately even if the drift is negative. In their more resent model, each search incurs a cost
that depends on the stopping time. This more recent study finds that when noise vanishes the
equilibrium outcome converges to the symmetric equilibrium outcome of an all-pay auction. Lang
et al. (2014) consider a multi-period model in which each player decides when to stop a privately
observed stochastic points-accumulation process. They find that in equilibrium the distribution
4Also see, for example, Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye et al. (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1998), Che and Gale
(1998), Cohen and Sela (2007), Schöttner (2008), Bos (2012), Siegel (2009, 2010, 2014), Kaplan et al. (2003), and
Erkal and Xiao (2015).
5Innovation contests were modeled as a race in which the first to reach a defined finishing line gains a prize, e.g.,
Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), and Reinganum (1981, 1982).
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over successes converges to the symmetric equilibrium distribution of an all-pay auction when the
deadline is long.
Our study also contributes to the literature on information disclosure in innovation contests.
Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010), Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), and Wirtz (2013) study how much
information on intermediate performances a contest designer should disclose to the contestants.
Unlike what we do, these papers consider two-stage games in which the value of a contestant's
innovation is its total outputs from the two stages. Bimpikis et al. (2014) and Halac et al. (2017)
study the problem of designing innovation contests, which includes both the award structures and
the information disclosure policies. Halac et al. (2017) consider a model in which each contestant
searches for innovations, but search outcomes are binary. A contest ends after the occurrence of
a single breakthrough, and a contestant becomes more and more pessimistic over time if there
has been no breakthrough. Bimpikis et al. (2014) consider a model which shares some features
with Halac et al. (2017). In the model, an innovation happens only if two breakthroughs are
achieved by the contestants, the designer decides whether to disclose the information on whether
the first breakthrough has been achieved by a contestant, and intermediate awards can be used.
In both models, contestants are symmetric. In contrast, the contestants in our model are always
asymmetric. Rieck (2010) studies information disclosure in the two-period case of Taylor's (1995)
model. In contrast to our finding, he shows that the contest designer prefers concealing the outcome
in the first stage. Unlike all the above papers, Gill (2008), Yildirim (2005), and Akcigit and Liu
(2015) address the incentives for contestants, rather than the designer, to disclose intermediate
outcomes.
Last but most importantly, our study contributes to the literature on the relationship between
market structure and incentive for R&D investment. The debate over the effect of market structure
on R&D investment dates back to Schumpeter (1934, 1942).6 Due to the complexity of the R&D
process, earlier theoretical studies tend to focus on one facet of the process. Gilbert and Newbery
(1982), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985a,b, 1987), Judd (2003), Grossman and
Shapiro (1987), and Lippman and McCardle (1987) study preemption games. In these models, an
incumbent monopolist has more incentive to invest in R&D than a potential entrant. In fact, a
potential entrant sees little chance to win the competition, because of a lag at the starting point
of the competition, and is deterred from competition. In our model, the intuition for the result in
the case of a large head start is similar to this preemption effect, except that no firm invests in
our case.
6See Gilbert (2006) for a comprehensive survey.
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By contrast, Arrow (1962) and Reinganum (1983, 1985) show, in their respective models, that
an incumbent monopolist has less incentive to innovate than a new entrant.7 The cause for this
is what is called the replacement effect by Tirole (1997). While an incumbent monopolist can
increase its profit by innovating, it has to lose the profit from the old technology once it adopts a
new technology. This effectively reduces the net value of the new technology to the incumbent. It
is then natural that a firm who has a lower value of an innovation has less incentive to innovate,
which is exactly what happens in our model with asymmetric costs. On the other hand, our
main result, on medium-sized head start, has an intuition very similar to the replacement effect.
Rather than a reduction in the value of an innovation to the head starter, a head start decreases
the increase in the probability of winning from innovating. In both Reinganum's models and
our model, an incumbent could have a lower probability of winning than a new entrant. However,
different from her models, in our model an incumbent (head starter) can also have a lower expected
payoff than a new entrant (latecomer).
3.3 The Model
Firms and Tasks
There are two risk neutral firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, competing for a prespecified prize, normalized
to 1, in the contest. Time is continuous, and each firm searches for innovations before a deadline T .
At the deadline T , each firm releases to the public the best innovation it has discovered, and the
firm who releases a superior innovation wins the prize. If no firm has discovered any innovation,
the prize is retained. If there is a tie between the two firms, the prize is randomly allocated to
them with equal probability.
At any time point t ∈ [0, T ) before the deadline, each firm decides whether to continue searching
for innovations. If a firm continues searching, the arrival of innovations in this firm follows a
Poisson process with an arrival rate of λ. That is, the probability of discovering m innovations
in an interval of length δ is e
−λδ(λδ)m
m! . The values of innovations are drawn independently from
a distribution F , defined on (0, 1] with F (0) := lima→0 F (a) = 0. F is continuous and strictly
increasing over the domain.
Each firm's search cost is c > 0 per unit of time. We assume that c < λ, because if c > λ the
cost is so high that no firm is going to conduct a search. To illustrate this claim, suppose Firm 2
does not search, Firm 1 will not continue searching if it has an innovation with a value above 0,
7Doraszelski (2003) generalizes the models of Reinganum (1981, 1982) to a history-dependent innovation process
model and shows, in some circumstances, the catching-up behavior in equilibrium.
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whereas Firm 1's instantaneous gain from searching at any moment when it has no innovation is
lim
δ→0
∑+∞
m=1
e−λδ(λδ)m
m! − cδ
δ
= λ− c,
which is negative if c > λ.
Information
The search processes of the two firms are independent and with recall. Whether the opponent
firm is actively searching is unobservable; whether a firm has discovered any innovation, as well
as the values of discovered innovations, is private information until the deadline T .
For convenience, we say a firm is in a state a ∈ [0, 1] at time t if the value of the best innovation
it has discovered by time t is a, where a = 0 means that the firm has no innovation. The initial
states of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are denoted by aI1 and a
I
2, respectively. Firms' initial states are
commonly known.
Strategies
In our model, each firm's information on its opponent is not updated. Hence, the game is static,
although the firms' decisions are dynamic. Then, the solution concept we use is Nash equilibrium.
In accordance with the standard result from search theory that each firm's optimal strategy is a
constant cut-off rule, we make the following assumption.8
Assumption 3.1. We focus on equilibria that consist of constant cut-off rules: Denote aˆ∗i as
an equilibrium strategy. aˆ∗i ∈ Si := {−1} ∪ [aIi , 1].
If a constant cut-off strategy aˆ∗i ∈ [aIi , 1] is played, at any time point t ∈ [0, T ), Firm i stops
searching if it is in a state above aˆ∗i and continues searching if in a state below or at aˆ
∗
i .
9 The
strategy aˆi = −1 represents that Firm i does not conduct a search.
Suppose both firms have no initial innovation. Without this assumption, for any given strategy
played by a firm's opponent, there is a constant cut-off rule being the firm's best response. Such
a cut-off value being above zero is the unique best response strategy, ignoring elements associated
with zero probability events. However, in the cases in which a firm is indifferent between continuing
searching and not if it is in state 0, this firm has (uncountably) many best response strategies.
8See Lippman and McCall (1976) for the discussion on optimal stopping strategies for searching with finite
horizon and recall.
9Once Firm i stops searching at some time point it shall not search again later.
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The above assumption helps us to focus on the two most natural strategies: not to search at all
and to search with 0 as the cut-off.10 A full justification for this assumption is provided in the
appendix.
Let P˜ [a|aˆi, aIi ] denote the probability of Firm i ending up in a state below a if it adopts a
strategy aˆi and its initial state is aIi ; let E[cost|aˆi] denote Firm i's expected cost on search if it
adopts a strategy aˆi. Firm i's ex ante expected utility is
Ui =
∫ 1
0
P [a|aˆ−i, aI−i]dP [a|aˆi, aIi ]− E[cost|aˆi].
Now, we are ready to study equilibrium behavior. Before solving the head start case, we first
look at the case with no initial innovation.
3.4 The Symmetric-Firms Benchmark (aI1 = a
I
2 = 0)
In this section, we look at the benchmark case, in which both firms start with no innovation. It
is in the spirit of Taylor's (1995), except that it is in continuous time. The equilibrium strategies
are presented below.11
Theorem 3.1. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0.
i. If c ∈ [12λ(1 + e−λT ), λ), there are two equilibria, in each of which one firm searches with 0
as the cut-off and the other firm does not search.
ii. If c ∈ [12λ(1− e−λT ), 12λ(1 + e−λT )), there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search
with 0 as the cut-off.
iii. If c ∈ (0, 12λ(1− e−λT )), there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search with a∗ as
the cut-off, where a∗ > 0 is the unique value that satisfies
1
2
λ[1− F (a∗)]
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
]
= c. (3.1)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2.
10Without this assumption, there can be additional best response strategies of the following type: a firm ran-
domizes between searching and not searching until a time T ′ < T with cutoff 0 and stops at T ′ even if no discovery
was made.
11When search cost is low, the equilibrium is unique even without Assumption 3.1. When search is high, without
Assumption 3.1, there are additional symmetric equilibria of the following type: each firm randomizes between not
participating and participating until a time T ′ < T with 0 as the cutoff.
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The result is illustrated in figure 3.1. The deadline-cost space is divided into three regions.12
In Region 1, the search cost is so high that it is not profitable for both firms to innovate. In Region
2, both firms would like to conduct a search in order to discover an innovation with any value,
but none has the incentive to spend additional effort to find an innovation with a high value. In
Region 3, both firms exert efforts to find an innovation with a value above a certain level. In this
case, a firm in the cut-off state is indifferent between continuing and stopping searching. This is
represented by equation (3.1), in which 1 − e−λT [1−F (a∗)] is the probability of a firm's opponent
ending up in a state above a∗ and 12 [1− F (a∗)] is the increase in the probability of winning if the
firm, in state a∗, obtains a new innovation. Hence, this equation represents that, in the cut-off
state, the instantaneous increase in the probability of winning from continuing searching equals
the instantaneous cost of searching. As T goes to infinity, c = λ2 becomes the separation line for
Case [i] and Case [iii].
Generally, there is no closed form solution for the cut-off value in Case [iii]. However, if the
search cost is very low, we have a simple approximation for it.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. When c is small, a
∗ ≈ F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ2T
)
.
Proof. First, we assume that λT [1−F (a∗)] is small, and we come back to check that it is implied
12An  area we say is the interior of the corresponding area.
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by that c is small. Applying equation (3.1), we have
c
λ
=
1
2
[1− F (a∗)]
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
]
≈ 1
2
λT [1− F (a∗)]2
⇔[1− F (a∗)]2 ≈ 2c
λ2T
⇔a∗ ≈ F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ2T
)
and λT [1− F (a∗)] ≈
√
2cT .
For later reference we, based on the previous theorem, define a function a∗ : (0, λ)× [0,+∞)→
[0, 1] where
a∗(c, T ) =

0 for c ∈ [12λ(1− e−λT ), λ)
the a∗ that solves (3.1) for c ∈ (0, 12λ(1− e−λT )).
A simple property which will be used in later sections is stated below.
Lemma 3.1. In Region 3, a∗(c, T ) is strictly increasing in T (and λ) and strictly decreasing in c.
There are two observations. One is that a∗(c, T ) = 0 if c ≥ λ2 . The other is that a∗(c, T )
converges to F−1(1 − 2cλ ) as T goes to infinity if c < λ2 , which derives from taking the limit of
equation (3.1) w.r.t. T . Let us denote a∗L as the limit of a
∗(c, T ) w.r.t. T :
a∗L := lim
T→+∞
a∗(c, T ) =

0 for c ≥ λ2 ,
F−1(1− 2cλ ) for c < λ2 .
We end this section by presenting a full rent dissipation property of the contest when the
deadline approaches infinity.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. If c <
λ
2 , each firm's expected payoff in equilibrium goes to 0
as the deadline T goes to infinity.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2.
The intuition is as follows. The instantaneous increase in the expected payoff from searching for
a firm who is in state a∗(c, T ), the value of the equilibrium cut-off, is 0 (it is indifferent between
continuing searching and not). If the deadline is finite, a firm in a state below a∗(c, T ) has a
positive probability of winning even if it stops searching. Hence, the firms have positive rents in
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the contest. As the deadline approaches infinity, there is no difference between being in a state
below a∗(c, T ) and at a∗(c, T ), because the firm will lose the contest for sure if it does not search.
In either case the instantaneous increase in the expected payoff from searching is 0. Hence, in the
limit the firms' rents in the contest are fully dissipated.
Though the equilibrium expected payoff goes to 0 in the limit, it is not monotonically decreasing
to 0 as the deadline approaches infinity, because each firm's expected payoff converges to 0 as the
deadline approaches 0 as well.13
3.5 Main Results: Exogenous Head Starts (aI1 > a
I
2)
In this section, we add head starts into the study. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Firm 1 has a better initial innovation than does Firm 2 before competition begins, i.e., aI1 > a
I
2.
We first derive the equilibrium strategies, and then we explore equilibrium properties.
3.5.1 Equilibrium Strategies
Theorem 3.2. Suppose aI1 > a
I
2.
1. For aI1 > F
−1(1 − cλ), there is a unique equilibrium, in which no firm searches, and thus
Firm 1 wins the prize.
2. For aI1 = F
−1(1− cλ), there are many equilibria. In one equilibrium, both firms do not search.
In the other equilibria, Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches with a value aˆ2 ∈ [aI2, aI1]
as the cut-off.
3. For aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1 − cλ)), there is a unique equilibrium, in which Firm 1 does not
search and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off .
4. For aI1 = a
∗(c, T ), there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, both firms search with aI1 as
the cut-off. In the other equilibrium, Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as
the cut-off.
5. For aI1 ∈ (0, a∗(c, T )), there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search with a∗(c, T )
as the cut-off.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.3.
Remark. Case [4] and [5] exist only when c ≤ 12λ[1− e−λT ] (Region 3).
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Figure 3.2: Thresholds (when c < λ
2
(1− e−λT ) ).
The thresholds in the theorem are depicted in figure 3.2. The leading case is Case [3], when
the head start is in the middle range. A head start reduces the return of a search, in terms of the
increase in the probability of winning. Having a sufficiently large initial innovation, Firm 1 loses
incentive to search because the marginal increase in the probability of winning from searching
for Firm 1 is too small compared to the marginal cost of searching, whether Firm 2 searches or
not. Firm 2 takes advantage of that and commits to search until it discovers an innovation better
than Firm 1's initial innovation. Hence, compared to its equilibrium behavior in the benchmark
case, Firm 2 is more active in searching (in terms of a higher cut-off value) when Firm 1 has a
medium-sized head start, and a larger value of head start forces Firm 2 to search more actively.
In Case [1], Firm 1's head start is so large that Firm 2 is deterred from competition because
Firm 2 has little chance to win if it searches. Firm 1 wins the prize without incurring any cost.
Moreover, it is independent of the deadline T .
In Case [5], in which Firm 1's head start is small, the head start has no effect on either firm's
equilibrium strategy, and both firms search with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off, same as in the benchmark
case. The only effect of the head start is an increase in Firm 1's probability of winning (and a
decrease in Firm 2's).
In brief, a comparison of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.1 shows that a head start of Firm 1 does
not alter its own equilibrium behavior but Firm 2's. The effect on Firm 2's equilibrium strategy is
13In fact, by taking the derivative of (3.12) (as in the appendix) w.r.t. T , one can show that the derivative at
T = 0 is λ− c > 0 and that, if c < λ
2
, (3.12) is increasing in T for T < min{ 1
λ
ln λ
c
, 1
λ
ln λ
λ−2c} and decreasing in T
for T > max{ 1
λ
ln λ
c
, 1
λ
ln λ
λ−2c}.
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not monotone in the head start of Firm 1. The initial state of Firm 2, the latecomer, is irrelevant
to the equilibrium strategies. Figure 3.3 illustrates how each firm's equilibrium strategy changes
as the value of the initial innovation of Firm 1, the head starter, varies.
a∗(c,T ) 1
-1
0
a∗(c,T )
1
aI1
aˆ1
(a) Firm 1
a∗(c,T ) 1
-1
0
a∗(c,T )
F−1(1− c
λ
)
1
F−1(1− c
λ
)
aI1
aˆ2
(b) Firm 2
Figure 3.3: Firms' equilibrium cut-off values as the value of Firm 1's initial innovation, aI1,
varies.
Figure 3.4 illustrates Firm 2'the best responses (when it has no initial innovation) to Firm 1's
strategies for various values of Firm 1's initial states. The case in which Firm 1 has a high-value
initial innovation is significantly different from the case in which Firm 1 has no initial innovation.
Turning back to Case [3] in the previous result, we notice that the lower bound for this
case to happen does not converge to the upper bound as the deadline approaches infinity, i.e.,
a∗L < F
−1(1− cλ). The simplest but most interesting result of this study, the case of head starts
and doomed losers, derives.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)).
1. Firm 2's (Firm 1's) probability of winning increases (decreases) in the deadline.
2. As T goes to infinity, Firm 2's probability of winning goes to 1, and Firm 1's goes to 0.
Proof. In equilibrium Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off. Firm 2's
probability of winning is thus
1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)],
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Figure 3.4: Best response projections for Firm 2 as aI1 takes values in {−1, α, α′, α′′}
(c < λ
2
(1− e−λT ) and aI2 = 0 ).
BR1 represents Firm 2's best responses when no firm has an initial innovation. If Firm 1
does not search, Firm 2 would search with 0 as the cut-off. If Firm 1 searches with 0 as the
cut-off, Firm 2 would search with a cut-off higher than the equilibrium cut-off. As Firm 1
further rises its cut-off, Firm 2 would first rise its cut-off and then lower its cut-off. When the
deadline is long, Firm 2 would not search if Firm 1's cut-off is high. BR2 and BR3 represent
Firm 2's best responses when Firm 1 has an initial innovation with a value slightly above
a∗(c, T ), the equilibrium cut-off when there is no initial innovation. In this case, if Firm 1
does not search, Firm 2's best response is to search with the value Firm 1's initial innovation
as the cut-off. If Firm 1 searches with a cut-off slightly above the value of its initial innovation,
Firm 2's best response is still to search with the value of Firm 1's initial innovation as the
cut-off. Once Firm 1's cut-off is greater than a certain value, Firm 2 would not search. BR4
represents Firm 2's best responses when Firm 1 has a high-value initial innovation. In this
case, if Firm 1 does not search, Firm 2 would still search with the value of Firm 1's initial
innovation as the cut-off; if Firm 1 searches, Firm 2 would have no incentive to search. On
the other hand, when the value of Firm 1's initial innovation is above a∗(c, T ), Firm 1's best
response to any strategy of Firm 2 is not to search.
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which is increasing in T , and it converges to 1 as T goes infinity. Firm 1's probability of winning
is e−λT [1−F (aI1)], which is, in the contrast, decreasing in T , and it converges to 0 as T approaches
infinity.
This property results from our assumption that search processes are with recall. The larger
the head start is, the smaller the marginal increase in the probability of winning from searching
is, given any strategy played by the latecomer. Hence, even if the head starter knows that in the
long run the latecomer will almost surely obtain an innovation with a value higher than its initial
innovation, the head starter is not going to conduct a search as long as the instantaneous increase
in the probability of winning is smaller than the instantaneous cost of searching.
3.5.2 Payoff Comparison across Firms
A natural question arises: which firm does a head start favor? Will Firm 1 or Firm 2 achieve a
higher expected payoff? To determine that, we need a direct comparison of the two firms' expected
payoffs. When aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)), the difference between the payoffs of Firm 1 and Firm
2 is14
DF (T, aI1) := e
−λT [1−F (aI1)] − (1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)])(1− c
λ[1− F (aI1)]
). (3.2)
The head start of Firm 1 favors Firm 1 (Firm 2) if DF (T, aI1) > (<)0.
DF (T, aI1) is increasing in a
I
1 and decreasing in T . Hence, a longer deadline tends toward to
favor Firm 2 when the head start is in the middle range. Since
DF (0, aI1) = 1 > 0
and
lim
T→∞
DF (T, aI1) = −(1−
c
λ[1− F (aI1)]
) < 0 for any aI < F−1(1− c
λ
),
there must be a unique Tˆ (aI1) > 0 such that DE(Tˆ (a
I
1), a
I
1) = 0. The following result derives.
Proposition 3.1. For aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)), there is a unique Tˆ (aI1) > 0 such that Firm 1 (Firm
2) obtains a higher expected payoff if T < (>)Tˆ (aI1).
141 − e−λT [1−F (aI1)] is Firm 2's probability of obtaining an innovation better than Firm 1's initial innovation,
aI1, and
1
λ[1−F (aI1)]
is the unconditional expected interarrival time of innovations with a value higher than aI1. The
second term in DF (T, aI1) thus represents the expected payoff of Firm 2.
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That is, for any given value of the head start in the middle range (a∗L, F
−1(1− cλ)), the head
start favors the latecomer (head starter) if the deadline is long (short). The effects of a head start
do not vanish as the deadline approaches infinity. In fact, as the deadline approaches infinity, the
head start eventually pushes the whole share of the surplus to Firm 2.
Lemma 3.3. As the deadline increases to infinity,
1. for aI1 ∈ (0, a∗L), both Firms' equilibrium payoffs converge to 0;
2. for aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)), Firm 1's equilibrium payoff converges to 0, whereas Firm 2's
equilibrium payoff converges to 1− c
λ[1−F (aI1)]
∈ (0, 12).
Proof. [1] follows from Lemma 3.2. [2] follows from Corollary 3.2 and the limit of Firm 2's expected
payoff
(1− e−λT [1−F (aI)])
(
1− c
λ[1− F (aI1)]
)
(3.3)
w.r.t. T .
A comparison to Lemma 3.2 shows that, just as having no initial innovation, when Firm 1
has an innovation whose value is not of very high, its expected payoff still converges to 0 as the
deadline becomes excessively long. When there is no initial innovation, the expected total surplus
for the firms (i.e., the sum of the two firms' expected payoff) converges to 0. In contrast, when
there is a head start with a value above a∗L, the expected total surplus is strictly positive even when
the deadline approaches infinity. However, as it approaches infinity, this total surplus created by
the head start of Firm 1 goes entirely to Firm 2, the latecomer, if the head start is in the middle
range. The intuition is as follows. For Firm 1, it is clear that its probability of winning converges
to 0 as the deadline goes to infinity. For Firm 2, we first look at the case that aI1 = F
−1(1− cλ). In
this case Firm 2 is indifferent between searching and not searching, and thus the expected payoff
is 0. As the deadline approaches infinity, both expected cost of searching and the probability of
winning converges to 1, if Firm 2 conducts a search. Then, if aI1 is below F
−1(1− cλ) (but above
a∗L), as the deadline approaches infinity, Firm 2's probability of winning still goes to 1, but the
expected cost of searching drops to a value below 1 because it adopts a lower cut-off for stopping.
Hence, Firm 2's expected payoff converges to a positive value.
The relationship between the rank order of the two Firms' payoffs and the deadline is illustrated
in figure 3.5, in each of which Firm 2 obtains a higher expected payoff at each point in the colored
area. (a) is for the cases in which c ≤ λ2 . In these cases a longer deadline tends to favor the
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latecomer. (b) and (c) are for the cases in which c > λ2 . In these cases, the rank order is not
generally monotone in the deadline and the head start.
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Figure 3.5: When (aI1, T ) lies in the colored area, the head start favors the latecomer.
We notice in all the figures that if the deadline is sufficiently short, a head start is ensured to
bias toward Firm 1, whereas if it is long, only a relatively large head start biases toward Firm 1.
3.6 Effects of Head Starts on Payoffs
In this section, we study the effects of a head start on both firms' payoffs. Suppose Firm 2 has
no initial innovation, who does a head start of Firm 1 benefit or hurt? The previous comparison
between Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 already shows that a head start aI1 benefits Firm 1 and
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hurts Firm 2 if aI1 < a
∗(c, T ) or aI1 > F−1(1 − cλ). In the former case, which happens only when
a∗(c, T ) > 0 (Region 3 of figure 3.1), both firms search with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off, the same as
when there is no head start, and the head start increases Firm 1's probability of winning and
decreases Firm 2's. As the deadline goes to infinity, the expected payoffs to both firms converge
to 0, with the effect of the head start disappearing. In the latter case, Firm 1 always obtains a
payoff of 1, and Firm 2 always 0.
The interesting case occurs then when the head start is in the middle range, aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1−
c
λ)), which will be the focus in the remaining parts of this study. To answer the above question
regarding the head start being in the middle range, we first analyze the case that point (c, T ) lies
in Regions 2 and 3 (in figure 3.1), and then we turn to analyze the case of Region 1.
3.6.1 Regions 2 and 3
In the previous section, we showed that for T being sufficiently long, Firm 1 is almost surely going
to lose the competition if aI1 is in the middle range. Although it seems reasonable that in this case
a head start may make Firm 1 worse off, the following proposition shows that this conjecture is
not true.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose aI2 = 0. In Regions 2 and 3, in which c <
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ), a head start
aI1 > 0 always benefits Firm 1, compared to the equilibrium payoff it gets in the benchmark case.
To give the intuition, we consider the case of a∗(c, T ) > 0. Suppose Firm 1 has a head start
aI1 = a
∗(c, T ). As shown in Case [4] of Theorem 3.2, we have the following two equilibria: in one
equilibrium both firms search with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off; in another equilibrium Firm 1 does not
search and Firm 2 searches with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off. Firm 1 is indifferent between these two
equilibria, hence its expected payoffs from both equilibria are e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))], the probability
of Firm 2 finding no innovation with a value higher than a∗(c, T ). However, Firm 1's probability
of winning increases in its head start, hence a larger head start gives Firm 1 a higher expected
payoff.
The above result itself corresponds to expectation. What unexpected is the mechanism through
which Firm 1 gets better off. As a head start gives Firm 1 a higher position, we would expect that
it is better off by (1) having a better chance to win and (2) spending less on searching. Together
with Theorem 3.2, the above proposition shows that Firm 1 is better off purely from an increase
in the probability of winning when aI1 < a
∗(c, T ); purely from spending nothing on searching when
aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1 − cλ)) (though there could be a loss from a decrease in the probability of
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winning); from an increase in the probability of winning and a reduction in the cost of searching
when aI1 > F
−1(1− cλ).
In contrast to the effect of a head start of Firm 1 on Firm 1's own expected payoff, the effect
on Firm 2's expected payoff is not clear-cut. Instead of giving a general picture of the effect, we
present some properties in the following.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose aI2 = 0.
1. A head start aI1 ∈ (0, F−1(1− cλ)) hurts Firm 2 if the deadline T is sufficiently small.
2. If c < λ2 , a head start a
I
1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)) benefits Firm 2 if the deadline is sufficiently
long.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.3.
Case [1] occurs because a head start of Firm 1 reduces Firm 2's probability of winning and may
increase its expected cost of searching. Case [2] follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.1. Because a
head start of Firm 1 always benefits Firm 1 and a long deadline favors Firm 2, a head start must
also benefit Firm 2 if the deadline is long.15
Figure 3.6 illustrates how Firm 2's equilibrium payoff changes as Firm 1's head start increases.
In particular, a head start of Firm 1 slightly above a∗(c, T ), the equilibrium cut-off when there is
no initial innovation, benefits Firm 2 if a∗(c, T ) is low. Some more conditions under which a head
start benefits or hurts the latecomer are given below.
-1 0 α˜ ˜˜α F−1(1− cλ ) 1
When a∗(c, T ) = α˜
When a∗(c, T ) = ˜˜α
aI1
U2
Figure 3.6: Firm 2's equilibrium payoffs as a∗(c, T ) varies.
Proposition 3.4. In Region 2 and 3, in which c < 12λ(1 + e
−λT ),
15Alternatively, it also follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. If the deadline is very long and the head start of Firm
1 is in the middle range, Firm 2's payoff converges to 0 same as in the benchmark case and some positive value in
head start case.
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1. if
(1− e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))])− 1
2
(1− e−2λT ) > 0, (3.4)
there exists a a˜I1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1 − cλ)) such that the head start aI1 hurts Firm 2 if aI1 ∈
(a˜I1, F
−1(1− cλ)) and benefits Firm 2 if aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), a˜I1);
2. if (3.4) holds in the opposite direction, any head start aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)) hurts Firm
2.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.3.
The first term on the left side of inequality (3.4) is Firm 2's probability of winning in the
equilibrium in which Firm 2 searches and Firm 1 does not search in the limiting case that Firm 1
has a head start of a∗(c, T ). The second term, excluding the minus sign, is Firm 1's probability
of winning when there is no head start. The expected searching costs are the same in both cases.
The following corollary shows some scenarios in which inequality (3.4) holds.
Corollary 3.3. In Region 2, when a∗(c, T ) = 0, inequality (3.4) holds.
This shows that for search cost lying in the middle range, a head start of Firm 1 must benefit
Firm 2, if it is slightly above 0. The simple intuition is as follows. When Firm 1 has such a small
head start, Firm 2's cut-off value of searching increases by only a little bit, and thus the expected
cost of searching also increases slightly. However, the increase in Firm 2's probability of winning
is very large, because Firm 1, when having a head start, does not search any more. Thus, in this
case Firm 2 is strictly better off.
Lastly, even though Firm 1 does not search when the head start aI1 > a
∗(c, T ), it seems that a
low search cost may benefit Firm 2. On the contrary, a head start of Firm 1 would always hurt
Firm 2 when the search cost is sufficiently small.
Corollary 3.4. For any fixed deadline T , if the search cost is sufficiently small, inequality (3.4)
holds in the opposite direction.
Proof. As c being close to 0, a∗(c, T ) is close to 1, and thus the term on left side of inequality (3.4)
is close to −12(1− e−2λT ) < 0.
That is because when c is close to 0, a∗(c, T ) is close to 1, and the interval in which Firm 1
does not search while Firm 2 searches is very small, and thus the chance for Firm 2 to win is too
low when aI1 > a
∗(c, T ), even though the expected cost of searching is low as well.
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3.6.2 Region 1
Since there are multiple equilibria in the benchmark case when (c, T ) lies in Region 1, whether a
head start hurts or benefits a firm depends on which equilibrium we compare to. If we compare
the two equilibria in each of which Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches, then the head
start benefits Firm 1 and hurts Firm 2. If we compare to the other equilibrium in the benchmark
case, the outcome is not clear-cut.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose aI2 = 0. In Region 1, in which c >
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ) and a∗(c, T ) = 0, for
aI1 ∈ (0, F−1(1− cλ)), if
(1− e−λT )(1− c
λ
)− e−λT [1−F (aI1)] < 0, (3.5)
Firm 1's equilibrium payoff is higher than its expected payoff in any equilibrium in the benchmark
case. If the inequality holds in the opposite direction, Firm 1's equilibrium payoff is lower than its
payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 searches and Firm 2 does not search in the benchmark
case.
This result is straightforward. The first term on the left side of inequality (3.5) is Firm 1's
expected payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 searches and Firm 2 does not in the benchmark
case and the second term, excluding the minus sign, is its expected payoff when there is no head
start.
Moreover, the left hand side of inequality (3.5) strictly increases in T , and it reaches −1 when
T approaches 0 and 1 − cλ when T approaches infinity. The intermediate value theorem insures
that inequality (3.5) holds in the opposite direction for the deadline T being large.
As a result of the above property, when the head start is small and the deadline is long, in an
extended game in which Firm 1 can publicly discard its head start before the contest starts, there
are two subgame perfect equilibria: in one equilibrium, Firm 1 does not discard its head start and
Firm 2 searches with the Firm 1's initial innovation value as the cut-off; in the other equilibrium,
Firm 1 discards the head start and searches with 0 as the cut-off and Firm 2 does not search.
Hence, there is the possibility that Firm 1 can improve its expected payoff if it discards its head
start.
Last, we discuss Firm 2's expected payoff. The result is also straightforward.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose aI2 = 0. In Region 1, in which c >
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ), for aI1 ∈ (0, F−1(1−
c
λ)), Firm 2's equilibrium payoff is
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• less than its expected payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2
searches in the benchmark case, and
• higher than the payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 searches and Firm 2 does not
search in the benchmark case.
Proof. Compared to the equilibrium in which Firm 2 searches in the benchmark case, in the
equilibrium when Firm 1 has a head start, Firm 2 has a lower expected probability of winning and
a higher expected cost because of a higher cut-off, and and thus a lower expected payoff. But this
payoff is positive.
3.7 Extended Dynamic Models (aI1 > a
I
2)
In this section, we study two extended models.
3.7.1 Endogenous Head Starts
We first study how the firms would play if each firm has the option to discard its initial innovation
before the contest starts. Formally, a game proceeds as below.
Model∗:
• Stage 1: Firm i decides whether to discard its initial innovation.
• Stage 2: Firm i's opponent decides whether to discard its initial innovation.
• Stage 3: Upon observing the outcomes in the previous stages, both firms simultaneously
start playing the contest as described before.
The incentive for a head starter to discard its initial innovation when the latecomer has no
initial innovation has been studied in the previous section. The focus of the section is on the
case in which both firms have an initial innovation in the middle range.16 The main result of this
section is as follows.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose aI1, a
I
2 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)). In Model∗ with Firm 1 having the first
move, there is a T˘ (aI1, a
I
2) > 0 such that
16As shown in Proposition 3.2, when (c, T ) lies in Regions 2 and 3, the head starter with a medium-sized initial
innovation has no incentive to discard its head start if the latecomer has a no innovation. The head starter would
also have no incentive to discard its initial innovation when the latecomer has a low-value initial innovation.
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• if T > T˘ (aI1, aI2), there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), in which Firm 1
discards its initial innovation and searches with aI2 as the cut-off and Firm 2 keeps its initial
innovation and does not search;
• if T < T˘ (aI1, aI2), subgame perfect equilibria exist, and in each equilibrium Firm 2 searches
with aI1 as the cut-off and Firm 1 keeps its initial innovation and does not search.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.4.
This proposition shows that in the prescribed scenario Firm 1 is better off giving up its initial
innovation if the deadline is long.17 The intuition is simple. For the deadline being long, Firm 1's
expected payoff is low, because its probability of winning is low. By giving up its initial innovation,
it makes Firm 2 the head starter, and thus Firm 1 obtains a higher expected payoff than before
by committing to searching whereas Firm 2 has no incentive to search. Yet the reasoning for the
case in which c ≤ λ2 differs from that for the case in which c > λ2 . After Firm 1 discards its
initial innovation, Firm 2 turns to the new head start firm. In the former case, Firm 2 would then
have no incentive to discard its initial innovation any more as shown in Proposition 3.2, and its
dominant strategy in the subgame is not to search whether Firm 1 is to search or not. In the latter
case, Firm 2 may have the incentive to discard its initial innovation and search if the deadline is
17Discarding a head start is one way to give up one's initial leading position. In reality, a more practical
and credible way is to give away the head start innovation. A head start firm could give away it patent
for its technology. By doing so, any firm can use this technology for free. That is, every firm's initial state
becomes aI1. If firms can enter the competition freely, the value of the head start technology is approximately
zero to any single firm, because everyone has approximately zero probability to win with this freely obtained
innovation. For a head start being in the middle range, the market is not large enough to accommodate two
firms to compete. Hence, to model giving away head starts with free entry to the competition, we can study a
competition between two firms but with some modified prize allocation rules. Formally, the game proceeds as below.
Model∗∗:
• Stage 1: Firm 1 decides whether to give away its initial innovation.
• Stage 2: Upon observing the stage 1 outcome, Firm 1 and Firm 2 simultaneously start playing the contest
as described before.
• If Firm 1 gives away its initial innovation:
 Both firms' states at time 0 become aI1.
 The prize is retained if no firm is in a state above aI1 at the deadline T .
 The firm with a higher state, which is higher than aI1, at the deadline wins.
• If Firm 1 retains its initial innovation, the firm with a higher state at the deadline wins.
Suppose aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ )). If the deadline is long, in Model∗∗ there are two subgame perfect equilibria. In
one equilibrium, Firm 1 gives away its initial innovation and searches with aI1 as the cut-off and Firm 2 does not
search. In the other equilibrium, Firm 1 retains its initial innovation and does not search and Firm 2 searches with
aI1 as the cut-off. However, forward induction selects the first equilibrium as the refined equilibrium, because giving
away a head start is a credible signal of Firm 1 to commit to search.
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long. However, discarding the initial innovation is a credible threat for Firm 1 to deter Firm 2
from doing that.
Remark. When the deadline is sufficiently long, by giving up the initial innovation, Firm 1
makes itself better off but Firm 2 worse off. However, if the deadline is not too long, by doing
so, Firm 1 can benefit both firms. This is because the total expected cost of searching after Firm
1 discards its initial innovation is lower than before and hence there is an increase in the total
surplus for the two firms. It is then possible that both firms get a share of the increase in the
surplus. We illustrate that in the following example.
Example 3.1. Suppose F is the uniform distribution, c = 13 , λ = 1, a
I
1 =
1
2 , and a
I
2 =
1
3 . If
Firm 1 discards its initial innovation, then its expected payoff would be 12(1− e−
T
3 ), and Firm 2's
expected payoff would be e−
T
3 ; if Firm 1 does not discard its initial innovation, then its expected
payoff would be e−
T
2 , and Firm 2's expected payoff would be 13(1− e−
T
2 ).
Firm 1 would be better off by discarding its initial innovation if T > 2.52. If T ∈ (2.52, 3.78),
by discarding the initial innovation, Firm 1 makes both firms better off. If T is larger, then doing
so would only make Firm 2 worse off.
The previous result is conditional on Firm 1 having the first move. If Firm 2 has the first move,
it may, by discarding its initial innovation, be able to prevent Firm 1 from discarding its own head
start and committing to searching. However, if the deadline is not sufficiently long, Firm 1 would
still have the incentive to discard its initial innovation.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose aI1, a
I
2 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)). In Model∗ with Firm 2 having the first
move, there is a Tˆ (aI1, a
I
2) > 0 such that
• for T > Tˆ (aI1, aI2), there is a unique SPE, in which Firm 2 discards its initial innovation and
searches with aI2 as the cut-off and Firm 1 keeps the initial innovation and does not search;
• for T ∈ (T˘ (aI1, aI2), Tˆ (aI1, aI2)), there is a unique SPE, in which Firm 2 keeps its initial
innovation and does not search and Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and searches with
aI1 as cut-off;
• for T < T˘ (aI1, aI2), subgame perfect equilibria exist, and in each equilibrium Firm 2 searches
with cut-off aI1 and Firm 1 keeps its initial innovation and does not search.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.4.
In the middle range of the deadline, even though Firm 2 can credibly commit to searching and
scare Firm 1 away from competition by discarding its initial innovation, it is not willing to do so,
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yet Firm 1 would like to discard its initial innovation and commit to searching. This is because
Firm 1's initial innovation is of a higher value than Firm 2's. The cut-off value of the deadline at
which Firm 2 is indifferent between discarding the initial innovation to commit to searching, and
keeping the initial innovation, is higher than that of Firm 1.
3.7.2 Intermediate Information Disclosure
In the software industry, it is common to preannounce with a long lag to launch (Bayus et al.,
2001). Many firms do that by describing the expected features or demonstrating prototypes at
trade shows. Many other firms publish their findings in a commercial disclosure service, such as
Research Disclosure, or in research journals.18 Suppose there is a regulator who would like to
impose an intermediate information disclosure requirement on innovation contests. What are the
effects of the requirement on firms' competition strategies and the expected value of the winning
innovation. Specifically, suppose there is a time point t0 ∈ (0, T ) at which both firms have to
reveal everything they have, how would firms compete against each other?
When the head start aI1 is larger the threshold F
−1(1 − cλ), it is clear that no firm has an
incentive to conduct any search. When the head start is below this threshold, if t0 is very close to T ,
information revelation has little effect on the firms' strategies. Both firms will play approximately
the same actions before time t0 as they do when there is no revelation requirement. After time
t0, the firm in a higher state at time t0 stops searching. The other firm searches with this higher
state as the cut-off if this higher state is below F−1(1 − cλ), and stops searching as well if it is
higher than F−1(1− cλ).
Our main finding in this part regards the cases in which the head start is in the middle range
and the deadline is sufficiently far from the information revelation point.19 That is, firms have to
reveal their progress at an early stage of a competition.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose at a time point t0 ∈ (0, T ) both firms have to reveal their discoveries.
For aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)) and aI2 < aI1, if T − t0 is sufficiently large, there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium, in which
• Firm 1 searches with F−1(1− cλ) as the cut-off before time t0 and stops searching from time
t0;
18Over 90% of the world's leading companies have published disclosures in Research Disclosure's pages (see
www.researchdisclosure.com).
19Generally, for the cases in which aI1 < a
∗
L, there are many subgame perfect equilibria, including two equilibria
in each of which one firm searches with F−1(1 − c
λ
) as the cut-off between time 0 and time t0 and the other firm
does not.
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• Firm 2 does not search before time t0 and searches with aI1 as the cut-off from time t0 if
aI1 < F
−1(1− cλ).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.4.
In the proof, we show that between time 0 and time t0, the dominant action of Firm 2 is not
to search, given that the equilibria in the subgames from time t0 are described as in Theorem 3.2.
If Firm 1 is in a state higher than the threshold F−1(1 − cλ) at time t0, Firm 2's effort will be
futile if it searches before time t0. If Firm 1 is in a state in between its initial state aI1 and and
the threshold F−1(1− cλ) at time t0, Firm 2 has the chance to get into a state above the threshold
F−1(1− cλ) and thus a continuation payoff of 1, but this instantaneous benefit only compensates
the instantaneous cost of searching. Firm 2 also has the chance to get into a state above that of
Firm 1 but below the threshold F−1(1 − cλ) at time t0, which results in a continuation payoff of
approximately 0 if the deadline is sufficiently long, whereas it obtains a strictly positive payoff if
it does not search before time t0. It is thus not worthwhile for Firm 2 to conduct a search before
time t0. If Firm 2 does not search before time t0, Firm 1 then has the incentive to conduct a
search if the deadline is far from t0. If it does not search, it obtains a payoff of approximately 0
when T − t0 is sufficiently large. If it conducts a search before time t0, the benefit from getting
into a higher state can compensate the cost.
An early stage revelation requirement therefore hurts the latecomer and benefits the head
starter. It gives the head starter a chance to get a high-value innovation so as to deter the
latecomer from competition. It also increases the expected value of the winning innovation.
3.8 Discussion: Asymmetric Costs (aI1 = a
I
2 = 0, c1 < c2)
In this section, we show that, compared to the effects of head starts, the effects of cost advantages
are simpler. A head start probably discourages a firm from conducting searching and can either
discourage its competitor from searching or encourage its competitor to search more actively. In
contrast, a cost advantage encourages a firm to search more actively and discourages its opponent.
We now assume that the value of pre-specified prize to Firm i, i = 1, 2, is Vi and that the
search cost is for Firm i is Ci per unit of time. However, at each time point Firm i only makes a
binary decision on whether to stop searching or to continue searching. Whether it is profitable to
continue searching depends on the ratio of CiVi rather than the scale of Vi and Ci. Therefore, we
can normalize the valuation of each player to be 1 and the search cost to be CiVi =: ci. W.l.o.g, we
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assume c1 < c2. For convenience, we define a function
I(ai|aj , ci) := λ
∫ a¯
ai
[Z(a|aj)− Z(ai|aj)]dF (a)− ci,
where Z(a|aj) is defined, in Lemma 3.5 in the appendix, as Firm j's probability of ending up in
a state below a if it searches with aj as the cut-off. We emphasize on the most important case,
in which both firms' search costs are low.
Proposition 3.10. For 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1−e−λT ), there must exist a unique equilibrium (a∗1, a∗2),
in which a∗1 > a∗2 ≥ 0. Specifically,
1. if I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
> 0, the unique equilibrium is a pair of cut-off rules
(a∗1, a∗2), a∗1 > a∗2 > 0, that satisfy
λ
∫ a¯
a∗i
[
Z(a|a∗j , T )− Z(a∗i |a∗j , T )
]
dF (a) = ci;
2. if I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is a pair of cut-off rules(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.5.
The existence of equilibrium is proved by using Brouwer's fixed point theorem. As expected,
a cost (valuation) advantage would drive a firm to search more actively than its opponent. The
following statement shows that while an increase in cost advantage of the firm in advantage would
make the firm more active in searching and its opponent less active, a further cost disadvantage
of the firm in disadvantage would make both firms less active in searching.
Proposition 3.11. For 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1 − e−λT ) and I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
> 0,
in which case there is a unique equilibrium (a∗1, a∗2), a∗1, a∗2 > 0,
1. for fixed c2,
∂a∗1
∂c1
< 0 and
∂a∗2
∂c1
> 0;
2. for fixed c1,
∂a∗1
∂c2
< 0 and
∂a∗2
∂c2
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.5.
The intuition is simple. When the cost of the firm in advantage decreases, this firm would
be more willing to search, while the opponent firm would be discouraged because the marginal
increase in the probability of winning from continuing searching in any state is reduced, and
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c2 \ c1 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
Region 1 (a∗1, a∗2)
(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
(0,−1)
Region 2 / (0, 0) (0,−1)
Region 3 / / (0,−1), (−1, 0)
Table 3.1: Equilibria in all non-marginal cases.
therefore the opponent firm would lower its cut-off. When the cost of the firm at a disadvantage
increases, the firm would be less willing to search, and the opponent firm would consider it less
necessary to search actively because the probability of winning in any state has increased.
A comparison between the equilibrium strategies in this model and that of the benchmark
model can be made.
Corollary 3.5. For 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1 − e−λT ) and I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
> 0, in
which case there is a unique equilibrium (a∗1, a∗2), a∗1 > a∗2 > 0, a∗1 and a∗2 satisfy
1. a∗1 < a∗(c, T ) for the corresponding c = c2 > c1;
2. a∗2 < a∗(c, T ) for the corresponding c = c1 < c2.
Based on the benchmark model, a cost reduction for Firm 1 will result in both firms searching
with cut-offs below the original one; a cost increase for Firm 2 will certainly result in Form 2
searching with a cut-off below the original one.
The equilibrium for the other non-marginal cases (conditional on c1 < c2), together with the
above case, are stated in Table 3.1 without proof. The regions in Table 3.1 are the same as in
Figure 3.1. The row (column) number indicates in which region c1 (c2) lies, and each element
in each cell represents a corresponding equilibrium. For example, the element in the cell at the
second row and the second column means that for c1, c2 ∈ (12λ(1− e−λT ), 12λ(1 + e−λT )), there is
a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search with cut-off 0. This shows that Firm 1 is more
active in searching than is Firm 2.
Remark. Similar results can be found in a model with the same search cost but with different
arrival rates of innovations for the two firms.
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3.9 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we studied the long-run effects of head starts in innovation contests in which each
firm decides when to stop a privately observed repeated sampling process before a preset deadline.
Unlike an advantage in innovation cost or innovation ability, which encourages a firm to search
more actively for innovations and discourages its opponent, a head start has non-monotone effects.
The head starter is discouraged from searching if the head start is large, and its strategy remains
the same if the head start is small. The latecomer is discouraged from searching if the head start
is large but is encouraged to search more actively if it is in the middle range. Our main finding
is that, if the head start is in the middle range, in the long run, the head starter is doomed to
lose the competition with a payoff of zero and the latecomer will take the entire surplus for the
competing firms. As a consequence, our model can exhibit either the preemption effect or the
replacement effect, depending on the value of the head start.
Our results have implications on antitrust problems. Market regulators have concerns that the
existence of market dominating firms, such as Google, may hinder competitions, and they take
measures to curb the monopoly power of these companies. For instance, the European Union voted
to split Google into smaller companies.20 Our results imply that in many cases the positions of the
dominant firms are precarious. In the long run, they will be knocked off their perch. These firms'
current high positions, in fact, may promote competitions in the long run because they encourage
their rivals to exert efforts to innovate and reach high targets. Curbing the power of the current
dominating firms may benefit the society and these firms' rivals in the short run, but in the long
run it hurts the society because it discourages innovation. However, the the dominating firms'
positions are excessively high, which deters new firms from entering the the market, a market
regulator could take some actions.
The results have also implications on R&D policies. When selecting an R&D policy, policy
makers have to consider both the nature of the R&D projects and the market structure. If the
projects are on radical innovations, subsidizing innovation costs effectively increases competition
when the market is blank (no advanced substitutive technology exists in the market). However,
when there is a current market dominating firm with an existing advanced technology, a subsidy
may not be effective. The dominating firm has no incentive to innovate, and the latecomer, even
if it is subsidized, will not innovate more actively.
In our model we have only one head starter and one latecomer. The model can be extended to
20Google break-up plan emerges from Brussels, Financial Times, November 21, 2014.
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include more than two firms, and similar results still hold. One extension is to study the designing
problem in our framework. For example, one question is how to set the deadline. If the designer
is impatient, she may want to directly take the head starter's initial innovation without holding a
contest; if she is patient, she may set a long deadline in order to obtain a better innovation. Some
other extensions include: to consider a model with a stochastic number of firms; to consider a
model with cumulative scores with or without regret instead of a model with repeated sampling.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Preliminaries
To justify Assumption 3.1, we show in the following that, for any given strategy played by a firm's
opponent, there is a constant cut-off rule being the firm's best response. If the cut-off value is
above zero, it is actually the unique best response strategy, ignoring elements associated with zero
probability events. We argue only for the case that both firms' initial states are 0. The arguments
for the other cases are similar and thus are omitted.
Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. For a given strategy played by Firm j, we say at time t
ati := inf{a˜ ∈ A|Firm i weakly prefers stopping to continuing searching in state a˜}
is Firm i's lower optimal cut-off and
a¯ti := inf{a˜ ∈ A|Firm i strictly prefers stopping to continuing searching in state a˜}
is Firm i's upper optimal cut-off .
Lemma 3.4. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. For any fixed strategy played by Firm j, Firm i's best response
belongs to one of the three cases.
i. Not to search: a¯ti = a
t
i = −1 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ii. Search with a constant cut-off rule aˆi ≥ 0: a¯ti = ati = aˆi ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
iii. Both not to search and search until being in a state above 0: a¯ti = 0 and a
t
i = −1 for all
t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Fix a strategy of Firm j. Let P (a) denote the probability of Firm j
ending up in a state below a at time T . P (a) is either constant in a or strictly increasing in a.
It is a constant if and only if Firm j does not search.21 If this is the case, Firm i's best response
21More generally, it is constant if and only if the opponent firm conducts search with a measure 0 over [0, T ].
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is to continue searching with a fixed cut-off aˆti = a¯
ti = ati = 0 for all t. In the following, we study
the case in which P (a) is strictly increasing in a.
Step 1. We argue that, given a fixed strategy played by Firm j, Firm i's best response is a
(potentially history-dependent) cut-off rule. Suppose at time t Firm i is in a state a˜ ∈ [0, 1]. If it
is strictly marginally profitable to stop (continue) searching at t, then it is also strictly marginally
profitable to continue searching if it is in a state higher (lower) than a˜. Let the upper and lower
optimal cut-offs at time t be a¯ti and a
t
i, respectively, as defined previously.
Step 2. We show that {a¯ti}Tt=0 and {ati}Tt=0 should be history-independent. We use a discrete
version to approximate the continuous version. Take any t˜ ∈ [0, T ). Let {tl}kl=0, where tl − tl−1 =
T−t˜
k =: δ for l = 1, ..., k, be a partition of the interval [t˜, T ]. Suppose Firm i can only make decisions
at {tl}kl=0 in the interval [t˜, T ]. Let {a¯tl}k−1l=0 and {atl}k−1l=0 be the corresponding upper and lower
optimal cut-offs, respectively, and Gδ(a) be Firm i's probability of discovering no innovation with
a value above a in an interval δ.
At tk−1, for Firm i in a state a, if it stops searching, the expected payoff is P (a); if it continues
searching, the expected payoff is
Gδ(a)P (a) +
∫ 1
a
P (a˜)dGδ(a˜)− δci
=P (a) +
∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δci.
The firm strictly prefers continuing searching if and only if searching in the last period strictly
increases its expected payoff,
eδ(a) :=
∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δci > 0.
eδ(a) strictly decreases in a and eδ(1) ≤ 0. Because eδ(0) can be either negative or positive, we
have to discuss several cases.
Case 1. If eδ(0) < 0, Firm i is strictly better off stopping searching in any state a ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
a¯tk−1 = atk−1 = −1.
Case 2. If eδ(0) = 0, Firm i is indifferent between stopping searching and continuing searching
with 0 as the cut-off, if it is in state 0; strictly prefers stopping searching, if it is in any state above
0. Then a¯tk−1 = 0 and atk−1 = −1.
Case 3. If eδ(0) > 0 ≥ lima→0 eδ(a), Firm i is strictly better off continuing searching in state 0,
but stopping searching once it is in a state above 0. Thus, a¯tk−1 = atk−1 = 0.
Case 4. If lima→0 eδ(a) > 0, then Firm i's is strictly better off stopping searching if it is in a
state above aˆtk−1 and continuing searching if it is in a state below aˆtk−1 , where the optimal cut-off
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aˆtk−1 > 0 is the unique value of a that satisfies,∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δc = 0.
Thus, in this case a¯tk−1 = atk−1 = aˆtk−1 .
Hence, the continuation payoff at tk−1 ≥ 0 for Firm i in a state a ∈ [0, 1] is
ω(a) =
P (a) +
∫ 1
a [P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δc for a < atk−1
P (a) for a ≥ atk−1 .
Then, we look at the time point tk−2. In the following, we argue that a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 . The
argument for atk−2 = atk−1 is very similar and thus is omitted.
First, we show that a¯tk−2 ≤ a¯tk−1 . Suppose a¯tk−2 > a¯tk−1 . Suppose Firm i is in state a¯tk−2 at
time tk−2. Suppose Firm i searches between tk−2 and tk−1. If it does not discover any innovation
with a value higher than a¯tk−2 , then at the end of this period it stops searching and takes a¯tk−2 .
However, a¯tk−2 > a¯tk−1 implies
0 =
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)− δci
<
∫ 1
a¯tk−1
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−1)]dGδ(a˜)− δc ≤ 0.
The search cost is not compensated by the increase in the probability of winning from searching
between tk−2 and tk−1, and thus the firm strictly prefers stopping searching to continuing searching
at time tk−2, which contradicts the assumption that a¯tk−2 is the upper optimal cut-off. Hence, it
must be the case that a¯tk−2 ≤ a¯tk−1 .
Next, we show that a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 .
In Case 1, it is straightforward that Firm i strictly prefers stopping searching at tk−2, since
it is for sure not going to search between tk−1 and tk. Hence, Firm i stops searching before tk−1,
and a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 = atk−2 = atk−1 = −1.
For a¯tk−1 ≥ 0, we prove by contradiction that a¯tk−2 < a¯tk−1 is not possible. Suppose the
inequality holds. If Firm i stops searching at tk−2, it would choose to continue searching at
tk−1, and its expected continuation payoff at tk−2 is ω(a¯tk−2). If the firm continues searching, its
expected continuation payoff is
ω(a¯tk−2) +
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[ω(a)− ω(a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a)− δc. (3.6)
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In Cases 2 and 3, a¯tk−1 = 0 implies a¯tk−2 = −1. Then,∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[ω(a)− ω(a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a)− δci
=
∫ 1
−1
[P (a)]dGδ(a)− δci
=eδ(−1)
≥0
which means that Firm i in state 0 is weakly better off continuing searching between tk−2 and
tk−1, which implies that a¯tk−2 ≥ 0, resulting in a contradiction.
For Case 4, in which a¯tk−1 > 0, we have in (3.6)∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[ω(a)− ω(a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a)
=
∫ a¯tk−1
a¯tk−2
[(
P (a) +
∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)
)
−
(
P (a¯tk−2) +
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)
)]
dGδ(a)
+
∫ 1
a¯tk−1
[
P (a)−
(
P (a¯tk−2) +
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)
)]
dGδ(a)
=
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[
P (a)− P (a¯tk−2)] dGδ(a) + ∫ a¯tk−1
a¯tk−2
[∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)
]
dGδ(a)
−
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)
]
dGδ(a)
=Gδ(a¯tk−2)
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[
P (a)− P (a¯tk−2)] dGδ(a) + ∫ a¯tk−1
a¯tk−2
[∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)
]
dGδ(a)
>0.
Hence, at tk−2 Firm i would strictly prefer continuing searching, which again contradicts the
assumption that a¯tk−2 is the upper optimal cut-off. Consequently, a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 .
By backward induction from tk−1 to t0, we have a¯t0 = a¯tk−1 . Taking the limit we get
a¯t = lim
δ→0
a¯T−δ =: a¯ for all t ∈ [0, T ).
Similarly,
at = lim
δ→0
aT−δ =: a for all t ∈ [0, T ).
In addition, a¯ 6= a when and only when a¯ = 0 and a = −1.
As a consequence, Firm i's best response is not to search, if a¯ = a = −1; to continue searching
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if it is in a state below a¯ and to stop searching once the firm in a state above a¯, if a¯ = a ≥ 0.
In brief, the above property is proved by backward induction. Take Case [ii] for example. If
at the last moment a firm is indifferent between continuing and stopping searching when it is in
a certain state, which means the increase in the probability of winning from continuing searching
equals the cost of searching, and therefore there is no gain from searching. Immediately before the
last moment the firm should also be indifferent between continuing searching and not given the
same state. This is because, if the firm reaches a higher state from continuing searching, it weakly
prefers not to search at the last moment, and thus the increase in the probability of winning from
continuing searching at this moment equals the cost of searching as well. By induction, the firm
should be indifferent between continuing and stopping searching in the same state from the very
beginning.
In Case [iii], Firm i generally has uncountably many best response strategies. By Assump-
tion 3.1, we rule out most strategies and consider only two natural strategies: not to search at all
and to search with 0 as the cut-off.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose a firm's initial state is 0, and she searches with a cut-off aˆ ≥ 0. Then, the
firm's probability of ending up in a state below a ∈ [0, 1] at time T is
Z(a|aˆ, T ) =

0 if a = 0
e−λT [1−F (a)] if 0 < a ≤ aˆ
e−λT [1−F (aˆ)] +
[
1− e−λT [1−F (aˆ)]] F (a)−F (aˆ)1−F (aˆ) if a > aˆ.
1−e−λT [1−F (aˆ)] is the probability that the firm stops searching before time T, and F (a)−F (aˆ)1−F (aˆ) is
the conditional probability that the innovation above the threshold the firm discovers is in between
aˆ and a.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. For a = 0, it is clear that Z(a|aˆ, T ) = 0.
For 0 < a ≤ aˆ,
Z(a|aˆ, T ) =
∞∑
l=0
e−λT (λT )l
l!
F l(a) = e−λT [1−F (a)].
For a > aˆ, we approximate it by a discrete time model. Let {tl}kl=0, where 0 = t0 < t1 < ... <
tk = T , be a partition of the interval [0, T ], and let δl = tl − tl−1 for l = 1, 2, ..., k. Define pi as
‖ pi ‖= max
1≤l≤k
|δl|.
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Then,
Z(a|aˆ, T ) =Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) + lim
‖pi‖→0
k∑
l=1
Z(a|aˆ, tl−1)
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−λδl(λδl)n
n!
[Fn(a)− Fn(aˆ)]
]
=Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) + lim
‖pi‖→0
k∑
l=1
e−λtl−1[1−F (aˆ)]λe−λδl
(
[F (a)− F (aˆ)] +O(δl)
)
δl
=Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) +
∫ T
0
λe−λt[1−F (aˆ)][F (a)− F (aˆ)]dt
=Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) +
[
1− e−λT [1−F (aˆ)]
] F (a)− F (aˆ)
1− F (aˆ) ,
where the second term on the right hand side of each equality is the firm's probability of ending
up in a state between aˆ and a. The term Z(aˆ|aˆ, tn) used here is a convenient approximation when
δl is small. The second equality is derived from the fact that
∞∑
n=2
(λδl)
n
n!
[Fn(a)− Fn(a∗)] < λ
2δ2l
2(1− λδl) = o(δl).
Lemma 3.6. Given a > a′, Z(a|a˜, T )− Z(a′|a˜, T )
1. is constant in a˜ for a˜ ≥ a;
2. strictly decreases in a˜ for a˜ ∈ (a′, a);
3. strictly increases in a˜ for a˜ ≤ a′.
This single-peaked property says that the probability of ending up in a state between a′ and a
is maximized if a firm chooses strategy a′.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. First, we show that 1−e
−λTx
x strictly decreases in x over (0, 1] as follows.
Define s := λT and take x1, x2, 0 < x1 < x2 ≤ 1, we have
1− e−sx1
x1
>
1− e−sx2
x2
,
implied by
∂(1− e−sx1)x2 − (1− e−sx2)x1
∂s
= x1x2(e
−sx1 − e−sx2) ≥ 0 (= 0 iff s = 0) and
(1− e−sx1)x2 − (1− e−sx2)x1 = 0 for s = 0.
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Next, define x := 1− F (a), x′ := 1− F (a′), and x˜ := 1− F (a˜). We have
Z(a|a˜, T )− Z(a′|a˜, T ) =

e−λTx − e−λTx′ for a˜ ≥ a
(1− e−λTx′)− (1− e−λT x˜)xx˜ for a˜ ∈ (a′, a)
(1− e−λT x˜)x′−xx˜ for a˜ ≤ a′.
It is independent of a˜ for a˜ ≥ a, strictly increasing in x˜ and thus strictly decreasing in a˜ for a˜ ≤ a′,
and strictly decreasing in x˜ and thus strictly increasing in a˜ for a˜ ≤ a′.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose Firm j with initial state 0 plays a strategy aˆj. Then, the instantaneous
gain on payoff from searching for Firm i in a state a is
λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(ai|aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. For convenience, denote H(a) as Z(a|aˆj , T ) for short. The instantaneous
gain from searching for Firm i in a state ai is
lim
δ→0
(
e−λδH(ai) + λδe−λδ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
+ o(δ)− δc
)
−H(ai)
δ
= lim
δ→0
−(1− e−λδ)H(ai) + λδe−λδ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
+ o(δ)− δc
δ
= lim
δ→0
−λδe−λδH(ai) + λδe−λδ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
+ o(δ)− δc
δ
=− λH(ai) + λ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
− c
=λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(ai|aˆj , T )] dF (a)− c.
3.A.2 Proofs for the Benchmark Case
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We prove the theorem case by case.
Case[i]. When Firm i does not search, Firm j's best response is to search with cut-off 0. For
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ) ≤ c, when Firm j searches with any cut-off aj ≥ 0, Firm i's best response is not to
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search, since the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i in state 0 is
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|aj , T )dF (a)− c
≤λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|0, T )dF (a)− c
=λ
∫ 1
0
[
e−λT + (1− e−λT )F (a)]dF (a)− c
=λ
[
e−λT +
1
2
(1− e−λT )
]
− c
=
1
2
λ(1 + e−λT )− c
≤0 (= 0 iff 1
2
λ(1 + e−λT ) = c),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.6. Hence, there are two pure strategy equilibria,
in each of which one firm does not search and the other firm searches with 0 as the cut-off, and if
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ) = c there is also an equilibrium in which both firms search with 0 as the cut-off.
Case [ii]. First, we show that any strategy with a cut-off value higher than zero is a dominated
strategy. When Firm j does not search, Firm i prefers searching with 0 as the cut-off to any
other strategy. Suppose Firm j searches with aˆj ≥ 0 as the cut-off. The instantaneous gain from
searching for Firm i in a state ai > 0 is
λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(ai|aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c
≤λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|ai, T )− Z(ai|ai, T )]dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1− e−λT )[1− F (ai)]2 − c
<0,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.6. Hence, once Firm i is in a state above 0, it
has no incentive to continue searching any more. In this case, Firm i prefers either not to conduct
any search or to search with 0 as the cut-off to any strategy with a cut-off value higher than zero.
Second, we show that the prescribed strategy profile is the unique equilibrium. It is sufficient
to show that searching with 0 as the cut-off is the best response to searching with 0 as the cut-off.
Suppose Firm j searches with 0 as the cut-off, the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i
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in state a = 0 is
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|0, T )dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1 + e−λT )− c
>0.
That is, Firm i is strictly better off continuing searching if it is in state 0, and strictly better
off stopping searching once it is in a state above 0. Hence, the prescribed strategy profile is the
unique equilibrium.
Case [iii]. First, we prove that among the strategy profiles in which each firm searches with a
cut-off higher than 0, the prescribed symmetric strategy profile is the unique equilibrium. Suppose
a pair of cut-off rules (a∗1, a∗2), in which a∗1, a∗2 > 0, is an equilibrium, then Firm i in state a∗i is
indifferent between continuing searching and not. That is, by Lemma 3.7, we have
λ
∫ 1
a∗i
[
Z(a|a∗j , T )− Z(a∗i |a∗j , T )
]
dF (a)− c = 0. (3.7)
Suppose a∗1 6= a∗2. W.l.o.g., we assume a∗1 < a∗2. Then,
c =λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗1, T )]dF (a) = c
resulting in a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that a∗1 = a∗2.
Next, we show the existence of equilibrium by deriving the unique equilibrium cut-off value
a∗ := a∗1 = a∗2 explicitly. Applying Lemma 3.5 to (3.7), we have
λ
∫ 1
a∗
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
] F (a)− F (a∗)
1− F (a∗) dF (a) = c
⇔1
2
[1− F (a∗)]
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
]
=
c
λ
. (3.8)
The existence of a solution is ensured by the intermediate value theorem: when F (a∗) = 1,
the term on the left hand side of (3.8) equals to 0, smaller than cλ ; when F (a
∗) = 0, it equals to
1−e−λT
2 , larger than or equals to
c
λ . The uniqueness of the solution is insured by that the term on
the left hand side of the above equality is strictly decreasing in a∗.
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Second, we show that there is no equilibrium in which one firm searches with 0 as the cut-off.
Suppose Firm j searches with 0 as the cut-off. The instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i
in a state ai > 0 is
λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(ai|0, T )]dF (a)− c
=λ
∫ 1
ai
(1− e−λT )[F (a)− F (ai)]dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1− e−λT )[1− F (ai)]2 − c, (3.9)
which is positive when ai = 0 and negative when ai = 1. By the intermediate value theorem, there
must be a value aˆi > 0 such that (3.9) equals 0 when ai = aˆi. Hence, Firm i's best response is to
search with aˆi as the cut-off. However, if Firm i searches with aˆi as the cut-off, it is not Firm j's
best response to search with 0 as the cut-off, because
0 =
∫ 1
aˆj
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆj |0, T )]dF (a)− c
<
∫ 1
aˆj
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(aˆj |aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c
<
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(0|aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c,
which means that Firm j strictly prefers continuing searching when it is in a state slightly above
0.
Last, we show that there is no equilibrium in which one firm does not search. Suppose Firm j
does not search. Firm i's best response is to search with 0 as the cut-off. However, Firm j then
strictly prefers searching when it is in state 0, since the instantaneous gain from searching for the
firm in state 0 is again
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|ai, T )dF (a)− c > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The expected total cost of a firm who searches with a cut-off a ≥ 0 is
c
[∫ T
0
∂(1− Z(a|a, t))
∂t
tdt+ TZ(a|a, T )
]
=(1− e−λT [1−F (a)]) c
λ[1− F (a)] , (3.10)
which strictly increases in a. In Regions 2 and 3, in equilibrium, the probability of winning for
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each firm is
1
2
[1− Z2(0|a∗(c, T ), T )]
=
1
2
(1− e−2λT ), (3.11)
and thus the expected payoff to each firm is the difference between the expected probability of
winning (3.11) and the expected search cost (3.10), setting a to be a∗(a, T ):
1
2
(1− e−2λT )− (1− e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))]) c
λ[1− F (a∗(c, T ))] . (3.12)
The limit of (3.12) as T approaches infinity is 0.
3.A.3 Proofs for the Head Start Case
First, we state two crucial lemmas for the whole section.
Lemma 3.8.
1. For aI1 > a
∗(c, T ), not to search is Firm 1's strictly dominant strategy.
2. For aI1 = a
∗(c, T ), not to search is Firm 1's weakly dominant strategy. If Firm 2 searches
with cut-off aI1, Firm 1 is indifferent between not to search and search with a
I
1 as the cut-off;
Otherwise, Firm 1 strictly prefers not to search.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Suppose Firm 2 does not search, Firm 1's best response is not to search.
Suppose Firm 2 searches with cut-off a2 ≥ aI1. If Firm 1 searches with cut-off a1 ≥ aI1, following
from Lemma 3.6, the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm 1 in any state a1 ≥ aI1 ≥ a∗(c, T )
is
λ
∫ 1
a1
[Z(a|a2, T )− Z(a1|a2, T )]dF (a)− c
≤λ
∫ 1
a∗(c,T )
[Z(a|a∗(c, T ), T )− Z(a∗(c, T )|a∗(c, T ), T )]dF (a)− c, (3.13)
where equality holds if and only if a1 = a2 = a∗(c, T ). The right hand side of inequality (3.13) is
less than or equal to 0 (it equals to 0 iff c ≥ 12λ[1− e−λT ]). Hence, the desired results follow.
Lemma 3.9.
1. For aI1 > F
−1(1− cλ), not to search is Firm 2's strictly dominant strategy.
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2. For aI1 = F
−1(1 − cλ), not to search is Firm 2's weakly dominant strategy. If Firm 1 does
not search, Firm 2 is indifferent between not to search and search with any aˆ2 ∈ [aI2, aI1] as
the cut-off. If Firm 1 searches, Firm 2's strictly prefers not to search.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. If Firm 1 does not search, the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm
2 in a state a2 ≤ aI1 is
lim
δ→0
λδe−λδ[1− F (aI1)] + o(δ)− cδ
δ
= λ[1− F (aI1)]− c
< 0 in Case [1]= 0 in Case [2].
If Firm 1 searches, Firm 2's instantaneous gain is even lower. Hence, the desired results follow.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. [1],[2], and [3] directly follow from Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9. We only need
to prove [4] and [5] in the following.
[4]. Following Lemma 3.8, if Firm 2 searches with cut-off aI1, Firm 1 has two best responses:
not to search and search with cut-off aI1. If Firm 1 searches with cut-off a
I
1, the instantaneous gain
from searching for Firm 2 is
λ
∫ 1
aI1
Z(a|aI1, T )dF (a)− c
=λ
∫ 1
aI1
[
e−λT [1−F (a
I
1)] + (1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)])F (a)− F (a
I
1)
1− F (aI1)
]
dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1 + e−λT [1−F (a
I
1)])[1− F (aI1)]− c
>λ[1− F (aI1)]− c
>0
if it is in a state a2 < aI1 = a
∗(c, T ); it is
λ
∫ 1
a2
[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(a2|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c < 0
if it is in a state a2 > aI1 = a
∗(c, T ). Hence, the two prescribed strategy profiles are equilibria.
[5]. First, there is no equilibrium in which either firm does not search. If Firm 2 does not
search, Firm 1's best response is not to search. However, if Firm 1 does not search, Firm 2's best
response is to search with cut-off aI1 rather than not to search. If Firm 2 searches with cut-off a
I
1,
then not to search is not Firm 1's best response, because the instantaneous gain from searching
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for Firm 1 in state aI1 is
λ
∫ 1
aI1
[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(aI1|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)])[1− F (aI1)]− c
>0,
where inequality holds because aI1 < a
∗(c, T ).
Next, we argue that there is no equilibrium in which either firm searches with cut-off aI1.
Suppose Firm i searches with cut-off aI1. Firm j's best response is to search with a cut-off aˆj ∈
[aI1, a
∗(c, T )). This is because the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm j in a state a′ ≥ aI1
is
λ
∫ 1
a′
p2[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(a′|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c. (3.14)
(3.14) is larger than 0 when a′ = aI1. It is less than 0 if a′ = a∗(c, T ), because by Lemma 3.6 we
have
λ
∫ 1
a∗
p2[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(a∗|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c
<λ
∫ 1
a∗(c,T )
[Z(a|a∗(c, T ), T )− Z(a∗|a∗(c, T ), T )]dF (a)− c
=0.
Then, the intermediate value theorem and the strict monotonicity yield the unique cut-off value
of aˆj ∈ (aI1, a∗(c, T )).
However, if Firm j searches with cut-off aˆj ∈ [aI1, a∗(c, T )), Firm i's best response is to search
with a cut-off value aˆi ∈ (aˆj , a∗(c, T )) rather than aI1, because the instantaneous gain from search-
ing for Firm i in a state a˜ is
λ
∫ 1
a˜
[Z(a|aˆ1, T )− Z(a˜|aˆ1, T )]dF (a)− c
< 0 for a˜ = a∗(c, T )> 0 for a˜ = aˆ1
and it is monotone w.r.t. a˜. This results in contradiction. Hence, there is no equilibrium in which
either firm searches with aI1 as the cut-off.
Last, we only need to consider the case in which each firm searches with a cut-off higher than
aI1. Following the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have (a
∗(c, T ), a∗(c, T )) being
the unique equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2. We apply Theorem 3.2 here for the analysis. We only need to show
the case for aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1 − cλ)). In this case, Firm 1 does not to search and Firm 2
searches with aI1 as the cut-off. Now, take the limit a
I
1 → a∗(c, T ) from the right hand side of
a∗(c, T ). In the limit, where Firm 2 searches with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off, Firm 1 weakly prefers
not to search. If aI1 = a
∗(c, T ), Firm 1 is actually indifferent between searching and not. Hence, a
head start in the limit makes Firm 1 weakly better off. Firm 1's payoff when it does not search is
e−λT [1−F (aI1)], the probability of Firm 2 ending up in a state below aI1, is strictly increasing in aI1.
Hence, a higher value of the head start makes Firm 1 even better off.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. [1]. For T being small, a∗(c, T ) = 0. DM (0, aI1) = 0, and the partial
derivative of DM (T, aI1) w.r.t. T when T is small is
∂DM (T, aI1)
∂T
= λ(1− aI1)e−λT (1−a
I
1)[1− c
λ(1− aI1)
]− λe−2λT + ce−λT ,
which equals to −λaI1 < 0 at the limit of T = 0.
[2]. Follows from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. DM (T, aI1) is strictly decreasing in a
I
1, and it goes to the opposite of
(3.12), which is less than 0, as aI1 goes to F
−1(1− cλ), and
(1− e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))])− 1
2
(1− e−2λT ) (3.15)
as aI1 goes to a
∗(c, T ). Hence, if (3.15) is positive, Case 1 yields from the intermediate value
theorem; Case 2 holds if (3.15) is negative.
3.A.4 Proofs for the Extended Models
Proof of Proposition 3.7. We argue that, to determine a subgame perfect equilibrium, we only
need to consider two kinds of strategies profiles:
a Firm 1 retains its initial innovation and does not search, and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the
cut-off;
b Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and searches with aI2 as the cut-off, and Firm 2 retains
its initial innovation.
First, suppose c < λ2 (1+e
−λT ). If Firm 1 retains the initial innovation, it will have no incentive
to search, and Firm 2 is indifferent between discarding the initial innovation and not. In either
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case, Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off. Given that Firm 1 has discarded its initial innovation,
Firm 2 has no incentive to discard its initial innovation as shown in Proposition 3.2.
Second, suppose c > λ2 (1 + e
−λT ). In the subgame in which both firms discard their initial
innovation, there are two equilibria, in each of which one firm searches with 0 as the cut-off and
the other firm does not search. Hence, to determine a subgame perfect equilibrium, we have to
consider another two strategy profiles, in addition to [a] and [b]:
c Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and searches with 0 as the cut-off, and Firm 2 discards
its initial innovation and does not search.
d Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and does not search, and Firm 2 discards its initial
innovation and searches with 0 as the cut-off.
However, we can easily rule out [c] and [d] from the candidates for equilibria. In [c], Firm 2
obtains a payoff of 0. It can deviate by retaining its initial innovation so as to obtain a positive
payoff. Similarly, in [d], Firm 1 can deviate by retaining its initial innovation to obtain a positive
payoff rather than 0.
Last, it remains to compare Firm 1's payoff in [a] and [b]. In [a], Firm 1's payoff is
e−λT [1−F (a
I
1)]. (3.16)
In [b], it is
(1− e−λT [1−F (aI2)])(1− c
λ[1− F (aI2)]
). (3.17)
The difference between these two payoffs, (3.17) and (3.16), is increasing in T , and it equals
−1 when T = 0 and goes to 1− c
λ[1−F (aI2)]
> 0 as T approaches infinity. Hence, the desired result
is implied by the intermediate value theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. The backward induction is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.7,
and thus is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. The equilibrium for the subgame starting from time t0 derives from
Theorem 3.2. Suppose at time t0, Firm i is in a state a0i , where max{a01, a02} ≥ aI1. Assume
a0i > a
0
j . If a
0
i > F
−1(1− cλ), then Firm i obtains a continuation payoff of 1, and Firm j obtains 0.
If a0i ∈ (a∗(c, T − t0), F−1(1− cλ)), then Firm i obtains a continuation payoff of e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
0
i )],
and Firm j obtains (1− e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a0i )])(1− c
λ[1−F−1(a0i )]
).
To prove this result, we first show that not to search before t0 is Firm 2's best response
regardless of Firm 1's action before time t0. It is equivalent to showing that not to search before
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t0 is Firm 2's best response if Firm 2 knows that Firm 1 is definitely going to be in any state
a01 ≥ a∗L at time t0.
As we have shown before, for any a01 ≥ (>)F−1(1− cλ), Firm 2 (strictly) prefers not to conduct
searching before time t0.
If a01 ∈ [a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)), Firm 2's unique best response before time t0 is not to search. The
instantaneous gain from searching at any time point before t0 for Firm 2 in a state below a01 is
λ
[
[1− F (F−1(1− c
λ
))] +
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
a01
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)
− [1− F (a01)](1− e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
0
i )])(1− c
λ[1− F−1(a0i )]
)
]− c
=λ
[ ∫ F−1(1− cλ )
a01
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)
− [1− F (a01)](1− e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
0
i )])(1− c
λ[1− F−1(a0i )]
)
]
,
which is strictly negative when T − t0 is sufficiently large, and thus conducting a search before
time t0 actually makes Firm 2 strictly worse off in this case.
Next, we show that Firm 1's best response before time t0 is to search with F−1(1 − cλ) as
the cut-off, if Firm 2 does not search before t0. To see this, look at the instantaneous gain from
searching for Firm 1 in a state below F−1(1− cλ):
λ
[
[1− F (F−1(1− c
λ
))]
+
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
aI1
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)− [1− F (aI1)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
I
1)]
]− c
=
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
aI1
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)− [1− F (aI1)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
I
1)]
>
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
a˜
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)− [1− F (a˜)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (aI1)]
>(1− c
λ
− F (a˜))e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a˜)] − [1− F (a˜)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (aI1)]
=e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
I
1)][1− c
λ
− F (a˜)]
(
eλ(T−t0)[F (a˜)−F (a
I
1)] − 1− F (a˜)
1− cλ − F (a˜)
)
,
where a˜ is any value in (aI1, F
−1(1 − cλ)). The term on the right hand side of the last equality is
strictly positive if T − t0 is sufficiently large. Hence, the desired result yields.
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3.A.5 Proofs for the Case with Asymmetric Costs
Proposition 3.12. If 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1 − e−λT ) there exists a pure strategy equilibrium (a∗1,
a∗2) with a∗1, a∗2 ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.12. We prove the existence of equilibrium by applying Brouwer's fixed
point theorem. First, same as in the previous proofs, if Firm j searches with a cut-off aˆj ≥ 0, the
instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i in state 0 is
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|1, T )− ci > 0,
and thus Firm i is better off continuing searching if it is in state 0.
Next, let us define for each Firm j a critical value
αj = sup{aj ∈ [0, 1] | I(0|αj , ci) = λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|αj)− Z(0|αj)]dF (a)− ci > 0}.
Suppose there is a αj ∈ (0, 1) such that
I(0|αj , ci) = λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|αj)− Z(0|αj)]dF (a)− ci = 0.
For any aˆj ∈ [0, αj ],
I(0|aˆj , ci) ≥ 0 and
I(1|aˆj , ci) < 0.
By the intermediate value theorem and the strict monotonicity of Q(a|aˆj , ci) in a, there must exist
a unique a˜i ∈ [0, 1) such that
I(a˜i|aˆj , ci) = 0.
That is, if Firm j searches with cut-off aˆj , Firm i's best response is to search with cut-off a˜i.
For any aˆj ∈ (αj , 1], if the set is not empty,
I(0|aˆj , ci) < 0.
That is, Firm i's best response is to search with cut-off 0.
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Then, we could define two best response functions BRi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] where
BRi(aˆj) :=
0 for aˆj ∈ (αj , 1] if it is not emptya˜i where I(a˜i|aˆj , ci) = 0 for aˆj ∈ [0, αj ].
It is also easy to verify that BRi is a continuous function over [0, 1]. Hence, we have a continuous
self map BR : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 where
BR = (BR1, BR2)
on a compact set, and by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, there must exist of a pure strategy
equilibrium in which each Firm searches with a cut-off higher than or equal to 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.10. First, using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.1,
we claim that if there exists an equilibrium it must be the case that each firm searches with a
cut-off higher than or equal to 0 with one strictly positive value for one firm.
Next, we show that there can be no equilibrium in which Firm 2 searches with a cut-off aˆ2 > 0
and Firm 1 searches with cut-off 0. Such a strategy profile (0, aˆ2) is an equilibrium if and only if
λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆ2, T )− Z(0|aˆ2, T )]dF (a)− c1 ≤ 0, and
λ
∫ 1
aˆ2
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆ2|0, T )]dF (a)− c2 = 0.
However,
0 = λ
∫ 1
aˆ2
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆ2|0, T )]dF (a)− c2
< λ
∫ 1
aˆ2
[Z(a|aˆ2, T )− Z(aˆ2|aˆ2, T )]dF (a)− c2
< λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆ2, T )− Z(0|aˆ2, T )]dF (a)− c1 ≤ 0,
resulting in a contradiction.
Next, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilirbium in
which Firm 2 searches with a cut-off 0 and Firm 1 searches with a cut-off strictly higher than 0.
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A pair of cut-off rules (aˆ1, 0), aˆ1 > 0, is an equilibrium if and only if
λ
∫ 1
aˆ1
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆ1|0, T )]dF (a)− c1 = 0 and (3.18)
λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆ1, T )− Z(0|aˆ1, T )]dF (a)− c2 ≤ 0, (3.19)
where
(3.18)⇔1
2
λ(1− e−λT )[1− F (aˆ1)]2 − c = 0⇔ aˆj = F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1− e−λT )
)
. (3.20)
Then, (3.20) and (3.19) together imply that (aˆi, 0) is an equilibrium if and only if
I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1− e−λT )
)
, c2
)
≤ 0. (3.21)
We will see that if (3.21) holds there is no other equilibrium.
When (3.21) does not hold, there is a unique equilibrium, in which each firm searches with a
cut-off strictly higher than 0. Because by Proposition 3.12 an equilibrium must exists. Let (a∗1, a∗2)
be such an equilibrium. We first show that a∗1 > a∗2 must hold by proof by contradiction, and then
we show that it must be a unique equilibrium. Such a pair (a∗1, a∗2) is an equilibrium if and only if
λ
∫ 1
a∗i
[Z(a|a∗j , T )− Z(a∗i |a∗j , T )]dF (a) = ci for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. (3.22)
Suppose a∗1 ≤ a∗2. Applying Lemma 3.6, we have
c1 =λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
≥λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
≥λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗1, T )]dF (a) = c2,
resulting in a contradiction.
Then, we show the uniqueness of the equilibrium for Cases [1] − [3] by contradiction. For
Case [1] we show that the solution to (3.22) is unique, and for Cases [2] and [3] we show that
there can be no equilibrium in which each firm searches with a cut-off higher than 0 coexisting
with equilibrium
(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
. We can prove all of them together. Suppose there
are two equilibria (a∗1, a∗2) and (a˜∗1, a˜∗2), where (a∗1, a∗2) is a solution to (3.22) and (a˜∗1, a˜∗2) is either
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(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
or a solution to (3.22). It is sufficient to show that the following two
cases are not possible:
1. a˜∗1 > a∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0 and
2. a∗1 > a˜∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0.
Suppose a˜∗1 > a∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0. Applying Lemma 3.6 we have
0 =λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)− c1
<λ
∫ 1
a˜∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a˜∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)− c1
<λ
∫ 1
a˜∗1
[Z(a|a˜∗2, T )− Z(a˜∗1|a˜∗2, T )]dF (a)− c1 = 0,
resulting in a contradiction.
Suppose a∗1 > a˜∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0. Applying Lemma 3.6 again, we have
0 ≥λ
∫ 1
a˜∗2
[Z(a|a˜∗1, T )− Z(a˜∗2|a˜∗1, T )]dF (a)− c2
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a˜∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a˜∗1, T )]dF (a)− c2
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗1, T )]dF (a)− c2 = 0,
resulting in another contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.11. For fixed c2 we have
∂a∗2
∂a∗1
= −
∂
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗1
∂
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗2
=
∫ 1
a∗2
∂[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]
∂a∗1
dF (a)
∂Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )
∂a∗2
< 0.
Then,
∂a∗1
∂c1
= − −1
λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[
∂[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]
∂a∗2
∂a∗2
∂a∗1
− ∂Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )a∗1
]
dF (a)
< 0 and
∂a∗2
∂c1
=
∂a∗2
∂a∗1
∂a∗1
∂c1
> 0.
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For fixed c1 we have
∂a∗1
∂a∗2
= −
∂
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗2
∂
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗1
=
∫ 1
a∗1
∂[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]
∂a∗2
dF (a)
∂Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )
∂a∗1
> 0.
Then,
∂a∗2
∂c2
= − −1
λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[
∂[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]
∂a∗1
∂a∗1
∂a∗2
− ∂Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )a∗2
]
dF (a)
< 0 and
∂a∗1
∂c1
=
∂a∗1
∂a∗2
∂a∗2
∂c2
< 0.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Prize Structures in Elimination Contests
4.1 Introduction
Many real-life interactions among different agents such as elections, the implementation of inno-
vations, promotion tournaments and sports can be well described and analyzed through contest
models. Many contests involve multiple stages where the number of agents compete at successive
stages until the winner is finally determined. The most prominent model sharing this feature is the
sequential elimination contest, which is commonly known from playoff rounds in sports competi-
tions. This model is also a good description of many corporate tournaments where employees from
low hierarchical levels compete for promotions to higher hierarchical levels. This contest structure
is also found in politics, where candidates compete in localized contests and where the winners
subsequently often compete against each other at higher levels. R&D can also be described by
such tournaments, where the firm with the most efficient technology wins the market1.
In this chapter, we look for the optimal prize structure of a sequential elimination contest
that maximizes the profit of the designer. Existing literature mainly considers the objective
of maximizing agents' efforts in the tournament (usually either the average level or the effort
in the final round). The prize pool is usually assumed to be a fixed amount of money, which
can be distributed to the agents according to their performance. We think that this is a suitable
assumption for one-stage simultaneous tournaments, but in multi-stage tournaments, the designer's
valuation of various stages may differ. Thus, we allow for an arbitrary form of the designer's
objective. We assume that agents' efforts at different stages produce the output according to some
output function, which defines how exactly the designer values various combinations of efforts at
different stages. In our model, the prize pool is not fixed, as the designer can pay the contestants
1An example of multi-stage R&D contest is Pre-commercial Procurement used in EU. Here, firms participate
in a R&D multi-stage contest where competing projects are evaluated phase-by-phase (e.g., proposal, prototype,
testing) and competitors are eliminated sequentially (European Comission, 2007)
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any amount of money. The designer's problem is to choose the prize structure that maximizes the
designer' profit, which is the difference between the value of the produced output and the value
of the prizes distributed to the agents. This problem can be seen in many real-life applications.
For example, the owners of a firm care about their profit, not the average level of effort applied
by the workers. Moreover, they can value the efforts of workers at higher positions more than
the efforts of those at lower positions(a higher position means a later stage in our model). As we
show, in this case, the optimal prize structure would drastically differ from the one that is optimal
when the average level of efforts is maximized. Hence, the results obtained in the literature for
multi-stage elimination under the objective of total (or average) effort maximization are not valid
in the general case. For example, in his classical paper, Rosen (1986) shows that the optimal prize
structure is linear with a bigger prize gap in the final round. Our results show that this is not true
in general. The prize structure can be not only concave or convex but also non-monotone.
We find that depending on the output function various prize structures might be optimal. The
prize at the first stage is always negative, and thus, it is essentially an entry fee. The equilibrium
level of effort is efficient and by appropriate choice of entry fee, the designer is able to extract
the full surplus. The structure of other prizes can differ substantially depending on the output
function. We consider an example of a sport tournament to illustrate the result when the prize
structure is increasing. We also provide an example in which the output function depends only on
one parameter, where for various values of this parameter five types of prize structures might be
optimal: (1) increasing concave prize structure, (2) increasing linear prize structure, 3) Increasing
convex prize structure, 4) winner-take-all structure, and (5) decreasing prize structure with the
big prize to the winner. The last case with negative prize differences is the most interesting of
all cases. It turns out that if the designer values efforts at each stage much more than the efforts
at the previous stage, the difference between the prizes at these stages could be negative. Thus,
the participants who survive longer may receive smaller prizes than those eliminated at the earlier
stages. We refer to this structure as a trap structure. Since non-monotonicity of prize structures
with respect to stages is new in the contests literature, we study this issue in detail and provide
sufficient conditions for both monotonicity and non-monotonicity of prize structures.
Decreasing prize structures are not observed in real-life direct contests very often. One possible
explanation is that they require unlimited liability and substantial payments from participants.
It may not be feasible to make such contracts in real-life contests. However, in indirect real-life
contests, that is situations that are not directly tournaments but can be thought as tournaments,
"prizes" can be decreasing. The following story may be an example of such situation. Students who
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are interested in careers in academia participate in a real-life contest called getting tenured. This
contest can be seen as a multi-stage elimination tournament where the stages are: 1) Undergrad-
uate, 2) Master, 3) PhD, 4) Junior faculty and 5) Tenured faculty. One may agree that the prize
when an average student is eliminated at stage 1)gets an average job for an undergraduatemay
be higher than the prize he gets when he is eliminated at stage 4) as it could be difficult for an
untenured researcher to get a good job in industry2.
We also investigate the possible optimal types of prize structure shapes. We find that any
shape with increasing prizes would be optimal for some specific designer's preferences over stages.
This result says that apriori the designer cannot favor any particular class of prize structures, for
example convex, concave, or linear. Specific valuations of different stages by the designer should
be taken into account.
Then, we consider the case of limited liability when the designer is not allowed to allocate
negative prizes. Hence, the obtained optimal prize structure is not feasible in this case. We add
one more degree of freedom for the designer, in which she can optimize. Not only is optimization
with respect to the prize structure available, but also the choice of a contest success function (CSF)
is possible. It means that at each stage, she can specify the probability of an agent moving to the
next stage depending on realized efforts. The important result here is that it is still possible to
implement efficiency and extract full surplus from agents even with limited liability by choosing
CSF in a special way from the class of Tullock functions. With this additional degree of freedom,
it is possible to avoid non-monotone structures. The optimal prize structure would be always
increasing.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a literature review. Then,
we describe our main model and solve for the optimal prize structure. Next, we investigate some
properties of the solution and provide an example to illustrate the solution. Then we show that
any increasing shape of prize structure may be optimal for a certain designer's valuation of stages.
Finally, we consider the limited liability case and allow the designer to choose a CSF. The last
section concludes and summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
The literature about tournaments, for example, that concerning lottery contests, R&D, patents,
or innovation implementation, is surveyed by Konrad et al. (2009) in detail. The classic work that
describes simple tournaments is Lazear and Rosen (1981). They consider the case of the simple
2I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this example.
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simultaneous one-stage tournament and compare rank-order wage schemes with wages based on
individual output and find that for risk-neutral agents, both wage schemes allocate resources in
an efficient way. The playoff or elimination tournaments considered in this chapter were analyzed
for the first time in Rosen (1986), to which this chapter is largely related. While Rosen (1986)
describes a double-elimination tournament with multiple stages, we allow for a multi-elimination
tournament; in other respects, the contest architecture is the same in both studies. Further,
different from this chapter, in Rosen (1986) there is a fixed prize pool. The designer's objective is
simply to maximize the same constant level of effort of all agents through the tournament. He has
found that the optimal incentive scheme is such that the difference between prizes at all stages is
the same. That is, the optimal prize growth is linear. It is true for all stages except the last one.
Since the contest will not continue, the prize spread between the first and the second places should
be significantly larger compared with the prize spreads between the final and the semi-final, the
semi-final and the quarter-final, and so on. It is also never optimal to pay losers in the first round
because it lowers their incentives to put forth an effort. The result of this work is a particular
case of our study in which the output function is simply a sum of all efforts. In other cases, the
optimal prize structure seriously differs from Rosen's optimal structure. We show that the optimal
prize structure strongly depends on the output function and that only in a separable linear case
it coincides with Rosen's optimal structure.
Skaperdas (1996) gives an axiomatic characterization of contest success functions. Under a
set of reasonable axioms the probability that an individual i wins a contest has a form f(xi)∑
j f(xj)
,
where xj is the effort of individual j. We use such functions in our model. Clark and Riis (1998)
generalize Skaperdas results for the asymmetric setting.
Further, there are several papers that study the efficiency in contests. Chung (1996) discusses a
rent-seeking model where productive efforts increase the single rent for which agents compete. He
considers a winner-take-all contest with linear costs. For this setup, he shows that the equilibrium
efforts are always greater than socially optimal ones. However, this is not the case in this chapter
because efforts in our model do not increase prizes directly and all agents are assumed to be risk-
neutral. Hence, in our setting the designer is always able to implement the efficient level of effort
and extract the whole rent from the contestants.
There are several papers where optimal prize structures in simultaneous one-stage contests are
considered. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that for convex cost functions it is optimal to give
positive prizes not only to the winner, although for concave and linear cost functions, the winner-
take-all structure is optimal. In a similar framework, Shaffer (2006) compares payoffs and efforts
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arising from exogenously given prizes with those from effort-dependent prizes. Cohen and Sela
(2007) characterize the optimal effort-dependent prize structure in the one-stage all-pay auction
setup. Depending on the designer's objective, they find that the optimal reward may decrease or
increase with the players' efforts.
Schweinzer and Segev (2012) analyze simultaneous Tullock contests. They give necessary and
sufficient conditions under which there is an equilibrium under the winner-take-all structure and
show that if it exists, then it is unique. If it does not exist, they construct a prize structure with
several prizes, under which an equilibrium exists. Though we consider a multi-stage tournament
instead of a simultaneous tournament, the condition for the existence of a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium is the same.
Though the architectural structure of the contest and the number of stages are fixed in this
chapter, there are several papers that consider the question of optimal tournament design. Fu
and Lu (2012) show that for a fixed prize pool and a linear cost function, under the objective
of maximization of the total effort, the optimal structure is such that at each state only one
contestant is eliminated until the final, and the single winner takes over the entire prize. However,
in this chapter, we show that for a classical elimination tournament, the winner-take-all structure
is almost never optimal unless the cost function is linear. Gradstein and Konrad (1999) allow the
designer to choose the number of stages in a contest and the way the agents are matched. They
show that the optimal number of stages crucially depends on the particular Tullock function.
The role of punishment (negative prize) for losers in a one-stage tournament was discussed in
Moldovanu et al. (2012) and Thomas and Wang (2013). The multi-stage contests considered in
this chapter allow allocating negative prizes not only to the losers but also to the contestants who
have been successful in every stage but one. Thus, in the optimum, we obtain not only negative
prizes for the losers at the first stage, but actually decreasing and non-monotone prize schemes.
Kolmar and Sisak (2014) analyze the public good provision by heterogeneous players. The
contest prizes are financed from taxation. This is similar to our model because, at each stage in
our model, the prizes are paid from the revenue, generated by the agents. Kolmar and Sisak show
how multiple prizes can be used to achieve efficiency.
Further, there are several papers, such as Gürtler and Kräkel (2010), Parreiras and Rubinchik
(2010), Ryvkin (2007) that consider tournament settings with heterogeneous agents. We discuss
complications which arise in our model if we allow for heterogeneity of agents.
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4.3 Main Model
The tournament begins with mN players and proceeds sequentially through N stages. At each
stage, all participants who survived up to the current stage are randomly selected into groups.
They compete within groups, and only one winner from each group moves to the next stage. This
situation is well-known for m = 2, which is the case of football playoffs and tennis tournaments.
Winners move to the next round and losers are eliminated from the subsequent play. In the next
round other groups are randomly drawn, and again, half of the participants are excluded from
further competition. In a general case there are mN+1−n agents at the stage n who are distributed
to mN+1−n/m = mN−n groups. Each agent competes in a group of m contestants. The top
prize WN+1 is awarded to the winner of the final match, who has won N matches overall. Other
finalists, that is losers at the final stage, are awarded the second place and get the prize WN for
having won N − 1 stages and losing the last one. In earlier stages, all participants eliminated at
the same stage get equal prizes. We denoteWn as the prize for the losers at stage n.We emphasize
that each agent receives exactly one prize only at the stage where he is eliminated.
In our main model equally talented players are considered. The probability of agent i moving
to the next round P (xi,n,x−i,n) is the function of an agent's level of effort xi,n at that stage and
a vector of effort levels of competitors x−i,n in the same group. It is assumed to be symmetric,
increasing in xi,n and decreasing in each component of x−i,n. In this section the probability of
winning a match at some particular stage is assumed to be the following Tullock function:
P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
xai,n
xai,n +
∑
j 6=i
xaj,n
,
where a > 0 is a constant parameter and the sum is taken across contestants in the group with
agent i. In real life this means that there are some observable characteristics that are connected
with levels of effort and show whose effort is higher, but not perfectly.
Here we come to the crucial part of our model, namely, the output function, which determines,
how the designer values agents' efforts at different stages. Denote xn = (xi,n,x−i,n) as a vector
of agents' efforts at stage n. Let Π(x1, ...,xN ) be some concave, increasing in each component,
continuously differentiable output function of efforts that is symmetric with respect to different
efforts at the same stage. We emphasize that the output function is not necessarily separable with
respect to effort levels at different stages. In the existing literature, only specific examples are
considered. For example, the designer's objective is to maximize either the level of effort at the
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final or the average level of effort through the whole tournament. In this chapter, we characterize
the optimal prize structure for a general form of an output function.
When the prize structure is announced, agents choose their efforts by considering the an-
nounced prize structure. If the prize structure Ω = {W1, ...,WN ,WN+1} is announced, the profit
of the designer corresponds to the difference between the output produced by the agents and the
total amount of prizes.
Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))− (
∑
n
(mN+1−n −mN−n)Wn +WN+1). (4.1)
At each stage, every player who has survived up to this point chooses his effort. However,
applying the level of effort x is accompanied by the costs equal to C(x) = xγ , γ > 0. A player's
decision of how much effort to spend in any match depends on a cost-benefit analysis. Higher
effort increases the probability of winning this match and moving to the next stage but involves
higher costs.
We assume that the efforts of contestants are socially desirable. In orther words, we assume
that there exists a unique positive vector of levels of efforts at all stages, xe, that maximizes the
social surplus, that is, xe = arg maxx{Π(x1, ...,xN )−
∑
n
∑
j
C(xj,n)}, which can be found from the
first-order condition:
∂Π(xe1, ...,x
e
N )
∂xi,n
= C ′(xen). (4.2)
Suppose that some prize structure Ω is announced. Denote Vn as the value of participation
in the tournament for every player at stage n. Since all players are assumed to be symmetric,
this value of participation is equal for all players. It consists of two components. The first one
is the prize, which is earned if the match is lost, and the player is eliminated. This event occurs
with the probability 1 − P (xi,n,x−i,n). The other is the value of moving to the next stage if the
match is won. The probability of this event is P (xi,n,x−i,n). Either way, he also incurs costs
of effort C(xi,n). Instead of participation in the contest, agents can choose not to participate at
all, which brings them reservation utility 03. We assume unlimited liability in this section, that
is, the designer is able to allocate negative prizes for agents, provided that their participation
constraint holds. Agents are assumed to be risk-neutral4. The solution concept is a sub-game
3Instead of 0 it could also be some positive number uR. All results are largely the same, with the only change
being a parallel shift of the whole prize structure upwards. The shape of the prize structure and the differences
between prizes remain unchanged.
4For risk-averse agents, we can use the similar techniques by using a concave function U(W ) instead of W and
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perfect equilibrium. We also restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. Therefore, we can
write the agent's problem recursively as follows:
Vi,n = max
xi,n≥0
(1− x
a
i,n
xai,n +
∑
j 6=i
xaj,n
)Wn +
xai,n
xai,n +
∑
j 6=i
xaj,n
Vi,n+1 − C(xi,n). (4.3)
4.4 Solution and Main Results
4.4.1 Solution to agents' problem
We start with the solution to the agents' problem (4.3). Existence of symmetric equilibria with a
positive level of effort depends on the relation between γ and a. The solution is described in the
following lemma. Index i is skipped because we consider a symmetric solution. We use ∆Wn to
denote the prize spread between prizes at stages n and n+ 1, that is ∆Wn = Wn+1 −Wn.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that
N∑
j=n
κj−n∆Wj ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N.
If a > mm−1γ there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
If a ≤ mm−1γ there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies such that the level of
effort x∗n at stage n, given the prize structure Ω, does not depend on the prizes at all earlier stages
and increases with an increase in the prize difference at that stage and at all later stages with
decreasing weights:
γm2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
n) = ∆Wn + κ∆Wn+1 + κ2∆Wn+2 + ...+ κN−n∆WN , (4.4)
where κ = (γ−a)m+a
γm2
,
and x∗n = 0 if ∆Wn + κ∆Wn+1 + κ2∆Wn+2 + ...+ κN−n∆WN < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
If the condition on prize differences (
N∑
j=n
κj−n∆Wj ≥ 0 for each n) does not hold, the levels
of efforts will be zero at all stages, where
N∑
j=n
κj−n∆Wj < 0. However, as we show below, when
the designer chooses the optimal structure, this is never the case and the efficient level of efforts
is implemented.
Lemma 4.1 can be used to find the optimal prize scheme. From this moment we consider only
the case a ≤ mm−1γ, when the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
∆U(Wn) = U(Wn+1)− U(Wn) instead of ∆Wn = Wn+1 −Wn in what follows. However, the efficiency is lost and
the characterization of the optimal prize structure would be more complex.
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4.4.2 Designer's problem
The designer knows how agents choose efforts (from Lemma 4.1). Thus, she maximizes the profit,
given by expression (4.3), subject to the agents' participation constraint. Thus, the designer's
problem can be written by using prize spreads in the following way:
Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))−mNW1 −(
∑
n
mN−n∆Wn) =⇒ max
Ω
, (4.5)
s.t.V1 > 0.
Solving this problem, we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. The optimal prize structure implements the efficient level of efforts in the
equilibrium at all stages, i.e., x∗n = xen for each n.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
The result is intuitive since there is no private information and the agents are risk neutral. One
can also notice that if the designer does not value efforts at some stage at all, then the equilibrium
level of efforts in that stage would be equal to zero.
If we take the equilibrium levels of efforts from Proposition 1 and rewrite equations (2.12), we
can formulate the following result:
Proposition 4.2. The optimal prize structure satisfies the following:
W1 = − γκm
2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
1)q,
∆Wn =
γm2
a(m− 1)(C(x
∗
n)− κC(x∗n+1)), n 6= N, (4.6)
∆WN =
γm2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
N ),
where {x∗n} satisfies:
∂Π(x∗1, ...,x∗N )
∂xi,n
= C ′(x∗n).
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
This result suggests that the prize structure must be constructed as follows. First, the prize
at the first stage is always non-positive and depends on the efficient level of efforts at this stage.
Thus, we can think about it as the entry fee. It is used in order to extract the full rent from the
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agents5. Next, the optimal prize spread at some particular stage depends on the efficient level of
effort at that stage and the next stage. The higher the desirable level of effort at some stage is,
the higher the optimal difference in prizes between this and the next stage is. The effect of the
efficient level of effort at the next stage is opposite. A higher efficient level of effort at the next
stage implies smaller prize difference at the current stage. If the difference between efficient levels
of effort is not too large or simply negative (i.e. efficient level of efforts is decreasing), the prize
structure is increasing because C(x∗n) − κC(x∗n+1) > 0. However, if the efficient level of efforts
at the next stage is much higher, then prize spread would be necessarily negative. Finally, the
difference in prizes for the winner and other finalists is necessary positive. Hence, we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. 1. The optimal prize structure is monotone and increasing with respect to
stages if and only if C(xen) ≥ κC(xen+1) for n = 1, ..., N − 1.
2. If at some stage the efficient level of effort is much lower than that at the next stage, namely
C(xen) < κC(xen+1), the optimal prize at the next stage must be lower than the current prize:
Wn+1 < Wn.
Since κ = (γ−a)m+a
γm2
< γm
γm2
= 1m in order to satisfy C(x
e
n) < κC(xen+1), the efficient level
of effort at stage n + 1 must be much higher. The intuition behind this result is that negative
prize difference at the current stage, which makes the next prize lower, will also put agents in the
situation where they strongly do not want to lose at the next stage. Otherwise, they would simply
prefer taking the prize of the current round and not going further. The prize for the winner would
be so big that every agent would benefit from going further and being closer to it, even if the prize
structure decreases at some point. Indeed,
Vn − Vn−1 = (1− κ)
N∑
k=n−1
κk−n+1∆Wk =
(1− κ)γm2
a(m− 1) C(x
∗
n−1) ≥ 0. (4.7)
We can show also that the prize for the winner is always the biggest prize. Indeed, the sum of
later prize spreads starting from any stage is positive:
5If reservation utility is greater than zero uR > 0, then the expression for the prize at the first stage in Propo-
sition!4.2 must be changed to W1 = uR −∑
n
κn∆Wn. Essentially, this is a parallel shift of the optimal prize
structure.
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N∑
k=n
∆Wk =
N−1∑
k=n
γm2
a(m− 1)(C(x
∗
n)− κC(x∗n+1)) +
γm2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
N ) =
=
N∑
k=n+1
γm2
a(m− 1)(1− κ)C(x
∗
k) +
γm2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
n) ≥ 0.
4.4.3 Example of a sport tournament
Consider pairwise elimination tournament with 2N players that proceeds sequentially through N
stages. For example, if N = 4 we have 16 players who play firstly eighth-finals, then quarter-finals,
then semi-finals, and the final at the last stage. According to this scheme the playoff rounds of
many sports are conducted. Assume that there is a representative fan, who wants to buy a ticket
for each match at each stage and has the following utility function:
U(xn, n) = xn
√
n− pn, (4.8)
where xn is the average level of effort in a match and pn is the price at the stage n. We multiply
efforts at stage n on a square root of n to reflect the importance of later stages. The cost function is
C(x) = x2. CSF has the following form: P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
xi,n
xi,n+
∑
j 6=i
xj,n
The contest designer extracts
full surplus from a fan and charges pn = xn
√
n. Thus, the output function Π(x1, ...,xN ) =∑N
n=1 2
N−nxn
√
n. Proposition 4.1 implies that the equilibrium level of effort coincides with the
efficient one xen = arg maxxn≥0(xn
√
n − 2x2n) = 0.25
√
n. Thus, the equilibrium level of effort
increases in later stages with a speed of
√
n. Applying Proposition 4.2 and considering that γ = 2,
a = 1, m = 2, and κ = 3/8 we have the following optimal prize structure:
W1 = − 3
16
,
∆Wn =
5n− 3
16
, n 6= N,
∆WN = N/2.
Going back from differences to levels we have W1 = − 316 , W2 = − 116 , W3 = 38 , ...,Wn =
(5n−11)n
32 , ...,WN+1 =
(5N+5)N
32 . Thus, the prizes at the first and the second stages are negative,
and then, it grows with an increasing rate of order n2. In this example of a sport tournament, the
prize structure is strictly increasing everywhere. However, we can construct a simple example to
illustrate that it is not always true.
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4.4.4 Example with different optimal structures
In this section, we provide a simple but rich enough example to illustrate different optimal struc-
tures.
Suppose that the output function has the following form:
Π(.) =
∑
n
(λn
∑
i
xi,n), λ > 0.
Costs are quadratic:
C(x) = x2
Thus, the designer cares about the average level of efforts at different stages. The parameter
λ determines the weights she attaches to different stages.
Then, we can apply Proposition 4.2 and get the following optimal prize structure:
∆Wn =
m2
m− 1
λ2n
2
(1− κλ2), n 6= N,
∆WN =
m2
m− 1
λ2N
2
.
Now we consider several cases for the parameter λ :
1. λ < 1 (Figure 4.1). In this case, the designer values the later stages less than the earlier
stages. The optimal prize structure is increasing (1− κλ2 > 0) and concave (λ2n decreases
with larger values of n, and hence, ∆Wn falls)6.
Figure 4.1: Concave prize shape
6At the last stage, the prize structure is not necessary concave.
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2. λ = 1 (Figure 4.2). All stages are equally important. The optimal prize structure is linearly
increasing with a jump in the final (∆Wn = const > 0, n 6= N). This result is the case
of Rosen (1986), where the designer maximizes the same average level of effort during the
tournament.
Figure 4.2: Linear prize shape
3. 1 < λ <
√
1
κ (Figure 4.3). The designer values the later stages more, but not drastically.
The optimal prize structure is increasing (1−κλ2 > 0) and convex (λ2n increases with larger
values on n, and hence, ∆Wn increases).
Figure 4.3: Convex prize shape
4. λ =
√
1
κ (Figure 4.4). The optimal prize structure is winner-take-all (all prize spreads equal
to zero ∆Wn = 0, except the first and the last stages). Further, there are several papers
where the winner-take-all structure turns out to be optimal in other settings (Krishna and
Morgan, 1998, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).
5. λ >
√
1
κ (Figure 4.5). The designer values the later stages drastically more than the earlier
ones. As 1− κλ2 < 0, the prize spread ∆Wn should be negative for all intermediate stages
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Figure 4.4: Winner-take-all
of the tournament. Therefore, the optimal prize structure is decreasing, with a large final
prize being awarded to the winner. This is an example of a "trap structure". When the
designer values each subsequent stage much more than the previous one, her valuation of
the final is so high that she tries to make the gap between the prize for the winner and
prizes for the other finalists as high as possible. Thus, using negative prize differences - and,
hence, negative prizes - the designer puts agents in a situation where they are punished more
if they go closer to the final and lose there. At the later stages, stakes become extremely
large, which enforces very high levels of efforts, as is needed by the principal. Though the
prizes become more negative and agents who survive longer obtain smaller prizes at all stages
except the final, the value from surviving until the later stages increases because the agent
gets closer to the final prize.
Figure 4.5: Trap
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4.4.5 (Non-)Monotonicity of prize structures
In the previous discussion, we have shown that optimal prize structures may vary a lot. In other
words, the shape of a prize structure may not be only convex or concave but even non-monotone
or decreasing. Here, we consider the case of a separable output function and directly address the
question of monotonicity, not in terms of the efficient level of efforts but in terms of the output
function.
We assume here that the output function is separable with respect to different stages, that
is, Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω)) =
∑
n
Πn(xn(Ω)).
7 To begin with, suppose that ∂Πn(x,...,x)∂xn ≥
∂Πn+1(x,...,x)
∂xn+1
for any x, which means that efforts at earlier stages are more important for the designer than at
later stages. Then, the equilibrium level of efforts falls during the contest and γm
2
a(m−1)(C(x
∗
n) −
κC(x∗n+1)) ≥ 08. Hence, all prize spreads are non-negative and the prize structure is increasing.
However, in real-life situations, this assumption usually does not hold. Thus, we need to consider a
more plausible case where ∂Πn(x
∗
n)
∂xn
<
∂Πn+1(x∗n+1)
∂xn+1
, that is, efforts at later stages are more important
than at the earlier ones. This is a natural assumption in many real-life situations such as corporate
tournaments and sports tournaments. For example, in application to a firm, this would mean
that the activities of workers at higher levels of corporate hierarchies are more important than
the activities of those at lower ones. In a sport tournament, the assumption means that the
performance of contestants in last rounds is valued more than in the early ones. This case is not
only the most reasonable but also the most interesting one: the prize structure is not necessarily
monotone here.
The main result here is that if the valuations of effort do not increase too much from each stage
to the next stage, and, simultaneously, the output function is concave enough, then the optimal
prize structure is always non-decreasing. The inverted conditions together serve as sufficient
conditions for "trap" structures. The exact statement is the following9:
Proposition 4.3. 1. If ∂Πn+1(x,...,x)∂xn+1 ≤ 1κ
∂Πn(x,...,x)
∂xn
and x∂Πn(x,...,x)∂xn is decreasing for all x and
n, then the optimal prize structure is increasing at all stages. If the inequality is strict and
x∂Πn(x,...,x)∂xn is strictly decreasing, then the optimal prize structure is strictly increasing.
2. If at some stage n, the opposite holds, that is, ∂Πn+1(x,...,x)∂xn+1 ≥ 1κ
∂Πn(x,...,x)
∂xn
and x∂Πn(x,...,x)∂xn is
7In many real-life applications, this is a reasonable assumption. For example, it is natural to assume that
for sports events the revenues from selling tickets on semi-final matches do not depend on the teams' efforts in
quarter-finals.
8As ∂Πn(.)
∂xi,n
= C′(x∗n), a decrease of the derivative of the output function would lead to a decrease of the
equilibrium level of efforts.
9For simplicity of notations we skip index i because all agents are treated in the same way.
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increasing for all x, then the optimal prize is decreasing at stage n. If the inequality is strict
and x∂Πn(x,...,x)∂xn is strictly increasing then the optimal prize is also strictly decreasing at this
stage. Hence, the optimal prize structure would be non-monotone10.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
However, these conditions are only sufficient, not necessary conditions.11 The most interesting
finding is in the second part of this proposition, which implies that if the designer values some
stage sufficiently higher than the previous one, the prize at this stage must be lower than the
prize at the previous stage. The intuition here is similar to the intuition in the 5th case of the
example. Agents react to the prize spreads at all later stages. By decreasing prize at some stage,
the designer is able to increase efforts applied at that stage.
4.4.6 Variability of optimal prize structures
As we have seen in an example, many shapes of prize structures can be optimal for specific output
functions. Here, we show that the class of prize structures that may be optimal is very large.
In fact, any increasing shape is optimal for some output function. To show it we start with the
following observation:
Claim 4.1. For any levels of efforts x1, ..., xN there exists an output function such that these effort
levels are implemented in equilibrium under the optimal prize structure.
Proof. Consider some arbitrary levels of efforts x1, ...xN at different stages. Then we can notice
that for these efforts there exists a separable output function Π(x1, ...,xN ) =
∑
n
Πn(xn) such that
these efforts would be implemented in equilibrium under the optimal prize structure. For each
xn we can find a concave, increasing in each component, continuously differentiable symmetric
function Πn(xn) :
∂Πn(xn,...,xn)
∂xn
= C ′(xn). Then, by Proposition 4.1, x1, ...xN are implemented in
the equilibrium under the optimal prize structure.
Thus, any levels of efforts may arise as the equilibrium levels of efforts for a particular prize
structure.
Now, consider some increasing shape of a prize structure, that is, {∆W1, ...,∆WN} such that
∆Wn ≥ 0. For this prize shape construct effort levels at different stages by the following recursive
procedure:
10This is because the prize difference in the final is always positive.
11See our previous example
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xN : C(xN ) =
a(m− 1)
γm2
∆WN ,
xN−1 : C(xN−1) =
a(m− 1)
γm2
∆WN−1 + κC(xN ),
...
xn : C(xn) =
a(m− 1)
γm2
∆Wn + κC(xn+1),
...
The construction is valid because ∆Wn ≥ 0 implies that xn are nonnegative. By Claim 4.1 there is
an output function such that these levels of efforts are the equilibrium ones under the optimal prize
structure. Note also that the constructed efforts and the given prize shape satisfies the system
(4.6). Hence, by Proposition ?? it is the optimal shape, that is, ∆W ∗n = ∆Wn for any stage n.
Thus, we can formulate the following result.
Proposition 4.4. For any increasing shape of prize structure ∆W1, ...∆WN ≥ 0, there exists an
output function Π(x1, ...,xN ) such that this prize shape is optimal.
There are two important things that we should mention in relation to this result. The first
one is that this result is about the optimality of the prize structure shape and not the prize
structure itself. That is, we do not state anything concerning prize W1 for the losers of the
first stage. Second, since our recursive procedure has to generate non-negative values of efforts,
a(m−1)
γm2
∆Wn+κC(xn+1) has to be positive. A sufficient condition for this is positive prize spreads
∆Wn ≥ 0. Thus, for some decreasing prize structures, this procedure would not work. Thus,
although the set of prize structures that might be optimal is large which includes all increasing
prize structures, a non-monotone prize structure can always be suboptimal.
4.5 Limited liability and the optimal CSF
From the previous discussion we know that the optimal prize at the first stageW1 = − γm2a(m−1)C(x∗1)
is always non-positive (and even negative if the designer values the efforts at the first stage). We
have already seen that in some cases the optimal prize structure is decreasing at some stages and,
hence, non-monotone. In many real-life situations, negative or decreasing prizes are not feasible.
In this section, we impose one additional restriction on the optimal prize structure, namely, limited
liability. It means that the designer is not allowed to make prizes negative. Thus, the optimal
prize structure under unlimited liability is not feasible under limited liability. The main result here
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suggests that if the sufficient conditions as in Proposition 3 hold, then the optimal prize structure
would be close to the optimal one in the case of unlimited liability with only one change at the
first stage. That is, W1 = 0 and
∂Π(.)
∂xi,n
= ma(m−1)γC
′(x∗n) and the rest remains the same. However,
since the efficient level of effort is not implementable anymore, the profit of the principal reduces
in comparison with the case of unlimited liability.
Now, we show how the designer can implement the efficient levels of efforts and extract the full
surplus from contestants if she is given one more degree of freedom with respect to the construction
of a contest. We assume that the designer not is only free to choose a prize structure but also
can implement any CSF. In modeling real-life situations, this can sometimes be a reasonable
assumption. If we consider a sport tournament, it is hard to believe that the designer can somehow
affect the probability of a win, provided that rules of a game are given. However, if we consider
a promotion tournament, the owner of a firm can make decisions about the way of competition
between workers, and our assumption is much more plausible here.
In this section, we can drop our previous assumption about the particular form of the cost
function. Thus, instead of C(x) = xγ , in this part, it can be any cost function C(x) such that
equation (4.2) has the unique interior solution.
In the previous sections, CSF was assumed to be the following Tullock function: P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
xai,n
xai,n+
∑
j 6=i
xaj,n
. We have shown that if degree of convexity of a cost function xγ is low, that is
a > mm−1γ, it is not possible to induce positive efforts in a symmetric equilibrium. However,
if the designer can choose a contest success function, then, as we show below, for any cost function
she is able to implement the efficient level of efforts in the equilibrium. Moreover, this function
can be found in the class of Tullock functions: P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
f(xi,n)
f(xi,n)+
∑
j 6=i
f(xj,n)
.
Thus, in this section, we ask the following question: if the designer could choose any P (xi,n,x−i,n),
which one is better in the sense of maximizing the profit under limited liability?
Let us suppose that we can find some CSF that satisfies the following condition for every e > 0:
P ′xi,n(e, e)
P (e, e)
=
C ′(e)
C(e)
. (4.9)
Then, using the similar arguments as in the previous section, we can write the following system
of equations, which defines our optimal prize structure and the equilibrium after choosing a CSF
satisfying (4.9):
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∂Π(.)
∂xi,n
= C ′(x∗n),
W1 = 0,
∆Wn = mC(x
∗
n).
We can now see that all efforts at all stages are efficient, and the designer is still able to extract
the whole surplus from the agents without allocating negative prizes. Hence, any probability
function that satisfies (4.9) would be an optimal CSF. We can also notice that any optimal CSF
does not depend on the output function Π(.). Thus, irrespective of how the principal values efforts
of agents, she should choose the same CSF at all stages.
We have not shown yet the existence of such probabilistic functions that satisfy (4.9). Now, we
demonstrate that such a function always exists. That is, for any cost function C(x) we can find
a contest success function from the class of Tullock functions P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
f(xi,n)
f(xi,n)+
∑
j 6=i
f(xj,n)
,
which satisfies sufficient condition (4.9).
Lemma 4.2. For any function C(x) take f(x) = C
m
m−1 (x). Then P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
f(xi,n)
f(xi,n)+
∑
j 6=i
f(xj,n)
satisfies the following condition:
P ′xi,n (e,e)
P (e,e) =
C′(e)
C(e) .
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
This lemma shows how the optimal CSF is constructed. Thus, the following must be true:
Proposition 4.5. The following structure of the elimination contest is optimal:
1. P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
f(xi,n)
f(xi,n)+
∑
j 6=i
f(xj,n)
, where f(x) = C
m
m−1 (x)
2. W1 = 0, ∆Wn = mC(x
∗
n),
where x∗n :
∂Π(.)
∂xi,n
= C ′(x∗n).
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
This is our main result here. We can compare it with Proposition 4.2. If the designer is
able to choose the CSF, then the optimal prize structure is always non-decreasing and satisfies
the limited liability requirement. Thus, there is no need to implement "trap" and other non-
monotone structures. The intuition behind this result is that the optimal CSF makes agents
indifferent between participation at each stage and choosing zero level of effort. Hence, at each
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stage, Vn = Wn. If we compare this to the results from the previous section we see that, in fact,
the whole dynamic structure of the tournament is broken because the value of participation at
each stage equals the prize at that stage. Therefore, for contestants, this tournament is equivalent
to participation in a sequence of independent one-stage tournaments. Thus, the prize difference
must be non-negative at each stage because this prize difference is equivalent to the prize in the
particular one-stage tournament.
If designer's valuation of effort is increasing with later stages, then the optimal prize structure
would be convex because prize spreads, ∆Wn = mC(x∗n), would be increasing. In our opinion,
this explains why one can observe convex prize structures very often in real-life tournaments.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we considered elimination contests and studied how the optimal prize structure
depends on the objective of the designer. Efforts of agents at different stages of a tournament
generate output for the principal according to some output function. Depending on this function
we characterized the optimal prize structure in the tournament that gives the highest profit for
the designer. We showed that the optimal prize structure is also efficient. Sometimes, the optimal
prize structure is non-monotone if the designer's valuation of efforts at some stage is much higher
than that at the previous stage. To illustrate the variability of optimal structures we gave a
simple example where different prize structures were optimal, depending on one parameter. Some
of these structures have already been characterized as optimal in the existing literature; however,
this is not the case for non-monotone and decreasing prize schemes. For example, under the "trap"
structure, prizes for agents are smaller at the later stages than at the earlier ones. If the prize
at the first stage is negative, it means that all prizes at all later stages would also be negative,
except the prize for the winner of the tournament. Further, we provided necessary and sufficient
conditions for the optimality of non-monotone structures.
In addition, we considered the case of limited liability, where the designer is not able to offer
negative prizes but is free to choose a contest success function. We showed that though prizes
cannot be negative, the optimal choice of CSF enables us to implement efficient levels of efforts
and extract the full surplus with only positive prizes. The optimal CSF does not depend on the
output function. Thus, irrespective of how the principal values efforts at different stages, it is
optimal to choose the same CSF.
The assumptions about the constant rate of elimination, equal cost functions and contest
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success function at all stages make it possible to get an analytical solution for the optimal prize
structure in the form as in Proposition 4.2. It would be interesting to consider a model with
heterogeneous agents. Unfortunately, due to increased complexity of the model, we are unable
to obtain the analytical results for this case. The problem is that if agents are ex-ante different,
the continuation payoff depends on the current opponent's type and on all other competitors'
types. Hence, Proposition 4.1 does not hold anymore and the equilibrium levels of efforts are
different from the efficient ones. However, the logic of the analysis suggests that non-monotone
prize structures would be optimal also for a setup with heterogeneous agents. Further, there is no
reason to think that relaxing assumptions or considering heterogeneous agents would help avoid
non-monotone and decreasing prize structures in the optimum.
4.A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1. First, assume that the solution to the agent's problem is interior. We
prove that the conditions for that are exactly those as specified in the statement of this lemma.
Differentiating (2.1) with respect to xi,n for 1 ≤ n ≤ N, we get the first-order condition:
F.O.C.:
axa−1i,n
∑
j 6=i
xaj,n(
xai,n +
∑
j 6=i
xaj,n
)2 (Vi,n+1 −Wn) = C ′(xi,n).
In the symmetric equilibrium we skip index i later and thus have:
Vn+1 −Wn = m
2
m− 1
x∗n
a
C ′ (x∗n) =
m2
m− 1
γ
a
C (x∗n) . (4.10)
Taking C(x∗n) from the previous equation and substituting it into the value function we get
the following difference equation for Vn:
Vn =
m− 1
m
Wn +
1
m
Vn+1 − m− 1
m2
Vn+1 −Wn
γ/a
.
Writing it recursively we get
Vn+1 −Wn = ∆Wn + κ∆Wn+1 + κ2∆Wn+2 + ...+ κN−n+1∆WN , (4.11)
where κ = (γ−a)m+a
γm2
.
Then,
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m2
m− 1
γ
a
C (x∗n) = Vn+1 −Wn = ∆Wn + κ∆Wn+1 + κ2∆Wn+2 + ...+ κN−n+1∆WN .
Obviously, the level of efforts does not depend on prizes at the previous stages and is greater than
zero if ∆Wn + κ∆Wn+1 + κ2∆Wn+2 + ...+ κN−n+1∆WN > 0.
Now, we show, when the interior solution is an equilibrium, that is:
x∗n ∈ Argmax
xn≥0
{(1− x
a
n
xan + (m− 1)(x∗n)a
)Wn +
xan
xan + (m− 1)(x∗n)a
Vn+1 − C(xn)}.
Consider the case a = mm−1γ. Then, κ = 0, Vn = Wn, Vn+1 −Wn = mC(x∗n). Hence, we need to
show that
x∗n ∈ Argmax
xn≥0
{ x
a
n
xan + (m− 1)(x∗n)a
mC(x∗n)− C(xn)}.
Denote
Qn(xn) :=
xan
xan + (m− 1)(x∗n)a
mC(x∗n)− C(xn).
Notice that Qn(x∗n) = 0. Hence, we need to show that Qn(xn) ≤ 0 for all xn > 0. Denote
xan = f(xn). Then we need to show that
mf(xn)C(x
∗
n)− f(xn)C(xn)−mC(xn)f(x∗n) + f(x∗n)C(xn) ≤ 0.
If a = mm−1γ then f(xn) = C
m
m−1 (x). Hence, the last inequality can be rewritten as
(mC(x∗n)− C(xn))C
1
m−1 (xn)− (m− 1)C(x∗n)C
1
m−1 (x∗n) ≤ 0.
The derivative of the left-hand side is equal to the following expression:
m
m− 1C
′(xn)C
1
m−1 (xn)
C(x∗n)− C(xn)
C(xn)
.
For xn < x∗n, this expression is positive. For xn > x∗n, it is negative. Hence, Qn(xn) attains
maximum at xn = x∗n, which guarantees that the interior stationary point is a global maximizer.
However, it is not a unique maximizer. Since Vn = Wn, applying x∗n gives the same payoff as
applying zero level of effort at each stage.
Next, in the case a < mm−1γ we have κ > 0. By the similar arguments, the interior solution to
F.O.C. would be a unique global maximizer.
Now, we show that if a > mm−1γ, there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. If it
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exists, then continuation values satisfy (4.11). Since we supposed that
N∑
j=n
κj−n∆Wj ≥ 0, equality
(4.11) implies that Vn+1−Wn ≥ ∆Wn. On the other hand, since a > mm−1γ we have κ < 0. Hence,
the same equality (1.13) implies Vn+1 < Wn+1. Hence, we obtain a contradiction which means
that there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. From the proof of Lemma 4.1, we know that
V1 = W1 +
∑
n
κn∆Wn.
Hence, we can rewrite the designer's problem (4.5) as
Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))−mNW1 − (
∑
n
mN−n∆Wn) =⇒ max
Ω
,
s.t.W1 +
∑
n
κn∆Wn ≥ 0.
We can notice that the participation constraint must be binding because otherwise, it would
be possible to decrease W1 and increase the profit. Considering this, we can substitute W1 =
−∑
n
κn∆Wn into the profit function:
Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN(Ω)) +m
N
∑
n
κn∆Wn − (
∑
n
mN−n∆Wn) =⇒ max
Ω
First, we note that from Lemma 4.1 for any 1 ≤ n ≤ N the following is true:
∂x∗n
∂∆Wn
=
a(m− 1)
m2γC ′(x∗n)
.
Next, we take first-order conditions:
∂
∂∆Wn
: mN+1−n
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n
∂x∗n
∂∆Wn
+
+mN+1−(n−1)
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n−1
∂x∗n−1
∂∆Wn
+
+...+mN
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,1
∂x∗1
∂∆Wn
= mN−n −mNκn,
125
∂∂∆Wn−1
: mN+1−(n−1)
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n−1
∂x∗n−1
∂∆Wn−1
+ ...+
+ mN
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,1
∂x∗1
∂∆Wn−1
= mN−(n−1) −mNκn−1.
As we have already noticed,
∂x∗n−1
∂∆Wn−1
=
a(m− 1)
m2γC ′(x∗n−1)
.
Using Lemma 4.1 we can get the following:
∂x∗n−1
∂∆Wn
= κ
a(m− 1)
m2γC ′(x∗n−1)
= κ
∂x∗n−1
∂∆Wn−1
.
Substituting the last expression into the F.O.C. we obtain
mN+1−n
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n
a(m− 1)
m2γC ′(x∗n)
+ κ(mN−(n−1) −mNκn−1) =
= mN−n −mNκn.
Hence,
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n
= C ′(x∗n).
This holds for every n 6= 1.
For n = 1 the following holds:
mN
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,1
∂x∗1
∂∆W1
= mN−1 − κmN .
Hence,
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,1
=
mN−1 − κmN
mN
∗ m
2γC ′(x∗1)
a(m− 1) = C
′(x∗1).
The only thing we need to explain is why the F.O.C. gives us the optimum. The equilibrium
under the proposed prize structure coincides with the social optimum, that is x∗ = xe, and
simultaneously, the designer is able to extract full surplus from agents. Hence, the obtained prize
structure is optimal.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2. The expressions for the equilibrium effort levels follow from Propo-
sition 4.1.
Then, for any 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, we can express ∆Wn by using the expression for two consequent
effort levels from Lemma 4.1:
∆Wn =
γm2
a(m− 1)(C(x
∗
n)− κC(x∗n+1)), n 6= N
∆WN =
γm2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
N )
For W1 we have the following from the previous equations and the proof of Proposition 4.1:
W1 = −
∑
n
κn∆Wn =
= − γm
2
a(m− 1)
[
κNC(x∗N ) +
N−1∑
n=1
κn(C(x∗n)− κC(x∗n+1))
]
= − γκm
2
a(m− 1)C(x
∗
1)
Proof of Proposition 4.3. From Proposition 4.2 for n 6= N and a separable output function
∆Wn =
γm2
a(m− 1)(C(x
∗
n)− κC(x∗n+1)), n 6= N,
∂Πn(.)
∂xn
= C ′(x∗n).
The second equality can be equivalently rewritten as
x∗n
∂Πn(.)
∂xn
= γC(x∗n).
Assume that properties in part (1) hold in a non-strict sense. Then, we have
C(x∗n) = x
∗
n
∂Πn(x
∗
n, ..., x
∗
n)
∂xn
/γ ≥ κx∗n
∂Πn+1(x
∗
n, ..., x
∗
n)
∂xn+1
/γ ≥
≥ κx∗n+1
∂Πn+1(x
∗
n+1, ..., x
∗
n+1)
∂xn+1
/γ = κC(x∗n+1).
Thus, ∆Wn ≥ 0 for n 6= N.
In the final ∆WN =
γm2
a(m−1)C(x
∗
N ), which is always non-negative.
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The proof for the case with strict inequalities in part (1) and that for the whole part (2) are
similar.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.
P ′xi,n(e, e)
P (e, e)
=
f ′(e)
∑
j 6=i
f(e)
(f(e) +
∑
j 6=i
f(e))2
/
 f(e)
f(e) +
∑
j 6=i
f(e)
 =
=
m− 1
m
f ′(e)
f(e)
=
m− 1
m
m
m− 1
C
m
m−1−1(e)
C
m
m−1 (e)
C ′(e) =
C ′(e)
C(e)
Proof of Proposition 4.5. The agent's problem is
Vi,n = max
xi,n
(1− P (xi,n,x−i,n))Wn + P (xi,n,x−i,n)Vi,n+1 − C(xi,n).
Let us assume that Vi,n+1 −Wn ≥ 0 and the solution is interior and show later that this is
true. Then,
P ′xi,n(xi,n,x−i,n)(Vi,n+1 −Wn) = C ′(xi).
Denote the interior symmetric solution to this equation by x∗n. Then, it satisfies the following:
P ′xi,n(x
∗
n,x
∗
n)(Vn+1 −Wn) = C ′(x∗n).
From Lemma 4.2 if P (xi,n,x−i,n) =
f(xi,n)
f(xi,n)+
∑
j 6=i
f(xj,n)
, where f(x) = C
m
m−1 (x), then
P ′xi,n (e,e)
P (e,e) =
C′(e)
C(e)
Thus,
P (x∗n,x
∗
n)(Vn+1 −Wn) = C(x∗n).
Then, due to symmetry of the CSF,
C(x∗n) =
1
m
(Vn+1 −Wn).
Substituting this in the value function we obtain
Vn = (1− 1
m
)Wn +
1
m
Vn+1 − 1
m
(Vn+1 −Wn) = Wn.
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Thus, agents' valuations of the participation in each stage would be exactly equal to the prize
at that stage. Thus, this solution coincides with the solution obtained in Lemma 4.1 for a = mm−1γ.
To argue that this interior solution is an equilibrium we could just repeat the argument from the
proof of Lemma 4.1 for a = mm−1γ.
Then,
C(x∗n) =
1
m
(Wn+1 −Wn) = 1
m
∆Wn
Thus, the level of effort at the particular stage depends only on the prize increase at that stage.
Now, the designer can optimize with respect to the prize structure:
Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))−mNW1 − (
∑
n
mN−n∆Wn) =⇒ max
Ω
,
s.t. limited liability: Wi ≥ 0.
We must notice here that the participation constraint is automatically satisfied in the case
with non-negative prizes because agents always have an opportunity to apply zero level of effort.
Now, we assume that there is no limited liability constraint and W1 = 0. If the solution for
this reduced problem satisfies limited liability, we have the solution to the whole problem.
F.O.C. for the reduced problem is
mN+1−n
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n
∂x∗n
∂∆Wn
= mN−n.
The response of the effort to the change of a prize is
∂x∗n
∂∆Wn
=
1
m
1
C ′(x∗n)
.
We substitute the last equation in the F.O.C.
mN+1−n
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n
1
m
1
C ′(x∗n)
= mN−n.
Hence,
∂Π(x1(Ω), ...,xN (Ω))
∂xi,n
= C ′(x∗n).
Thus, the equilibrium effort level is efficient. Simultaneously, the designer obtains the whole
surplus from the agents: V1 = W1 = 0. Thus, we have got the solution to the reduced problem,
which implements the efficient level of effort and extracts the whole surplus. Since all prize spreads
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are non-negative, the limited liability restriction is satisfied. Hence, the reduced solution is also
the solution to the whole problem and the proposed structure is optimal.
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